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Summary and Introduction  
The purpose of this introduction is to summarize the five papers that constitute this thesis. 
Each paper is self-contained and can be read independently of the others but they all 
centers around the same theme; the economics of transport. Papers one and five are 
theoretical dealing with questions related to the theory of taxation. The remaining three 
are empirical and centers on the estimation of car ownership and the use of cars in 
Denmark. 
 
The first paper, Taxation, Time Allocation, and Externalities, derives the optimal tax 
rules in a model of household time allocation and atmospheric externalities based on 
Becker (1965). In a situation without externalities and without distributional 
considerations the optimal tax structure in such a setting is derived in Kleven (2004). We 
extend on his findings in two ways. First, we include atmospheric externalities thus 
generalizing the model making it more in line with the situation found in the transport 
sector. Secondly we allow households to differ and implement a more general social 
welfare function than the one used by Kleven thereby introducing distributional 
considerations in the setup.  
 
We show that the additivity property derived in Sandmo (1975) survives in the present 
setup, even though it has to be modified to cope with distributional issues and time 
allocation. We show that the definition of the net social marginal utility of income 
defined in Diamond (1975) enters the optimal tax formula in a modified form which 
includes income effects on the externality. Since the modified net social marginal utility 
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of income enters the tax formula for both polluting and non-polluting goods the additivity 
property in the pure form, where the tax on non-polluting goods are independent of the 
externality fails. We show that the substitution effects still enters the tax formula for the 
externality generating good in an additive way and the additivity property thus survives 
in a modified form. Furthermore we find that the factor share for the polluting good also 
enters the additive term and the corrective term therefore no longer equals the pigouvian 
marginal cost.  
 
The policy implications of the insights obtained are obvious. As in Kleven (2004) we 
show that fast modes of transport should be taxed less than slow modes and that the 
modified additivity property states that a corrective tax should be levied on the polluting 
good only. The optimal corrective tax is not equal to the pigouvian level found in 
Sandmo (1975) since the time allocation has to be accounted for. If two modes pollute at 
the same level the corrective tax on the fastest mode should be set at a lower rate than the 
one at the slow mode.  
 
The result from this paper addresses the present policy debate regarding taxation of 
aviation fuel according to the emission of greenhouse gasses (CO2). Lately the Danish 
minister of the environment, Connie Hedegaard, has argued that airline traffic should be 
taxed according to the pigouvian principle since it emits large quantities of greenhouse 
gasses compared to car transport. Using the results presented in paper 1 we know that this 
argument is not a clear-cut case. It might be true that airline traffic emit higher quantities 
of greenhouse gasses but it is also true that for many trips it saves time to use airlines 
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instead of cars. Our result states that if the time savings are high enough there is an 
argument for having lower emission taxes on airlines than on cars. How the taxes are to 
be set is an empirical matter which the paper does not address. 
 
The second paper, Estimation of car ownership in Denmark - Discrete choice modeling 
and repeated cross-section analysis, examines the demand for cars in Denmark by using 
simple cross-section method. In this paper the problem of parameter instability in such 
models are addressed and we hypothesizes that omission of a variable for household  
wealth in the form of real estate values causes the estimates of income elasticities to be 
upward biased.  
 
To examine this we follow the same path as Pendyala et al. (1995) and use repeated 
cross-section data to estimate a simple multinomial model for car ownership and examine 
how the demand for cars evolves over time. The data used comes from the Danish 
Transport Diary Survey which is an interview based survey conducted on a monthly 
basis. The problem of parameter instability simple cross-section models is well known 
and it is also known that the omission of important macro variables can cause estimated 
parameters and elasticities to be biased. Due to lack of data one often has to relay on this 
approach even though more sophisticated frameworks should be used. The problems 
mentioned above therefore remains. 
 
In the paper we find that the estimated income elasticities are non-decreasing over time, 
which is expected from other studies. Furthermore we find that including a variable for 
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real estate values in the Danish municipalities reduce the estimated income elasticities. If 
our hypothesis that the real estate values influence the demand for cars we should see the 
largest changes in income elasticities for households who live in areas with the highest 
values of real estate. By showing that the income elasticities for real estate owners in 
urban areas are affected more than for other households and with real estate owners in 
general being affected more by the inclusion of a variable for real estate values we 
conclude that our hypothesis is correct. 
 
The third paper extends on this finding and uses a dynamic model to examine the effect 
of the housing prices in more detail.  
 
In paper three, Real estate ownership and the demand for cars in Denmark - A pseudo-
panel analysis, the investigation of the influence of the rising real estate prices and the 
falling interest rate, which was started in paper two, continues. Inspired by Dargay and 
Vythoulkas (1999) we construct a dynamic partial adjustment model for car ownership in 
Denmark. Using the approach described in Deaton (1985) we use data from the Danish 
Transport Diary survey to construct a pseudo panel and combine this with aggregate time 
series from Statistics Denmark for the development in real estate values in the Danish 
municipalities and the development in the long-term interest rate. We hypothesis that the 
increasing real estate values have increased the demand for cars and that the falling 
interest rate also increase car demand.  
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With the rising real estate prices and the falling interest rate we have in Denmark a 
situation where real estate owners can redraw equity from their real estate without 
increasing their monthly expenses. These households have thus received a capital gain 
which tenants have not and real estate owners could therefore have increased their 
demand for cars. If this hypothesis is true we expect that the increasing housing prices 
influence the demand for cars for real estate owners but not for tenants. The influence of 
the interest rate is less clear since all households face approximately the same interest rate 
if differences in capital restrictions are ignored. What we find is that only real estate 
owners are affected by the increasing real estate prices but all households increase their 
demand for cars due to the falling interest rate. Our hypothesis is thus confirmed. 
 
Our findings in this paper is important since excluding capital gains from models used for 
forecasting could cause estimates to be misleading. We have shown that future models 
should keep this in mind and if possible include variables for capital gains and especially 
gains originating from the real estate marked. Unfortunately we have not been able to 
examine the effect of falling real estate prices and increasing interest rates. This should 
be done since we should not expect the responses to be symmetric; a finding which 
Dargay (2001) found with regards to income where hysteresis exist in the demand for 
cars.  
 
Paper four, Demand for car transport in Denmark- Differences between rural and urban 
car owners, continues the investigation of differences between car owners in rural and 
urban areas which was started in Dargay (2002). The paper contributes to the literature in 
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two ways. Since Dargay only used a constructed value for car travel derived from the UK 
household expenditure survey one could question the validity of the results. By using a 
transport survey and obtaining estimates which are comparable with Dargays results we 
thus show that results obtained from household expenditure surveys can provide credible 
results about transport behavior. Secondly we show that the purchase price and fuel 
prices affects rural and urban households differently. This is an important insight since it 
helps us to understand how different policies affect households living in different areas. 
We show that rural households respond mostly to changes in the purchase price on cars 
whereas urban households respond more to changes in fuel price (or variable costs).  
 
The last paper, Transport tax reforms, two-part tariffs, and revenue recycling, construct 
a model for commuting traffic. The consumers consume a composite commodity, leisure 
and choose between public transport (a metro) and private transport (car) when they 
commute. The model is thus based on the framework presented in Parry and Bento 
(2001). The model extends on previous work by incorporating the discrete nature of car 
purchase in a tax model which (to our knowledge) has not been done before.  
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Taxation, Time Allocation, and Externalities 
 
 
 
Jens Erik Nielsen 
Danish Transport Research Institute 
and 
University of Copenhagen 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper shows that the traditional additivity property of Sandmo (1975) for taxation of 
atmospheric externalities needs modification when household time allocation is modeled 
in a Becker (1965) setup and it address the question of distributional consequences in a 
model with explicit modeling of household time allocation. The insights obtained have 
important policy implications in the transport sector, since we show that time saving 
activities should have their externality tax reduced compared to the pure Pigouvian case. 
The traditional arguments for marginal cost pricing thus looses some of its appeal.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper models household time allocation in a setup with atmospheric externalities. 
We assume that households require both household time and market produced 
commodities in the production of consumption goods in line with Becker (1965). This 
setup is particular relevant when the theory of optimal taxation is applied to the transport 
sector since one of the main characteristics of transportation is the use of time. 
Furthermore, personal transport produced by households takes up a large fraction of 
household time budgets and transport is also a significant source of externalities. In a 
situation without externalities and without distributional considerations the optimal tax 
rules for the present setup is derived in Kleven (2004). He derives a so called inverse 
factor share rule which state that activities with a high time share and thus a low factor 
share in household production should be taxed at a higher rate than activities which a low 
time share and a high factor share. The present paper extends this result by including 
externalities and considering distributional concerns. 
 
It is shown here that the additivity property found in Sandmo (1975) has to be modified 
when household production and time allocation is modeled explicitly in the presence of 
externalities. The additivity property states that if the externality generating good can be 
taxed directly, efficiency requires that this good is taxed by combining the Pigouvian 
principle and Ramsey taxation and that the externality level only enters the tax formula 
for the externality generating good. The Pigouvian tax is additive thus making a clear 
separation between the efficiency part of the tax formula and the part of the tax formula 
which correct for the externalities. When the allocation of time in household production 
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is included in the setup we show that the corrective tax has to account not only for the 
externalities but also for the time cost involved. This insight invalidates the conclusion 
that the internalizing part of the tax should be set equal to the marginal external damage 
costs. Furthermore we show that the definition of the net social marginal utility of income 
defined in Diamond (1975) has to be modified to account for the negative welfare effects 
of the externalities if distributional issues are included in the model. 
 
Allowing for distributional issues in the economy does not invalidate the additivity 
property but it has to be modified. We show that since the net social marginal utility of 
income is modified to include the income effect on the level of the externality the 
Ramsey part of the tax problem is no longer independent of the externality. The 
corrective term containing substitution effects still enters additive in the tax formula for 
the good causing externalities and the additivity property therefore remains valid. 
 
It has almost become the convention in the transport sector that a system of road pricing 
where the tax is set equal to the marginal external cost is the most efficient way to 
internalize externalities. In the present setup this no longer holds. The tax should also 
account for the time allocation inside the households. A direct consequence is that a 
transport mode which saves time should carry a lower corrective tax even if the marginal 
external damage costs for the different modes are the same. For example even if cars 
cause more atmospheric pollution than busses the optimal corrective tax on cars might be 
lower than the tax on busses. This can happen if the time saved from using the car is high 
enough. The insight can also be applied to the taxation of airlines where politicians are 
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discussing if a tax should be put on aviation fuel in order to reduce the emission of 
greenhouse gasses. Since air transport in general saves time compared to other modes of 
transport our result says that the internalizing tax should be set lower on aviation fuel 
relative to fuel used in car transport even if the marginal damage caused by the two 
modes are the same. 
 
Similar insights concerning pigouvian taxation are obtained from a different setup in 
Parry and Bento (2001). They analyze tax reforms in a simple labor-leisure model with 
two types of transport to show that when distortions on the labor market are included it 
might not be welfare improving to internalize externalities by setting the tax equal to the 
marginal external damage cost. Using their model they investigate different tax reforms 
in the transport sector and use numerical simulation to illustrate their results. The Parry 
and Bento result is extended in several recent papers. In Parry and Bento (2002) they 
extend their analysis and investigate more types of externalities and interactions with 
other taxes. De Borger and Van Dender (2003) show, using the same framework as Parry 
and Bento, that the value of time is also affected by the tax system and in Nielsen (2006) 
the setup is extended to include the discrete choice of car purchase.  
 
None of the above mentioned papers derive optimal tax rules in models with time 
allocation and externalities. This paper thus contributes to the literature by deriving the 
optimal tax rule in a model with explicit modeling of household time allocation, 
atmospheric externalities, and by including distributional considerations. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model describing the households' 
time allocation problem and the governments’ problem of raising revenue. Section 3 
derives the optimal tax rules and the final section concludes.  
2. The Model 
As in the standard setup the model used here includes a utilitarian social planner and a set 
of H households together with N+1 commodities. Households do not consume 
commodities bought in the market directly. Instead they undertake a production where 
market produced commodity, iX , and household time, iL , are used to produce 
consumption good, iZ , through a production process,
if . Letting h describe the 
individual household, they each have a utility function given by  
0 1( , ,..., ) ( ), 1,...,
h h h h h h
NNU U Z Z Z Z h Hφ= − =  (1) 
where 
1
H
h
N N
h
Z Z
=
= ∑  (2) 
is the total consumption of good N in the economy and 
( , ), 0,...,h i h hi i iZ f X L i N= =  (3) 
represents the way good hiZ  is being produced in household h using market produced 
commodity, hiX , household time,
h
iL , and production technology, 
if . The production 
technologies, if , are Leontief and every household uses the same set of technologies 
when producing consumption goods. This means that if a household wants to see a movie 
at a cinema they have to allocate the time required to see the movie and they have to 
purchase movie tickets. One could argue that more than one commodity could be 
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required in the production which would result in iX  being a vector of these market 
produced commodities, but to keep things simple we assume that only one commodity 
goes into the production of every consumption good1.  
 
In this setup the consumption of good N generates externalities. It is assumed that total 
consumption of good N and not only total consumption of market produced commodities 
that causes externalities. Considering transport as the main example in this paper, this is 
the intuitive choice and changing it will not affect the conclusions. The function ( )h NZφ  
is assumed to be increasing in NZ  so that 
( )' 0h
h N
N
Z
Z
φφ ∂ ∂= >  (4) 
As a result the total consumption of good N decreases the utility of the households. 
Assuming that H is large the households consider NZ  as fixed when making their 
choices. We therefore make the standard assumption that the individual household 
behaves as if 0Nh
N
Z
Z
∂
∂ = . This means that a household may realize that it affects the total 
consumption of good N but regards its contribution as insignificant. Using this we now 
formulate the optimization problem for household h as 
0 0
0 1
0 0 1 1
,..., , ,...,
0
0
max ( ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , ))
. .
h h h h
N N
h h h h h N h h
N N
X X L L
N
h h h
i i
i
N
h h
i
i
U f X L f X L f X L
s t
P X w T
L T T
=
=
=
+ =
∑
∑
 
 
 
(5) 
                                                 
1 A discussion of this can be found in Pollak and Wachter (1975). 
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where hT  is the amount of time spent on work for household h, iP  is the consumer price 
of commodity i, T is the total time available to the households, and hw  is the wage rate 
for household h and given exogenously. Since NZ  is considered to be constant we can 
leave out ( )h NZφ  of the utility maximization problem (5). 
 
The household production problem describing the way in which households choose hiX  
and hiL  in order to produce one unit of consumption good 
h
iZ  in the cheapest possible 
way can be formulated as 
,
min
. .
( , ) 1
h h
i i
h h h
i i i
X L
i h h
i i
P X w L
s t
f X L
+
=
 
 
(6) 
Due to the Leontief production technology the solution to (6) gives the constant factor 
demand coefficients 
Xi
h
i
h
i
X
Z
a =  (7) 
Li
h
i
h
i
L
Z
a =  (8) 
These are identical for all households since they use identical technologies. Using (7) and 
(8) together with the fact that the two constraints in (5) are interdependent through the 
variable hT , we can restate the households maximization problem as 
0
0 1
,...,
0
max ( , ,..., )
. .
( , ) ( )
h h
N
h h h h
N
Z Z
N
h h h h h
i i i
i
U Z Z Z
s t
Q P w Z I w
=
=∑
 
 
(9) 
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where ( )h h hI w w T=  is the households total income and ( , )h h hi i i Xi LiQ P w Pa w a= + . To 
see this remember that Xia  and Lia  are constant and identical for all households. 
Multiplying the time constraint in (5) with hw  and adding it to the budget constraint in 
(5) gives (9). Note that i XiPa  is the direct monetary cost of using 
h
iX  as input and 
h
Liw a  
is the value of the time used for the production which equals the earnings lost due to 
lower working time2. ( , )h hi iQ P w  is therefore the total opportunity cost of consuming one 
unit of hiZ  for household h.  
 
With (9) being a standard utility maximization problem the solution gives the ordinary 
demand functions 0 1( , ,..., , )
h h h h h
i NZ Q Q Q I  and the indirect utility function 
0 1( , ,..., , )
h h h h h
NV Q Q Q I . Note that the households’ indirect utility function does not include 
externalities. We also know that standard results like Roy's Identity, which states that 
, 0,...,h hk
h
h
k
V
Q
Z k Nλ∂∂ = − =  (10) 
will apply where hλ  is the Lagrangian multiplier from the households utility 
maximization problem (9) and thus equals marginal utility of income for consumer h. We 
also know that the Slutsky equation 
m , , 0,...,hj
hh h
k k k
h h h
j j
Z ZZ
Q Q I
Z j k N∂ ∂∂∂ ∂ ∂= − =  
(11) 
holds where l hkZ  is the compensated demand function for good k.  
 
                                                 
2 We have assumed that the value of time is equal to the wage rate. A large literature on the value of time 
exists and it is one of the main research areas in transport economics. A recent Danish publication on the 
topic of time values is Fosgerau and Pilegaard (2003) which also contains a survey of the time value 
literature. 
  
- 21 -
Having characterized the households’ behavior, we now focus on the government. The 
government knows that externalities are present and it therefore know that the true 
indirect utility function for household h is given by 
0 1 0 1 0 1
1
( , ,..., , ) ( , ,..., , ) ( ( , ,..., , ))
Hh h h h h h h h h h h h h h h
N N N N
h
V Q Q Q I V Q Q Q I Z Q Q Q Iφ
=
= − ∑  (12) 
We assume that the government seeks to maximize a Bergson-Samuelson type social 
welfare function 
1 2
( , ,..., )
H
W W V V V=  where 0hWV
∂
∂ > . Assuming that the production 
sector operates under constant returns to scale and that all markets are fully competitive 
the producer price, ip , for commodity iX  is fixed and equal to the marginal cost of 
production. We assume that good 0 is pure leisure and thus having 0 0Xa =  making good 
0 untaxable since no market produced commodity is used in the production of 0Z . We 
define the tax rate on commodity iX  as 
, 1,...,i i it P p i N= − =  (13) 
The government therefore has full control of all commodity prices. Furthermore the 
government must raise an externally given revenue, G, for some unspecified tasks (e.g. 
defense, healthcare, infrastructure) resulting in the governmental budget constraint  
0 1
( )
N H
h
i i
i h
t X G
= =
=∑ ∑  (14) 
We can now write the governments welfare maximization problem as 
1 2
0 1
, ,...,
1 1
max ( , ,..., )
. .
(( ) )
N
H
P P P
N H
h
i i Xi i
i h
W V V V
s t
P p a Z G
= =
− =∑ ∑
 
 
(15) 
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since h hXi i ia Z X=  and 0 0Xa = . The Lagrangian function emerging from (15) is given by 
0 1
1 1
( , ,..., ) (( )( ) )
N HH h
i i Xi i
i h
L W V V V P p a Z Gµ
= =
= + − −∑ ∑   
(16) 
where µ  is the Lagrangian multiplier from (15) and representing marginal value of 
government funds. The first order conditions for the governments welfare maximization 
problem (15) can now be written as 
1 1
1 1 1
( )
0, 1,...,
H H
h h
H N H
h
Xk k i Xi
h i h
h hhhh k N k
h h hNk k kk k
hh
i k
h kk
Q QZL W V
P P PZQ QV
QZ
PQ
a Z t a k N
φ
µ µ
= =
= = =
∂ ∂∂∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂∂ ∂∂
∂∂
∂∂
= −
+ + = =
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 
 
(17) 
which (by using Roy's identity (10) and the fact that 
h
k
k Xk
Q
P a
∂
∂ = ) can be written as 
1 1 1 11
(( ) ' ) , 1,...,
H H H N H
h h h h
k k i Xi
h h i hh
h h
N i
h hh
kk
Z ZW
QQV
Z Z t a k Nλ φ µ µ
= = = ==
∂ ∂∂
∂∂∂ − − = − − =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (18) 
Applying the Slutsky Equation (11) now gives 
m
m
1 1 1
1 1 1
( ) ' ( )
( ), 1,...,
H H H
h h h h
k k
h h h
H N H
h h
k i Xi k
h i h
h h
N N
h h h h
k
h h
i N
h h
k
ZZW W
Q IV V
ZZ
Q I
Z Z
Z t a Z k N
λ φ
µ µ
= = =
= = =
∂∂∂ ∂
∂ ∂∂ ∂
∂∂
∂ ∂
− − −
= − − − =
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 
 
(19) 
Following Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Diamond (1975) we define the social 
marginal utility of income hβ  and the net social marginal utility of income hβ  for 
household h as 
h h
h
W
V
β λ∂∂=  (20) 
1
Nh h
i Xi
i
h
i
h
Z
I
t aβ β µ
=
∂
∂= + ∑  (21) 
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We see that hβ  is the social value of increasing the utility of consumer h by increasing 
his budget. But if his budget is increased he will change his consumption pattern which 
will result in a change in the tax payments. The second term in the definition of 
hβ  
captures this effect and it is therefore the net social marginal utility of income for 
consumer h. By using (20) the first order condition (19) can now be written as 
m
m
1 1 1
1 1 1
' ( )
( ), 1,...,
H H H
h h h h
k k
h h h
H N H
h h
k i Xi k
h i h
h h
N N
h h h
k
h h
i i
h h
k
ZZW
Q IV
ZZ
Q I
Z Z
Z t a Z k N
β φ
µ µ
= = =
= = =
∂∂∂
∂ ∂∂
∂∂
∂ ∂
+ −
= + − =
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 
 
(22) 
By applying (21) and the symmetry of the derivative of the compensated demand 
functions, l l
h h
i k
h h
ik
Z Z
Q Q
∂ ∂
∂ ∂= , we can write (22) as 
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(23) 
We now define the index of discouragement (Mirrlees (1976)) as 
m
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=
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(24) 
We see that i Xit a  is the increase in generalized price, 
h
iQ , caused by the tax. The 
numerator therefore describes the total change in consumption of good k caused by 
changing the price system. The denominator is the total consumption of good k and (24) 
therefore measures the proportionate reduction in total consumption of good k caused by 
the tax system. Using (24) we can write (23) as 
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(25) 
This formula characterizes the optimal tax system in the economy. Knowing that the 
compensated cross-price effects are positive the discouragement index is positive (if the 
tax is positive). The right hand side of (25) capture the three goals of the tax system; 
efficient generation of revenue, equity considerations, and internalization of externalities. 
Part (a) of (25) is the standard Ramsey term3. The Ramsey result emerges in its most 
simple form if we take (a) of (25), assume that all households are identical, and that no 
externalities exist. This gives 
hβ β=  and 0hφ = for all h and the tax rule can be written 
as 
1, 1,...,kd k N
β
µ= − =  (26) 
saying that the taxes should be set in such a way that the index of discouragement is 
identical for all goods. The Ramsey term (a) in (25) capture both efficiency and equity 
considerations through 
hβ . To see this note that through 1
1
1
H
h h
k
h
H
h
k
h
Z
Z
β
µ =
=
∑
∑
 we get that the 
reduction in demand should be low when hβ  is high, which happens for socially 
important households. The second part of (a) given by 11
1
H N hZh i
i Xik hIih
H
h
k
h
Z t a
Z
∂
∂==
=
∑ ∑
∑
  tells us that if 
demand is consentrated among households where the tax payments are reduced 
significantly when income change, then the reduction in demand should be kept low, 
                                                 
3 See for example Myles (1995) formula (4.40) and (4.44) 
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since a high reduction in demand will reduce tax revenue significantly thus calling for 
even higher taxes to be set in order to meet the governments revenue requirement, which 
will lead to even larger distortions 
 
Part (b) of (25) deals with the externality. To simplify this we define 
'
h
h
h
W
V
β φ∂∂=  
(27) 
which, to keeping with the terminology, is the social marginal disutility of the externality 
for household h. It measures how much social welfare change due to changes in the 
utility for household h if the consumption of the externality generating good increases. 
We see that households who are socially important (having a high value of hWV
∂
∂ ) and who 
are highly sensitive to changes in the externality level (having a high value of 'hφ ) will 
have a high value of 
hβ . In a transport setting this could be the case for low-income 
households living near the source of pollution (e.g. near large roads or near airports). We 
see that from (4) and the definition of W, the social marginal disutility of the externality 
is positive and higher values of 
hβ  thus decrease welfare since it enters negatively in the 
utility function for the households (1). 
 
As in (2) we define 
1
H h
k kh
Z Z==∑   as the total consumption of good k and use it to write 
(b) of (25) as 
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(28) 
remembering that (b) of (25) shown in (28) increase the discouragement index if positive.  
Since we know that compensated cross-price effects are positive, (c) of (28) is positive. A 
high value of (c) thus indicates that the reduction in demand will be high. This makes 
sense since the externality tax not only affect the demand for good N but also increase the 
demand for good k thus countering negative effects of the tax imposed on good k 
directly. Due to the symmetry of the compensated demand derivatives it is also possible 
to reduce the externality by taxing good k if the compensated price effects are large. 
Again this calls for a larger reduction in demand for good k if the negative effect of this 
reduction is compensated by the positive effect of the reduction in the externality level. 
Assuming that good N is a normal good and thus having 0h
h
NZ
I
∂
∂ >  we see that (d) of (28) 
is positive and a high value of (d) thus indicate that a low reduction in demand for good 
k. The structure of (d) is the same as the structure of the last part of the Ramsey term in 
(25) which we can see if we write it as 111
H H hh Zh N
k hIhh
k
Z
Z
β
µ
∂
∂==
∑ ∑
  and it now tells us that if demand 
is concentrated among households where the disutility from the externality are reduced 
significantly when income change, then the reduction in demand should be high, since a 
high reduction in demand will reduce the externality level significantly.  
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3. Tax rules 
Since (25) only characterize the optimal tax system implicitly it is difficult to derive clear 
policy implications from it. This section imposes further restrictions on the model to 
derive some well known results and some new insights.  
3.1 Inverse factor share rule and inverse elasticity rule 
To obtain the inverse factor share rule we take (22) as a starting point. We assume that all 
households are identical (giving us hβ λ= , hk kQ Q= , and hk kZ Z=  for all household), that 
no externalities are present ( 0hφ =  for all households), that the government maximizes 
the unweighted sum of household utilities, and that no income effects exist since we are 
not concerned with distributional issues. With these assumptions the first order conditions 
for (15) reduces to 
m
1
, 1,...,
N
k i Xi
i
i
k
Z
QZ t a k N
λ µµ
=
− ∂
∂= =∑  (29) 
Assuming that there are no compensated cross price effects between taxable goods in the 
economy, and defining the constant  
λ µµθ −=  (30) 
we can simplify (29) to 
m 1 , 1,...,k Xk k kk
Z
ZQt a k Nθ ∂∂= =  (31) 
This allow us to write the optimal tax formulas as 
l
1 , 1,...,k
kkk Xk
t
P k Nα ε θ= =  (32) 
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where k Xk
kXk
P a
Qα =  is the factor share of kX  and  lk kkkkk QZ ZQε ∂∂=  is the compensated own 
price elasticity of commodity k (remembering that in optimum the value of compensated 
and uncompensated demand are equal, l k kZ Z= ). This is the inverse factor share rule 
derived in Kleven (2004) saying that goods which use much household time in 
production and hence have a low value of Xka  (thus having a large time share
4) should 
carry a higher tax rate than goods which primarily use market-produced commodities in 
the household production. The rationale behind this result is that since leisure time can 
not be taxed directly the tax system causes a distortion on the labor market. If the 
government taxes goods having a high time share in household production they therefore 
reduce the distortion by taxing time indirectly through the production process. It is easy 
to see that the inverse elasticity formula is imbedded in this formulation. Letting 1Xka =  
for all households the model reduces to the standard model used in the analysis of 
optimal taxation5 resulting in the inverse elasticity formula  
l , 1,...,k kkk
t
P k N
θε= =  (33) 
saying that goods with high compensated own-price elasticity should be taxed less than 
goods with low compensated own-price elasticity in order to reduce distortions in the 
consumption patterns. Lifting the assumption about identical treatment of the households 
allows us to derive a more general version of the inverse factor share rule (32) where 
distributional considerations are taken into account. We thus relax the assumption about 
the government allowing it to maximize a more general welfare function and treat the 
                                                 
4 The time share of kX  is given by 1LkkLk Xk
wa
Qα α= = − .  
5 See Sandmo (1976) for an introduction. 
  
- 29 -
households as being different (different utility functions and different income). Again we 
start from (20) we write the first order condition as 
m
1 1 1 1
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h h h h
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h h i h
h h
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We assume that no cross-price effects exist between taxable goods. This allow us to write 
(34) as 
l
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1
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k h
H hk h hkkk Xk
h
Z
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Z
k N
β µµ
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−
=
=
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(35) 
where k Xkh
k
h
Xk
P a
Q
α =  is the factor share of good k for household h. The insights from the 
simple inverse factor share rule (32) still holds but we see that we now have to take 
account of distributional concerns. It is easily recognized that ( )
hβ µ
µ
−  is negative (if G is 
positive) since µ  is the Lagrangian from (15). With the compensated own-price 
elasticity,  kkε , also being negative we have that k
k
t
P  is positive. Since high-income 
households have higher generalized price, hkQ , their factor-share, 
h
Xkα , will be lower than 
the factor-share for low-income households. To see this note that 
( , )h h hi i i Xi LiQ P w Pa w a= +  and that a higher value of hw  gives a higher value of hiQ . In 
this situation the inverse factor share rule will benefit high-income households which is a 
general dilemma in the transport sector when the value of time is assumed to be higher 
for high-income households (and especially if the wage rate is used as a proxy for the 
value of time as we do here). In such cases time-savings experienced by high-income 
households weight more than the time savings experienced by low-income households. 
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The distributional considerations working through hβ  pulls in the opposite direction and 
if good k is consumed primarily by socially important households (normally low-income 
households) the tax should be set at a low since 
hβ  will be closer to µ  for these 
households thus bringing 
hβ µ
µ
−  closer to zero calling for a lower tax to be set. 
3.3 The additivity property 
When externalities are present we can derive the optimal tax rules by again taking (22) as 
a starting point. Assuming that all households' are identical and that the government 
maximizes the unweighted sum of the households utility. This gives the first order 
conditions 
1
1 1 1 , 1,...,
N
k Xi
i
N i
N k kk k
Z Z
Z ZZ Q QH t a k N
λ µ φµ µ
=
∂ ∂− ∂
∂ ∂ ∂= − + =∑  (36) 
This, by assuming that no compensated cross-price effects exist between taxable goods 
and ignoring income effects, simplifies to 
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(37) 
giving the optimality conditions 
l l
l l
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t H H
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(38) 
where λµξ = . Note that since λ is the marginal value of private income and µ is the 
marginal value of public income the parameter ξ can be interpreted as the marginal rate 
of substitution between private and public income. The formulas for optimal taxation 
  
- 31 -
consist of three elements. The first, 1
Xkα , is the inverse factor share rule found in Kleven 
(2004) stating that goods which has a low time share and thus a high factor share in the 
household production process should be taxed less than other goods. The second, l1kkε , is 
the well known inverse elasticity rule stating that goods having low compensated own-
price elasticity should be taxed higher than goods with high compensated own-price 
elasticity. The last element, ' 1
Xkk
H
aQ
φ
µ , is the additive term on the externality generating 
good. With no explicit modeling of time (e.g. having 1=Xka  for all k) it is just the 
standard additive term found in Sandmo (1975) saying that the extra tax should be set 
according to the principle for Pigouvian taxation. This no longer holds as the term 1
Xkα  
enters the formula. The tax rule now states that the social planner has to account for the 
time allocation by taxing time saving activities at a lower rate even if these activities 
generate negative externalities. In summary, the tax problem can be separated into two 
parts. First, a tax is used to internalize externalities taking into consideration the time 
allocation involved. Hereafter the government uses the inverse factor share rule to satisfy 
its revenue requirement. The formula also tells us that in the event of 1ξ >  where the 
revenue generated from internalizing the externalities more than covers the government 
revenue requirement and funds therefore have to be given back to the households. Note 
that in the unlikely situation where 1ξ =  the tax system will be first-best. In this situation 
the government can finance its revenue requirement by using the corrective tax alone and 
no other taxes are needed. 
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If we lift the assumption about identical treatment of the households the basic results 
from above do not change. In this case the formulae combine those previously found and 
we can write the tax rules as 
m
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(39) 
One difference is that in the Ramsey-term of the tax formulas we now have an income 
effect from the externality. Changing income for the households will influence the 
consumption of good N and thus the level of the externality. The term 
1
h
H
h
h
N
h
Z
I
β= ∂∂∑  capture 
this effect and it enters in the same way as the revenue effect enters the definition of the 
net social marginal utility of income defined in (21). It has opposite sign though since the 
revenue generates positive welfare effects and the externality generates negative welfare 
effects. If we want the Ramsey parts of (39) to be structurally identical to the Ramsey 
parts of (35) we let 
hβst  be the externality corrected net social marginal utility of income 
given by 
1 1
'
N Hh h h
i Xi
i h
hh
i N
h hh
ZZ W
I IV
t aβ β µ φ
= =
∂∂ ∂
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= + −∑ ∑st  (40) 
where the first term is the marginal utility of income for household h, the second term 
capture the effect of extra tax revenue collected from household h if the income is 
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increased, and the last term is the loss in welfare due to changes in the consumption of 
good N by household h if the income is increased. Using this we can write (40) as 
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(41) 
where (h) and (i) of (40) is the familiar Ramsey term and has the same interpretation. Part 
(j) of (40) is the corrective term of the tax formula and it still enters additive and this 
additive term is the only part of (41) which incorporate substitution effects for good N. 
The additivity property thus survives in the present setup. 
4. Conclusion and possible extensions 
In this paper we have presented a model of household behavior where time enters the 
utility function directly as proposed in Becker (1965). Since the consumption of time is 
very important in the transport sector the approach is a natural extension to the traditional 
microeconomic setup when this sector is being modeled.  
 
The tax rules found in the previous section help us to understand how the tax system 
should be designed. If distributional considerations are ignored the inverse factor share 
rule states that fast transportation should carry a lower rate of tax than slow 
transportation. This conclusion is less clear when externalities are included because a 
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faster car might cause externalities that a slow car does not (for example accidents and 
pollution).  
 
Moving on to the question of distributional issues we see that the tax rules are easily 
generalized to include these. The results resemble those found elsewhere in the literature 
and it is worth noting that the corrective part of the tax which targets the externality still 
enters as an additive term. The additivity property has to be modified though since the 
marginal external damage enters the optimal tax formula for all taxes through an income 
effect. The claim that the corrective tax enters additive for the externality generating good 
still holds and the property prevails but in a more complicated form.  
 
We have extended the results by Kleven and included externalities and distributional 
concerns in the approach. We showed that the tax formulas emerging resemble those 
found by Sandmo and we therefore conclude that the additivity property survives in this 
new setup due to the additive externality in the utility functions. Furthermore we make it 
possible to see how distributional questions will affect the tax system.  
 
The model presented here can be generalized. The modeling of the externalities in a 
separable way could be criticized and alternative ways of modeling this will be subject to 
future research. Furthermore to assume that all households have the same technologies 
available to them could also be questioned. In spite of this it is believed that the insights 
from the model are valuable when trying to understand how the tax structure in the 
transport sector ought to be designed. 
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Abstract  
We investigate the demand for cars in Denmark by applying a simple discrete choice 
model for car ownership and estimate it on a series of neighboring cross-section data 
from Denmark for the years 1995 to 2002. We hypothesize that the increasing real estate 
prices in Denmark have biased parameter estimates. By including a variable for real 
estate values we show that only real estate owners and tenants in urban areas and real 
estate owners in rural areas are affected by the increasing prices on real estate. This we 
take as an indication that the hypothesis that real estate values influence car ownership in 
Denmark is true. If so, income elastities estimated on models not including a variable for 
real estate values might be upward biased for those households most strongly affected. 
We show that this is exactly what happens since including a variable for real estate values 
reduces the estimated income elastitites for real estate owners more than for tenants. 
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1. Introduction 
Transport demand is determined not only by demand changes on the intensive margin 
(the choice of how much to travel) but also on the extensive margin (the choice of 
transport mode)6 and different approaches have been used to examine transport demand. 
Some papers look at one of the margins while others combine the two in a unified 
framework. Which approach to choose depends on the purpose of the analysis but it is 
important to have reliable estimates of e.g. income elasticities for both car ownership and 
car transport when forecasting the transport demand and thus deciding how many 
resources to invest in the transport infrastructure to cope with the expected future 
demand. 
 
This paper examines car demand by using a simple discrete choice model for car 
ownership7 and estimating it on Danish cross-section data. We examine the problem of 
parameter stability when this method is used which is important since transport planners 
in many situations are forced to use simple cross-section methods due to data limitations.  
We show that car demand seems to have changed from 1995 to 2002 and that the income 
elasticity depends on the year in which the model is estimated. This insight is not new but 
if we are able to identify a variable which seems to reduce the severity of the problem 
this will be useful in future work. 
 
                                                 
6 The terms intensive and extensive margin is borrowed from the labor supply literature where decisions on 
the intensive margin describes the decision on how much to work and decisions on the extensive margin 
describes labor force participation decisions. 
7 A survey of relevant literature on this subject can be found in De Jong et al (2005). 
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A problem with the use of simple cross-sectional modeling is that omission of important 
macro variables might bias the result and perhaps cause the estimated parameters to 
become unstable. We investigate this and speculate that the omission of a variable for 
household wealth measured by the value of owner occupied housing cause the parameters 
for real estate owners to be biased compared with parameters estimated for tenants. Since 
real estate values in Denmark have increased much more in urban areas than in rural 
areas with values in urban areas being much higher than values in rural areas we can 
examine this hypothesis by looking at households in the two regions separately. By 
further separating the households in ‘owners’ and ‘tenants’ we have two samples in each 
region which should be affected differently by the increasing real estate prices if the 
hypothesis is true. We show that differences exist between real estate owners and tenants 
as well as between urban and rural households. We therefore speculate that the 
development in real estate prices have influenced the demand for cars. To examine this 
we include a variable for real estate value showing that this has affected real estate 
owners as well as tenants living in urban areas but not tenants living in rural areas. 
Unfortunately we are not able to include a variable for the wealth accumulated in real 
estate but we still believe that the variable used here can be used as a proxy, since our 
goal is to see if housing prices influence the demand for cars. 
 
We find that the elasticities estimated for real estate owners fluctuate more than those for 
tenants. To see if real estate values might reduce the fluctuations we include a variable 
for the real estate value in the different municipalities in Denmark. We then test whether 
we can restrict the parameter for this variable to zero. For tenants in rural areas this 
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restriction is accepted indicating that these households do not change their demand for 
cars due to changing real estate values. For urban households the test for the restriction 
on the parameter is rejected and we conclude that these households change their demand 
for cars due to the level of real estate prices. For rural real estate owners the parameter 
restriction is also rejected indicating that these households have been affected by the 
changing real estate values. If the hypothesis is correct we would expect urban real estate 
owners to be affected the most with rural tenants being affected the least (or not at all) 
and our investigation seems to support this. Ranking rural real estate owners and urban 
tenants with regards to how much they are expected to be affected is not straight forward 
since the increasing real estate values could influence tenants indirectly thus making a 
clear ranking impossible. 
 
Previous models of car demand looking at both the intensive and the extensive margin 
include Train (1980) who uses a multinomial logit model extimated on cross-section data 
from 1975 for the San Francisco Bay Area to evaluate the effect of a new train service. 
His model predicts transport demand and cars per household by estimating the number of 
cars a household would own and which mode households choose for their commuting 
trips. Pendyala et al. (1995) use repeated cross-sectional analysis to examine the 
relationship between car ownership and income over time. They employ an ordered 
probit model for car ownership estimated on Dutch Panel Survey data showing that large 
differences between different household types exist. They conclude that when modeling 
car demand it is important to account for the household structure8. They also find that 
                                                 
8 They focus on differences between couples with children, couples without children, singles with children 
and singles without children. 
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income elasticities change with the level of motorization which could cause parameter 
instability in cross-section models. Their results suggest that the level of motorization 
should be included in models for car ownership and that some kind of dynamic 
specification is needed. Even though this is true the transport planners often do not have 
data available to estimate dynamic models and they are forced to use simple cross-section 
analysis. The problem of parameter stability therefore remains in applied work and 
investigating the influence of variables which might reduce this problem is still in 
demand. 
 
The increasing motorization is also addressed in Jansson (1989) where he describes this 
phenomenon as a diffusion process where households increase their taste for cars over 
time. Other papers mention that we might approach a saturation point for car ownership, 
and we should therefore expect income elasticities to fall over time (Kwon and Preston 
(2005)). As mentioned in Fosgerau et al. (2004) we do not expect serious saturation 
effects to be present in Denmark since the number of cars per capita is much lower than 
in many other countries which is also shown in Dargay et al. (2006). 
 
Another study pointing out interesting aspects of car demand is Dargay (2002) where 
both a static and a dynamic model is used to estimate car demand in the UK. She 
concludes that the cross-section income elasticity declines over time. She also constructs 
a dynamic model of car ownership estimating it on a pseudo-panel9 from the UK Family 
Expenditure Survey. She analyses both life-cycle effects, cohort effects, and introduce the 
                                                 
9See Deaton (1985) for an introduction to construction and estimation of pseudo-panel models. We use a 
pseudo-panel approach to estimate the demand for cars in Denmark in Nielsen (2006a) and apply the 
method to estimate demand for car transport in Nielsen (2006b). 
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possibility of hysteresis effects. Several conclusions are drawn from Dargay’s paper. She 
shows that the life-cycle effects cause car ownership to decrease when the ‘head of 
household’ reaches the early 50s. This accord with findings of Jansson (1989), where 
entry and exit propensities of cars together with cohort data are used to determine car 
demand. Differences between urban and rural households are also addressed in Dargay 
(2002) using a dynamic partial adjustment model for the UK. She concludes that large 
differences exist between the different household groups and that car ownership in urban 
areas is more sensitive to changes in user cost of transport, fuel cost and car purchase cost 
than in rural households10. In a static model like the one applied here the inclusion of a 
variable for the general user cost on a national level would not bring anything, since it 
would enter as a constant in the estimation. We are however able to include a variable for 
real estate prices since these differ between municipalities. In Dargay (2001) car 
ownership is also investigated and she concludes that cohort effects may not be described 
by changes in income alone. Furthermore, she shows that income elasticities are falling 
when car ownership rises and she finds evidence of hysteresis effects in car demand. She 
thus confirms findings in Pendyala et al. (1995).  
 
The link between car ownership and geography is also examined in Christens & Fosgerau 
(2004) who use cross-section data from the Danish Transport Diary Survey to estimate a 
multinomial logit model for car ownership. They estimate the income elasticities for 
household car availability in different regions of Denmark and find that households in 
large cities have higher income elasticities than households living in small cities or in the 
                                                 
10 In Nielsen (2006a) we show that the increasing real estate prices and the falling interest rate which have 
taken place in Denmark since 1993 have influenced the demand for cars. 
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countryside. They find that the income elasticities in the five largest cities in Denmark11 
can be around 2.5 times higher than income elasticities in the countryside. The elasticities 
found for the five largest cities are between 0.47 and 0.86 whereas the elasticities 
elsewhere is between 0.31 and 0.54.  
 
Other Danish studies of car demand include Bjørner (1999). He uses a simple dynamic 
model for personal transport estimated on Danish registers data, and finds short and long 
run income elasticities for personal transport by car to be 0.21 and 0.57 respectively. He 
argues that these are low compared to other studies. Birkeland et al. (2000) calculate that 
the income elasticity for distance traveled by car is 0.19 for the pseudo-panel analysis and 
for a cross-section analysis in a non-dynamic setting they find income elasticities for car 
demand between 0.28 and 0.48.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data and explores some 
characteristics of car ownership in Denmark. In section 3 a simple multinomial logit 
model for car ownership is set up and estimated. Section 4 calculates income elasticities 
for car ownership and discusses the results. The final section concludes. 
2. The data 
We use data from the Danish Transport Diary Survey between 1995 and 200212. It is an 
interview based survey where a random sample is drawn from the Danish Civil Register 
once every month. Every person in the sample receives a letter explaining about the 
                                                 
11 Copenhagen, Århus, Odense, Ålborg and Esbjerg. 
12 A full description of the Danish Transport Diary Survey can be found at the homepage of the Danish 
Transport Research Institute, www.dtf.dk. 
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interview and its purpose. During the month in question people from Statistics Denmark 
call and ask about the travel behavior on the day before the interview is conducted. 
Furthermore, information concerning the household, family, car and occupation is 
collected and some register data is added to the sample. Until 1997 a total of around 1800 
persons between the age of 16 and 74 were drawn from the Danish Civil Register every 
month. In 1998 the survey was extended to 2100 persons between the age of 10 and 84. 
The response rate is around 65-70%.  It is important to note that the variable in the survey 
we model is called ‘car availability’ and could potentially include cars not owned by the 
household. Discrepancies might therefore exist between the number of cars owned by the 
household and the number of cars ‘available’ to the households since the latter could 
include e.g. work cars or cars shared between several households. What we model is thus 
‘car availability’ but we will continue to refer to it as car ownership13.  
 
To keep the sample as homogeneous as possible not all data are included. We exclude all 
people who were not part of the ‘head of household couple’. This ensures that we do not 
include young people living with their parents thus having access to the parents’ car but 
having very low income. Furthermore observations with missing values were excluded 
and we restrict the sample to interviewees between the age of 18 and 74. With these 
exclusions subsets of data are constructed for each year. The total number of observations 
in the different samples are shown in table 1.  
 
                                                 
13 Another factor that we have to keep in mind relates to the years 1995 and 1996. In these years the 
question in the survey concerning car availability differs from the one used in the preceding years and it 
might cause the number of recorded cars from 1997 and onwards to be slightly larger than in 1995 and 
1996. 
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Year Real estate owners Tenants 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Total 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
993
1.644
1.477
1.766
1.592
1.498
1.421
599
2.312
4.119
3.985
4.600
4.434
4.210
3.784
1.730
861
1.382
1.384
1.490
1.368
1.276
1.115
559
668 
962 
896 
1.171 
924 
973 
887 
384 
4.834
8.107
7.742
9.027
8.318
7.957
7.207
3.272
Total 10.990 29.174 9.435 6.865 56.464
Table 1: Number of observations 
 
The average number of cars per household for the entire population as well as for real 
estate owners and tenants living in urban and rural areas are shown in figure 1. We see 
that the number of cars in Danish households increases over time conforming to the 
expectation of motorization (as in Pendyala et al. (1995)). We note that the increase in car 
ownership happens for households living in rural areas. That the number of cars is 
expected to increase is also confirmed in Fosgerau et al. (2004). They predict that the car 
fleet in Denmark will increase further since the number of cars per capita in 2003 is 0.38 
which is far from the saturation point of 0.65 estimated in Dargay & Gately (1999). 
Fosgerau et al. (2004) claim, that the saturation point for Denmark is probably around 0.6 
cars per capita and in Dargay et al. (2006) it is shown that the number of cars per capita is 
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lower in Denmark than in most other European countries14. We therefore do not expect 
serious saturation effects to be present in Denmark.  
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Figure 1: Car ownership for real estate owners and tenants in urban and rural areas. 
Source: Danish Transport Diary Survey 
 
The development in after-tax income for households is shown in figure 2 for real estate 
owners and tenants living in urban and rural areas15. We see that not only do real estate 
owning households have higher income than tenants. The income for real estate owners 
also increases more than for tenants from 1995 to 2002, both in absolute terms and in 
relative terms as shown in figure 3. A possible explanation for the increasing car 
ownership seen in figure 1 is the increasing income shown in figure 2 since we expect 
cars to be a normal good. One expectation emerging from figure 1 is that the income 
                                                 
14 Dargay et al. (2006) use data from EuroStat to show this. 
15 We define urban areas as the five largest cities in Denmark (Copenhagen and suburbs, Århus, Odense, 
Ålborg and Esbjerg). Rural areas are defined as the remaining part of Denmark. 
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elasticity decreases over the period since we expect that increasing car ownership 
decreases the income elasticity of car ownership as pointed out in Dargay & Gately 
(1999). We also expect that the increasing income shown in figure 2 will reduce the 
income elasticity for car ownership. 
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Figure 2: Average after-tax income for real estate owners and tenants deflated to 2000-
values (1.000 DKr.) 
Source: Danish Transport Diary Survey 
 
With the results from Christens & Fosgerau (2004) showing that the income elasticity in 
the urban areas is higher than the income elasticity elsewhere, we expect the number of 
cars to increase more in urban areas if the income rises equally in the two regions. As 
seen in figure 3 real estate owners have experienced the largest increases in income.  
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Figure 3: Index for after-tax income deflated to 2000 (1995=100) 
Source: Danish Transport Diary Survey 
 
Based on the increases in income we should expect car ownership to increase more for 
households living in urban areas than elsewhere. But if we look at the regional 
differences shown in figure 1 this is not the case. It turns out that it is the households not 
living in the five largest cities who have experienced the largest increase in car ownership 
even though their income has increased the least. 
 
In this paper we speculate that the value of real estate influence the demand for cars. As 
seen in Figure 4 the housing prices have increased significantly from 1992 to 2002 and if 
the hypothesis that real estate values influence car demand is true a model not 
incorporating this might produced biased forecasts.  
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Figure 4: Real estate prices (1.000 DKr.).  
Source: Statistics Denmark. 
 
The developments in housing prices have differed much between rural and urban areas as 
shown in figure 5. In 1995 the difference in average housing prices between urban and 
rural areas was about 200.000 DKr. This difference increased to around 450.000 DKr. 
and we thus see that urban households have gained much more wealth in housing than 
rural households.  
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 Figure 5: Development of real estate value in urban and rural areas 
Source: Statistics Denmark 
 
Figure 6 shows the development in the interest rate from 1992 to 2004 which has dropped 
from around 10% to around 5% in Denmark. With the falling interest rate and the 
increasing housing prices, real estate owners will be able to capitalize wealth gains from 
real estate through the Danish mortgage credit associations. If the wealth gains generate 
higher demand for cars we expect that omission of this when modeling car ownership 
will cause the estimated income elastitities to be too high thus explaining some of the 
observed inconsistency mentioned above. Since tenants do not experience this wealth 
increase, it is likely that we can find out if the hypothesis that real estate values influence 
the demand for cars. 
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With the changing housing prices being a flow variable we examine if the inclusion of a 
variable for the value of real estate prices (a stock variable) influence real estate owners 
and tenants differently. We obtain this variable from Statistics Denmark for every 
municipality in Denmark and link it to the observations from the Danish Transport Diary 
Survey. Ideally we should have the information for the individual observations but this 
information is not available. We therefore assume that the average value of real estate in 
the municipalities can be used as a proxy for the real estate value for households living in 
that municipality. 
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Figure 6: Interest on 30-years bonds.  
Source: Statistics Denmark 
 
  
- 52 -
To examine these things more closely, the next section sets up a multinomial logit model 
for car ownership and estimated it on a series of neighboring cross-section data.  
3. Model and estimation 
The model used is a simple multinomial logit model16. With the choice variable for the 
households being the number of cars this problem fits very well into a discrete 
framework. The alternatives the households choose between are ‘no cars’, ‘one car’ or 
‘more than one car’. Letting Y represent the number of cars chosen by the households, 
and letting 0V , 1V , and 2V  represent household utility when owning ‘no cars’, ‘one car’ or 
‘more than one car’, and normalizing ‘no cars’ to zero we have the following standard 
choice probabilities for the logit model 
1 2
1
1 2
2
1 2
1
1
1
1
( 0)
( 1)
( 2)
V V
V
V V
V
V V
e e
e
e e
e
e e
P Y
P Y
P Y
+ +
+ +
+ +
= =
= =
≥ =
 
 
(1)
and the functions we estimate are  
( 1)
1 1( 0)
( 2)
2 2( 0)
( ) log( )
( ) log( )
P Y
P Y
P Y
P Y
V X X
V X X
β
β
=
=
≥
=
= =
= =  
(2)
where 1β  and 2β  are vectors of parameters and X is a vector of observations. The 
'sβ can now be found using standard maximum likelihood procedures. With the 
specification given above we expect parameters that have a positive effect on car 
                                                 
16 For an introduction to the multinomial logit model see Ben-Akiva & Lerman (1985) or Train (2003) 
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ownership to fulfill 1 2β β<  and parameters having a negative effect on car ownership to 
fulfill 1 2β β>  since the chosen specification sets parameters relative to having no car17. 
 
As noted in Pendyala et al. (1995) it is important to account for differences in household 
structure when it comes to the number of adults and children. We would like to estimate 
separate models for different household types (couples with and without children, and 
singles with and without children) but in order to keep the number of observations ‘high’ 
in every estimation, we instead include variables for the number of children under the age 
of 16 and the number of people over the age of 16 in the household18. We expect both 
variables to affect the probability of car ownership positively. Since the proximity (and 
thus accessibility) of public transport also influences car ownership, we include a variable 
for the distance between nearest public transport node and the home address and a 
variable for the distance between nearest public transport node and the workplace. Our 
expectation is that a longer distance to public transport increases the possibility of car 
ownership. We also include a dummy variable for the degree of urbanization (e.g. living 
in one of the 5 largest cities in Denmark or not) together with a variable for the age of the 
interviewee since a higher degree of urbanization is expected to reduce the demand for 
cars and people of different age have different demand for cars. We also include a 
variable for age squared. Age is thus modeled in a polynomial way allowing us to capture 
life-cycle effects. The income variable included accounts for total after-tax income in the 
                                                 
17 This point becomes clear if we had chosen 
( 2)
2 2( 1)( ) log( )
P Y
P YV X Xβ≥== =  
in which case 2β  parameters are relative to having one car.  
18 We would like the distinction to be at the age of 18 since this is the legal age in Denmark for acquiring a 
drivers license. But the data does not allow us to make this distinction. 
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households deflated to 2000 values. Furthermore we hypothesis, that households living in 
areas where housing prices are ‘high’ might have a different demand for cars than 
households living in areas where real estate values are ‘low’. We include a variable for 
the average real estate value in the different municipalities. Since we do not have 
information on individual wealth we will use this variable as a proxy for household 
wealth. A list of all variables used in the model can be seen in table 2. 
3.1 Estimating the model  
The model is estimated allowing parameters to differ between years. We estimate the 
model on the five different sets of data presented in table 1 and present the parameter 
estimates and test statistics in table A.1 through A.5 in the appendix19. In general we find 
that higher income gives a higher probability of car ownership and the signs of ‘Age’ and 
‘Age2’ differ. We also see that poor access to public transport (e.g. longer distance from 
home to nearest public transport node and longer distance from work to nearest public 
transport node) gives a higher probability of car ownership. The composition of the 
family also affects the choice probabilities as expected, since both the number of children 
and the number of adults in the household has a positive effect on the choice 
probabilities. Furthermore we see that people living in less urbanized areas have higher 
probability of owning a car, and we find that not owning real estate gives a lower 
                                                 
19 The five sets are; urban real estate owners, rural real estate owners, urban tenants, rural tenants, and the 
entire sample. 
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probability of owning cars. All five models produce good values for the McFadden 2ρ  
statistics20 between 0.34 and 0.43 which we find to be satisfactory. 
 
Variable Description 
Cars 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Workpub 
Child 
Adults 
Urban 
Owner 
Value 
Number of cars available to the household 
Logaritm of household yearly after-tax income deflated to 2000 values 
Age of the person interviewed 
Squared value of age 
Distance from home to public transport 
Distance from workplace to public transport 
Number of children younger than 16 in the household 
Number of people not registered as children 
Dummy for living in highly urbanized area (5 largest cities in Denmark) 
Dummy for ownership of real estate (1 if real estate owner, 2 if tenant) 
Average value of real estate in the municipality of residence 
Table 2: Model variables 
 
We also estimate models where we do not allow parameters to differ between years, 
effectively pooling all observations together. Estimates and test statistics can also be 
found in table A.1 through A.5 in the appendix. The signs are as expected and all five 
models produce McFadden 2ρ  statistics between 0.33 and 0.43 which we find to be 
                                                 
20 The McFadden 2ρ  values are defined as ( )2 (0)(0) 1 LL βρ = −  and ( )2 ( )( ) 1 LL cc βρ = −  where L(0), L(c) and L(β) 
are likelihood values for estimations with zero coefficients, constants and all parameters respectively. A 
discussion of this measure can be found in Ortúzar & Willumsen (1994) chapter 8. 
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satisfactory. To examine if the restrictions on the parameters can be accepted we 
calculate χ2-value in all five models for the restrictions that parameters are identical for 
all years. The results are shown in table 3. 
 
 Likelihood of 
unrestricted model 
Likelihood of 
restricted model 
Degrees of 
freedom 
χ2- 
value 
A.1: All households 
A.2: Urban owners 
A.3: Rural owners 
A.4: Urban tenants 
A.5: Rural tenants 
-37.021,3581 
-7.953,7969 
-18.055,3316 
-5.846,9292 
-4.752,4732 
-37.305,5362 
-8.060,4679 
-18.176,7024 
-5.970,4143 
-4.817,3043 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
0,0000 
0,0001 
0,0000 
0,0000 
0,7236 
Table 3: Test for restricting parameters 
 
The restrictions in the full model (A.1) through (A.4) are strongly rejected but for tenants 
living in rural areas the restriction is accepted. These households are also those which 
should be affected the least, if the hypothesis that real estate values affect car demand is 
correct since they do not own real estate and live in the areas which have experienced the 
lowest increase in real estate values. 
 
The difference between real estate owners and tenants in rural areas could indicate that 
there is something causing parameter instability, which is not affecting tenants in rural 
areas. To investigate further we examine if the inclusion of a variable for real estate 
values change the results. 
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3.2 Estimating the model with a variable for real estate values 
We now estimate the model where a variable for the real estate values are included. As 
before we estimate both the restricted model where all parameters are identical for all 
years and the unrestricted model where parameters are allowed to differ between years. 
The results are shown in table A.6 through A.10 in the appendix. Table 4 summarizes the 
statistics for the restrictions. As before we see that the restrictions are rejected in all cases 
except for tenants living in rural areas. The next step is therefore to see if we can restrict 
the parameter for real estate values to zero in any of the models used. This will be done 
next. 
 Likelihood of 
unrestricted 
model 
Likelihood of 
restricted model 
Degrees 
of freedom 
χ2-
value 
A.6: All households 
A.7: Urban owners 
A.8: Rural owners 
A.9: Urban tenants 
A.10: Rural tenants 
-36.916,0413 
-7.841,0372 
-18.041,8511 
-5.819,2340 
-4.744,1334 
-37.247,5566 
-8.001,3378 
-18.172,5051 
-5.961,9033 
-4.815,1884 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
0,0000 
0,0000 
0,0000 
0,0000 
0,8127 
Table 4: Test for restricting parameters in the models with a variable for real estate values 
3.3 Testing for insignificant effect of real estate value 
Table 5 and table 6 present the test results from testing the hypotheses that the variable 
for real estate values can be set equal to zero. We test this both in the model with 
different parameters for each year and in the model with identical parameters for all 
years.  
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 Likelihood of 
unrestricted model 
Likelihood of 
restricted model 
Degrees 
of freedom 
χ2-
value 
A.6: All households (βvalue=0) 
A.7: Urban owners (βvalue=0) 
A.8: Rural owners (βvalue=0) 
A.9: Urban tenants (βvalue=0) 
A.10: Rural tenants (βvalue=0) 
-36.916,0413 
-7.841,0372 
-18.041,8511 
-5.819,2340 
-4.744,1334 
--37.021,3581 
-7.953,7969 
-18.055,3316 
-5.846,9292 
-4.752,4732 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
0,0000 
0,0000 
0,1364 
0,0000 
0,6737 
Table 5: Test for restricting parameters in the models with a variable for real estate values 
 
The results of this test are clear. For households living in rural areas the restriction is 
accepted and we conclude that the real estate values have not significantly affected these 
households. For urban areas the restriction is not accepted. We believe that this indicates 
that our hypothesis that real estate values affect car demand could be correct. As we saw 
in figure 6 the largest increases in real estate values have happened in urban areas and the 
assumption of no influence of the real estate values are rejected for households living 
here. 
 
 Likelihood of 
unrestricted model 
Likelihood of 
restricted model 
Degrees 
of freedom 
χ2-
value 
A.6: All households (βvalue=0) 
A.7: Urban owners (βvalue=0) 
A.8: Rural owners (βvalue=0) 
A.9: Urban tenants (βvalue=0) 
A.10: Rural tenants (βvalue=0) 
-37.247,5566 
-8.001,3378 
-18.172,5051 
-5.961,9033 
-4.815,1884 
-37.305,5362 
-8.060,4679 
-18.176,7024 
-5.970,4143 
-4.817,3043 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
0,0000 
0,0000 
0,2106 
0,0092 
0,6453 
Table 6: Test for restricting parameters in the models with a variable for real estate values 
and identical parameters for all years 
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4. Calculating income elasticities  
We now use the unrestricted models to find income elasticities for car ownership for the 
different household groups. These can be found by using the model to simulate the 
changing choice probabilities when the income changes. We first calculate income 
elasticities using the model without a variable for real estate values but with separate 
parameters for all years. The results are shown in figure 7. 
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 Figure 7: Income elasticities for car ownership (not including a variable for real estate 
values) 
 
It is clear that in general tenants have higher income elasticities than real estate owners 
and urban households have higher income elasticities than rural households. We also see 
that the conventional wisdom that the income elasticity for car ownership should fall over 
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time is not rejected in our model. Looking at figure 7 it also becomes clear that income 
elasticities are not stable.  
 
The magnitude of the elasticities found for all households are higher than those reported 
in Birkeland et al. (2000) but in line with those reported by Dargay (2001) using a 
pseudo-panel analysis. The findings also conform to the differences in income elasticities 
between urban and rural households reported in Christens & Fosgerau (2004) and the size 
of the elasticities found here are in line with their findings.  
 
One explanation for the difference in income elasticity between real estate owners and 
tenants could be that real estate owners have higher car ownership than tenants as shown 
in figure 1, which reduces the income elasticity for car ownership for real estate owners. 
Furthermore, real estate owners in general have higher income than tenants which also 
cause tenants to have higher income elasticities for car ownership than real estate owners.  
 
Now we calculate elasticities using the model where real estate values are included. The 
results can be seen in figure 8. The same picture as before arises with urban households 
having higher income elasticities than rural households and with tenants having higher 
income elasticities than real estate owners. Comparing figure 7 and figure 8 we see that 
the inclusion of a variable for real estate values have decreased the elasticities for all 
households with the largest decrease for real estate owners. We take this as an indication 
that the real estate values have biased the income elasticities upwards. Calculating the 
best-fit straight lines for the development in income elasticities shown in figure 7 and 
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figure 8 we can make a comparison of the slopes and the constants to see how the 
estimates are affected by the inclusion of the variable for real estate value. These are 
shown in table 8. 
 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year
In
co
m
e 
el
as
tic
ity
 fo
r c
ar
 o
w
ne
rs
hi
p
All households
Ow ners in urban areas
Ow ners in rural areas
Tenants in urban areas
Tenants in rural areas
 Figure 8: Income elasticities for car ownership (including a variable for real estate 
values) 
 
It is clear that the inclusion of the variable for real estate values have reduced the slope 
numerically and the constants for the straight line equations shown. As we see the largest 
changes have happened for real estate owners with a slope for urban real estate owners 
increasing from -0.0302 to -0.0212 and for rural real estate owners the slope increased 
from -0.0185 to -0.0110. This is an increase of 0.0090 and 0.0075. For tenants the 
increases in the slope have only been 0.0025 and 0.0002. It is thus clear that the largest 
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impact of including the variable for real estate values have been in the elasticities for real 
estate owners.  
 
For real estate owners the change in the slope due to the inclusion of a variable for real 
estate value is 29.8% for urban real estate owners and 40.5% for rural real estate owners. 
For tenants the change in slope is 17.5% for urban tenants and 1.0% for rural tenants. For 
the model with all households the change is 15.1%.  
 
For real estate owners the change in constant due to the inclusion of a variable for real 
estate value is 14.7% for urban real estate owners and 24.9% for rural real estate owners. 
For tenants the change in constant is 2.3% for urban tenants and 0.8% for rural tenants. 
For the model with all households the change is 5.4%. We conclude that the real estate 
values influence real estate owners and tenants differently and we see that omission of a 
variable for real estate prices have biased the income elastities upwards. Further 
examination of this topic we address in Nielsen (2006). 
 Without real estate values With real estate values 
All households 0.6813-0.0185*year 0.6443-0.0157*year 
Urban owners 0.8165-0.0302*year 0.6962-0.0212*year 
Rural owners 0.6813-0.0185*year 0.5116-0.0110*year 
Urban tenants 1.1969-0.0143*year 1.1692-0.0118*year 
Rural tenants 0.9110-0.0192*year 0.9036-0.0190*year 
Table 7: Best-fit linear equations for income elasticities 
 (year=0 for 1995, year=1 for 1996,…, year=7 for 2002) 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper we addressed the problem of bias in estimated parameters when simple 
cross-section methods are used to determine car ownership. The problem of parameter 
instability is not unknown and ideally time series should be used. Unfortunately transport 
researchers are often forced to use simple methods due to data limitations. Identification 
of variables which can reduce the problem is therefore in demand. We used repeated 
cross-section analysis of Danish data to show that the omission of a variable for real 
estate values bias estimated income elastities upwards. By dividing data into four groups 
which we expect to be affected differently by real estate values we are able to analyze the 
hypothesis that real estate values influence car demand. We showed that the inclusion of 
a variable for real estate values in the Danish municipalities reduce the estimated income 
elasticities showing us that omission of this variable cause the estimates to be upward 
biased. 
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Appendix A  
Estimates for the A.1 model (All households but no variable for real estate values) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Identical coef 
Choice 1 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Urban 
Owner 
Choice 2 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Urban 
Owner 
Est. t-value 
-9,8192 -13,73 
2,1582 14,98 
-0,0120 -0,56 
0,0004 1,56 
0,2758 4,22 
0,1520 2,85 
0,1658 2,49 
0,3061 3,12 
-0,9672 -10,44 
-0,7659 -7,91 
 
-28,0344 -19,75 
5,0782 19,78 
0,0305 0,77 
-0,0002 -0,45 
0,4962 6,10 
0,2229 3,29 
0,1109 1,34 
0,3290 2,58 
-1,2592 -9,22 
-1,3158 -7,25 
Est. t-value 
-9,3776 -16,70 
2,1819 19,05 
-0,0353 -2,12 
0,0006 3,32 
0,3005 5,98 
0,1002 2,37 
0,1623 3,22 
0,3859 5,06 
-1,0941 -14,93 
-0,8216 -11,07 
 
-27,0840 -24,79 
5,1079 25,54 
-0,0385 -1,32 
0,0006 1,75 
0,5075 8,00 
0,1842 3,50 
0,1451 2,30 
0,5277 5,45 
-1,3741 -12,90 
-1,2292 -9,03 
Est. t-value 
-10,4673 -17,72 
2,2801 19,23 
0,0067 0,39 
0,0002 1,00 
0,2731 5,25 
0,1566 3,48 
0,0789 1,51 
0,2563 3,15 
-1,2366 -16,00 
-0,8472 -10,92 
 
-28,5254 -26,40 
5,4031 27,62 
-0,0066 -0,22 
0,0002 0,58 
0,4322 6,81 
0,1758 3,21 
0,0486 0,75 
0,4641 4,60 
-1,6323 -14,69 
-1,4167 -10,13 
Est. t-value 
-9,3193 -17,98 
1,9542 19,29 
0,0227 1,45 
0,0000 0,15 
0,2714 5,75 
0,1212 2,77 
0,2619 4,94 
0,3861 5,28 
-1,2019 -17,17 
-0,9129 -12,92 
 
-25,4912 -27,88 
4,4288 27,79 
0,0770 2,90 
-0,0006 -2,13 
0,4491 7,89 
0,1588 3,03 
0,3153 5,05 
0,5419 5,98 
-1,6301 -16,28 
-1,3229 -10,72 
Est. t-value 
-9,1949 -16,51 
2,0074 18,39 
-0,0179 -1,03 
0,0005 2,45 
0,2394 4,92 
0,1726 3,72 
0,2445 4,57 
0,5219 6,59 
-1,1346 -14,94 
-0,7968 -10,39 
 
-22,9536 -25,24 
4,2253 26,04 
0,0034 0,12 
0,0002 0,50 
0,3673 6,38 
0,1679 3,07 
0,3139 5,01 
0,7119 7,43 
-1,6561 -15,71 
-1,3765 -10,39 
Est. t-value 
-9,0795 -16,19 
2,1833 19,30 
-0,0361 -2,03 
0,0007 3,52 
0,2475 5,16 
0,0854 1,83 
0,3851 6,53 
0,2762 3,49 
-1,2247 -15,90 
-0,9589 -12,53 
 
-24,2704 -25,20 
4,6614 27,44 
-0,0198 -0,68 
0,0004 1,29 
0,4476 7,68 
0,1182 2,12 
0,3656 5,35 
0,4547 4,72 
-1,6624 -15,15 
-1,6210 -11,65 
Est. t-value 
-9,4952 -15,89 
1,9537 16,85 
0,0170 0,92 
0,0001 0,67 
0,1278 2,70 
0,1379 2,76 
0,2298 4,01 
0,5446 6,32 
-1,1469 -14,25 
-0,8515 -10,47 
 
-24,6226 -24,55 
4,5099 25,78 
-0,0020 -0,06 
0,0003 0,97 
0,3113 5,25 
0,1610 2,68 
0,2768 4,07 
0,8065 7,57 
-1,5365 -13,44 
-1,5951 -10,52 
Est. t-alue 
-7,7651 -9,15 
1,9682 11,55 
-0,0573 -1,96 
0,0009 2,78 
0,1817 2,45 
0,1254 2,04 
0,3044 3,17 
0,3871 3,20 
-1,0358 -8,58 
-0,8357 -6,91 
 
-21,6672 -14,96 
4,2178 16,63 
-0,0209 -0,45 
0,0003 0,61 
0,2184 2,39 
0,0988 1,37 
0,3498 3,24 
0,5504 3,75 
-1,6632 -9,93 
-1,2421 -6,17 
Est. t-value 
-1,4489 -9,78 
0,0126 46,92 
0,0061 0,98 
0,0002 2,74 
0,2235 12,39 
0,1418 8,48 
0,1865 9,09 
0,4646 15,63 
-1,1307 -40,53 
-0,8533 -30,09 
 
-5,7092 -24,05 
0,0215 67,64 
0,0406 3,84 
-0,0003 -2,66 
0,3889 17,58 
0,1833 9,08 
0,2075 8,49 
0,6826 18,69 
-1,5788 -38,92 
-1,4477 -28,32 
Observations 
L(0) 
L(c) (degrees of freedom) 
L(β) (degrees of freedom) 
McFaddens ρ2 (0) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (c) 
56.464 
-62.032,0443 
-51.148,2943 
-37.021,3581 
0,4032 
0,2762 
      56.464 
-62.032,0443 
-51.202,5516 
-37.305,5362 
0,3986 
0,2714 
Table A.1: Test statistics for the model with all households. Model estimates with free variables for all years and model estimates with 
identical parameters for all years. Variable for real estate value not included. 
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Estimates for the A.2 model (Urban real estate owners but no variable for real estate values) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Identical coef 
Choice 1 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Choice 2 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Est. t-value 
-13,1682 -8,34 
2,0563 6,49 
0,0400 0,77 
-0,0001 -0,14 
0,2759 1,66 
0,2773 2,02 
0,2177 1,59 
0,6365 2,99 
 
-33,3122 -11,00 
5,3125 9,71 
0,0471 0,57 
-0,0001 -0,14 
0,2945 1,42 
0,3885 2,24 
0,0841 0,49 
0,6676 2,54 
Est. t-value 
-13,6167 -11,70 
2,3969 10,03 
0,0142 0,38 
0,0002 0,58 
0,1637 1,23 
0,0703 0,75 
0,2445 2,24 
0,3190 2,16 
 
-35,7628 -14,32 
5,5732 12,83 
0,0936 1,38 
-0,0005 -0,69 
0,4651 2,79 
0,1750 1,44 
0,4020 2,99 
0,3990 2,08 
Est. t-value 
-14,3422 -11,48 
2,4116 9,09 
0,0461 1,20 
-0,0002 -0,42 
0,4930 3,48 
0,1738 1,57 
-0,0307 -0,30 
0,1179 0,71 
 
-37,0878 -15,52 
5,7955 13,76 
0,1156 1,69 
-0,0009 -1,21 
0,9114 5,09 
0,0633 0,45 
0,0381 0,29 
0,2587 1,20 
Est. t-value 
-11,1457 -10,81 
1,7169 8,21 
0,0143 0,38 
0,0003 0,68 
0,5187 3,71 
0,0158 0,16 
0,4233 3,79 
0,5894 3,89 
 
-28,3874 -15,30 
4,2024 13,27 
0,0982 1,65 
-0,0007 -1,13 
0,8760 5,27 
-0,1435 -1,11 
0,4529 3,42 
0,5831 3,01 
Est. t-value 
-11,2608 -10,04 
1,9496 8,35 
-0,0326 -0,79 
0,0008 1,82 
0,3257 2,35 
0,1573 1,42 
0,4610 4,01 
0,4921 2,99 
 
-27,4226 -14,06 
4,3128 12,66 
-0,0270 -0,41 
0,0008 1,08 
0,6585 3,95 
0,0599 0,43 
0,5414 3,92 
0,8643 4,22 
Est. t-value 
-11,5683 -10,58 
1,9376 8,18 
0,0059 0,14 
0,0004 0,87 
0,3652 2,69 
-0,0789 -0,72 
0,4563 3,89 
0,3312 2,04 
 
-26,1558 -13,82 
4,3841 12,98 
-0,0571 -0,88 
0,0010 1,47 
0,6468 3,92 
-0,1129 -0,80 
0,5696 4,12 
0,5114 2,49 
Est. t-value 
-13,8841 -10,87 
2,3117 8,99 
0,0039 0,09 
0,0005 1,09 
0,5027 3,29 
0,1299 1,13 
0,3348 2,77 
0,2887 1,68 
 
-29,6404 -14,62 
4,6372 13,15 
0,0026 0,04 
0,0006 0,85 
0,5969 3,16 
0,0404 0,28 
0,4664 3,24 
0,7404 3,50 
Est. t-value 
-7,6215 -4,13 
1,7115 4,42 
-0,1535 -1,95 
0,0023 2,71 
0,0697 0,28 
0,1646 1,11 
0,7590 3,76 
0,4379 1,56 
 
-22,1481 -7,33 
3,9633 7,26 
-0,1243 -1,13 
0,0020 1,70 
0,0447 0,15 
0,0434 0,24 
0,7461 3,25 
0,4582 1,35 
Est. t-value 
-4,1225 -13,64 
0,0112 22,56 
0,0191 1,32 
0,0002 1,37 
0,3568 6,89 
0,1003 2,58 
0,2901 6,80 
0,4290 7,05 
 
-9,6952 -19,38 
0,0188 32,70 
0,0719 3,04 
-0,0004 -1,44 
0,6128 9,68 
0,0753 1,52 
0,3689 7,20 
0,6566 8,67 
Observations 
L(0) 
L(c) (degrees of freedom) 
L(β) (degrees of freedom) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (0) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (c) 
10.990 
-12.073,7491 
-10.125,5609 
-7.953,7969 
0,3412 
0.2145 
      10.990 
-12.073,7491 
-10.132,4230 
-8.060,4679 
0,3324 
0,2025 
Table A.2: Test statistics for the model with all households. Model estimates with free variables for all years and model estimates with 
identical parameters for all years. Variable for real estate value not included. 
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Estimates for the A.3 model (Rural real estate owners but no variable for real estate values) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Identical coef 
Choice 1 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Choice 2 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Est. t-value 
-10,9887 -7,07 
2,0183 6,29 
0,0488 1,09 
-0,0003 -0,67 
0,3246 2,92 
0,0231 0,24 
0,1130 0,98 
0,3731 1,80 
 
-30,4935 -13,98 
4,8902 11,71 
0,1455 2,33 
-0,0015 -2,21 
0,5927 4,79 
0,0705 0,65 
0,1098 0,85 
0,3053 1,33 
Est. t-value 
-11,7382 -9,46 
2,1496 8,64 
0,0150 0,44 
0,0002 0,48 
0,2782 3,48 
0,0598 0,77 
0,3072 2,99 
0,6665 4,03 
 
-29,9672 -17,69 
5,1220 15,79 
0,0050 0,11 
0,0002 0,43 
0,4586 5,03 
0,1262 1,47 
0,2851 2,55 
0,8388 4,65 
Est. t-value 
-13,1728 -10,24 
2,5698 10,36 
0,0269 0,73 
0,0000 0,02 
0,1467 1,84 
0,0799 0,93 
0,2138 1,95 
0,3874 2,40 
 
-30,4862 -18,13 
5,4977 17,48 
0,0107 0,22 
0,0000 -0,06 
0,2555 2,86 
0,1015 1,10 
0,1434 1,21 
0,6262 3,58 
Est. t-value 
-9,8357 -8,98 
1,7775 8,28 
0,0135 0,40 
0,0001 0,37 
0,2154 2,70 
0,0990 1,17 
0,4746 3,83 
0,8548 5,48 
 
-26,7399 -18,59 
4,2921 16,06 
0,0781 1,82 
-0,0007 -1,44 
0,3599 4,13 
0,1793 2,00 
0,4974 3,84 
0,9908 5,90 
Est. t-value 
-8,9171 -7,55 
1,4695 6,17 
0,0418 1,16 
-0,0003 -0,73 
0,1015 1,42 
0,2311 2,64 
0,1853 1,66 
1,1276 6,34 
 
-22,9029 -15,85 
3,6003 12,89 
0,0786 1,79 
-0,0008 -1,63 
0,1949 2,48 
0,2258 2,43 
0,2638 2,26 
1,2704 6,75 
Est. t-value 
-11,0497 -8,35 
2,2570 8,70 
-0,0249 -0,61 
0,0006 1,37 
0,1855 2,41 
0,0344 0,39 
0,4989 3,49 
0,6890 3,70 
 
-26,8778 -16,54 
4,7645 15,57 
-0,0177 -0,36 
0,0004 0,70 
0,3540 4,15 
0,0896 0,95 
0,4519 3,05 
0,9229 4,67 
Est. t-value 
-10,9490 -8,37 
1,8521 7,54 
0,0554 1,39 
-0,0003 -0,61 
0,0290 0,40 
0,1980 2,00 
0,1857 1,59 
0,8621 4,76 
 
-27,0654 -16,50 
4,3990 14,82 
0,0555 1,12 
-0,0003 -0,52 
0,2201 2,71 
0,2461 2,35 
0,2354 1,91 
1,0530 5,38 
Est. t-value 
-10,4957 -5,66 
1,9860 5,31 
0,0099 0,16 
0,0002 0,25 
0,1578 1,35 
0,1799 1,53 
0,1766 0,92 
0,7323 2,76 
 
-25,9104 -10,93 
4,3955 9,86 
0,0555 0,72 
-0,0005 -0,65 
0,1938 1,48 
0,1880 1,51 
0,2332 1,17 
0,9039 3,19 
Est. t-value 
-3,2004 -10,43 
0,0123 20,40 
0,0354 2,65 
-0,0001 -0,92 
0,1560 5,51 
0,1187 3,75 
0,2202 5,17 
0,8204 12,99 
 
-8,1781 -22,00 
0,0218 33,81 
0,0756 4,46 
-0,0007 -3,95 
0,3004 9,49 
0,1696 5,00 
0,2333 5,17 
1,0106 14,88 
Observations 
L(0) 
L(c) (degrees of freedom) 
L(β) (degrees of freedom) 
McFaddens ρ2 (0) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (c) 
29.174 
-32.050,9149 
-21.168,3518 
-18.055,3316 
0,4367 
0,1471 
      29.174 
-32.050,9149 
-21.214,8269 
-18.176,7024 
0,4329 
0,1432 
Table A.3: Test statistics for the model with all households. Model estimates with free variables for all years and model estimates with 
identical parameters for all years. Variable for real estate value not included. 
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Estimates for the A.4 model (Urban tenants but no variable for real estate values) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Identical coef 
Choice 1 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Choice 2 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Est. t-value 
-12,2322 -10,41 
2,3956 9,02 
-0,0374 -0,92 
0,0006 1,42 
0,1851 1,16 
-0,0400 -0,36 
0,3117 2,16 
0,0444 0,23 
 
-31,2998 -5,81 
5,1608 5,07 
-0,1269 -0,80 
0,0015 0,79 
0,6917 1,56 
-0,0523 -0,18 
0,0372 0,10 
1,3582 2,83 
Est. t-value 
-10,6336 -12,00 
2,3504 11,42 
-0,1226 -3,98 
0,0015 4,53 
0,2597 2,23 
0,1106 1,24 
0,1467 1,46 
0,1299 0,95 
 
-25,1345 -8,47 
4,3206 7,36 
-0,0169 -0,19 
0,0000 -0,02 
0,8821 3,48 
0,0547 0,27 
-1,0878 -2,89 
-0,1297 -0,38 
Est. t-value 
-11,1991 -12,22 
2,0526 10,13 
-0,0385 -1,24 
0,0006 1,88 
0,3032 2,57 
0,1640 1,84 
0,0608 0,58 
0,2638 1,75 
 
-31,9303 -7,75 
6,2462 8,25 
-0,3122 -2,77 
0,0038 2,96 
-0,3416 -0,65 
0,8800 3,84 
-0,0008 0,00 
0,3345 0,71 
Est. t-value 
-13,2917 -14,29 
2,1779 11,29 
0,0486 1,65 
-0,0002 -0,73 
0,3145 2,88 
0,1760 1,90 
0,1145 1,15 
-0,0510 -0,37 
 
-31,8202 -9,55 
4,7447 7,81 
0,0978 0,98 
-0,0007 -0,63 
0,7034 2,56 
0,0148 0,06 
-0,4361 -1,40 
0,2844 0,83 
Est. t-value 
-12,4605 -13,24 
2,4414 12,11 
-0,0594 -1,83 
0,0009 2,50 
0,3266 2,75 
0,1054 0,98 
0,3775 3,75 
0,0614 0,44 
 
-25,3325 -8,87 
4,1904 7,95 
-0,0430 -0,46 
0,0005 0,51 
0,6219 2,22 
0,1995 0,91 
0,1634 0,73 
0,3734 1,20 
Est. t-value 
-11,5224 -12,32 
2,2995 11,59 
-0,0739 -2,24 
0,0010 2,84 
0,4141 3,49 
0,1499 1,51 
0,3894 3,61 
-0,0330 -0,24 
 
-34,3646 -8,83 
5,8738 8,21 
-0,0034 -0,03 
0,0004 0,33 
0,5858 1,80 
0,2807 1,16 
-0,1225 -0,42 
-0,8083 -1,81 
Est. t-value 
-10,8954 -11,49 
1,8349 8,90 
0,0111 0,31 
0,0001 0,20 
0,0196 0,17 
-0,0543 -0,47 
0,1621 1,46 
0,5333 3,22 
 
-28,3631 -7,88 
4,9150 7,99 
-0,1193 -0,99 
0,0013 0,92 
0,4236 1,17 
-0,1235 -0,45 
0,0924 0,35 
0,8046 1,82 
Est. t-value 
-11,5442 -8,00 
2,1013 6,69 
-0,0164 -0,32 
0,0003 0,62 
0,3781 2,06 
-0,0808 -0,62 
0,4882 2,39 
0,2304 1,02 
 
-26,5916 -5,60 
4,6859 5,19 
-0,1610 -1,04 
0,0016 0,92 
0,5089 1,11 
-0,0061 -0,02 
0,3657 1,06 
1,2380 2,34 
Est. t-value 
-3,3886 -14,00 
0,0132 27,77 
-0,0146 -1,26 
0,0004 3,06 
0,2467 5,78 
0,1016 2,85 
0,2039 5,11 
0,2057 3,77 
 
-8,5283 -11,48 
0,0230 26,33 
-0,0345 -0,92 
0,0005 1,15 
0,5314 4,69 
0,2122 2,51 
-0,1700 -1,68 
0,4200 3,34 
Observations 
L(0) 
L(c) (degrees of freedom) 
L(β) (degrees of freedom) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (0) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (c) 
9.435 
-10.365,4069 
-7.498,6473 
-5.846,9292 
0,4359 
0,2203 
      9.435 
-10.365,4069 
-7.507,2105 
-5.970,4143 
0,4240 
0,2047 
Table A.4: Test statistics for the model with all households. Model estimates with free variables for all years and model estimates with 
identical parameters for all years. Variable for real estate value not included. 
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 Estimates for the A.5 model (Rural tenants but no variable for real estate values) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Identical coef 
Choice 1 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Choice 2 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Est. t-value 
-10,0490 -7,92 
2,1192 7,48 
-0,0599 -1,46 
0,0008 1,81 
0,2676 2,25 
0,3073 3,12 
0,1056 0,67 
0,1007 0,49 
 
-26,9017 -6,78 
4,8788 6,29 
-0,0758 -0,64 
0,0008 0,58 
0,3811 1,61 
0,4244 2,45 
-0,4890 -1,42 
0,2602 0,62 
Est. t-value 
-10,1520 -9,17 
1,8542 7,24 
0,0090 0,26 
-0,0001 -0,16 
0,3893 3,83 
0,1394 1,70 
0,0120 0,12 
0,3518 1,89 
 
-29,3039 -8,40 
5,2491 7,65 
-0,1189 -1,13 
0,0011 0,83 
0,5859 3,20 
0,4122 2,79 
0,1172 0,59 
0,8120 2,19 
Est. t-value 
-11,8626 -9,69 
2,2532 8,66 
0,0037 0,10 
0,0002 0,48 
0,3192 3,15 
0,1781 2,13 
0,0666 0,57 
0,0479 0,26 
 
-31,9003 -9,31 
5,3295 8,52 
0,0576 0,60 
-0,0006 -0,56 
0,6851 4,31 
0,1770 1,25 
-0,0095 -0,05 
0,1878 0,57 
Est. t-value 
-10,3137 -10,53 
2,0324 9,48 
0,0011 0,04 
0,0001 0,19 
0,2271 2,78 
0,1273 1,57 
0,1311 1,22 
0,1383 0,88 
 
-24,8556 -10,12 
4,1739 8,83 
-0,0252 -0,36 
0,0003 0,43 
0,3934 2,90 
0,1206 0,90 
0,4296 2,76 
0,7768 2,92 
Est. t-value 
-9,5764 -8,51 
1,9026 7,91 
-0,0419 -1,20 
0,0006 1,52 
0,3271 3,37 
0,1289 1,55 
-0,0573 -0,52 
0,4525 2,51 
 
-29,5413 -9,09 
5,1596 8,32 
-0,0602 -0,63 
0,0007 0,63 
0,5505 3,44 
0,2631 1,79 
0,0062 0,03 
0,5170 1,41 
Est. t-value 
-9,4138 -8,80 
1,9314 8,29 
-0,0418 -1,28 
0,0006 1,64 
0,1734 2,03 
0,1930 2,25 
0,2366 1,98 
0,2306 1,40 
 
-26,0697 -8,59 
3,8689 7,56 
0,1432 1,43 
-0,0018 -1,47 
0,5809 3,85 
0,0186 0,12 
0,1732 0,90 
0,3890 1,49 
Est. t-value 
-10,4882 -9,20 
1,9687 7,91 
-0,0009 -0,03 
0,0002 0,56 
0,1507 1,70 
0,2131 2,45 
0,2639 2,24 
0,2331 1,30 
 
-29,4290 -8,43 
5,0107 7,74 
-0,0109 -0,09 
0,0001 0,04 
0,3607 1,92 
0,0345 0,18 
-0,0618 -0,25 
0,6504 1,85 
Est. t-value 
-7,6365 -4,98 
2,0162 5,83 
-0,1094 -1,93 
0,0012 1,95 
0,0728 0,56 
0,2315 1,87 
-0,0462 -0,24 
0,0892 0,39 
 
-19,7749 -5,18 
3,2026 4,69 
0,0949 0,70 
-0,0012 -0,81 
0,2568 1,20 
-0,1136 -0,52 
0,1053 0,38 
0,1280 0,33 
Est. t-value 
-2,7396 -10,57 
0,0147 21,97 
-0,0060 -0,49 
0,0002 1,43 
0,2281 6,80 
0,1870 6,07 
0,0782 1,84 
0,2150 3,33 
 
-8,3348 -13,19 
0,0250 24,64 
0,0115 0,34 
-0,0002 -0,53 
0,4625 7,90 
0,1959 3,59 
0,1085 1,52 
0,5763 5,13 
Observations 
L(0) 
L(c) (degrees of freedom) 
L(β) (degrees of freedom) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (0) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (c) 
6.865 
-7.541,9734 
-5.919,4227 
-4.752,4732 
0,3699 
0,1971 
      6.865 
-7.541,9734 
-5.926,5814 
-4.817,3043 
0,3613 
0,1872 
Table A.5: Test statistics for the model with all households. Model estimates with free variables for all years and model estimates with 
identical parameters for all years. Variable for real estate value not included. 
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 Estimates for the A.6 model (All households and a variable for real estate values) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Identical coef 
Choice 1 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Urban 
Owner 
Value 
Choice 2 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Urban 
Owner 
Value 
Est. t-value 
-10,1048 -14,02 
2,1139 14,62 
-0,0116 -0,54 
0,0004 1,50 
0,2676 4,10 
0,1531 2,87 
0,1494 2,23 
0,2996 3,03 
-1,0744 -10,90 
-0,6464 -6,27 
0,0008 3,36 
 
-28,1495 -19,74 
4,8584 18,75 
0,0337 0,85 
-0,0003 -0,61 
0,4906 6,02 
0,2248 3,31 
0,0796 0,96 
0,3358 2,62 
-1,6364 -10,65 
-1,0061 -5,31 
0,0017 5,69 
Est. t-value 
-9,7002 -17,18 
2,1105 18,31 
-0,0374 -2,24 
0,0006 3,33 
0,2884 5,75 
0,1001 2,37 
0,1368 2,70 
0,3904 5,08 
-1,2346 -15,86 
-0,6379 -7,93 
0,0010 5,81 
 
-27,1152 -24,72 
4,8732 24,07 
-0,0419 -1,43 
0,0006 1,74 
0,4953 7,81 
0,1911 3,62 
0,1106 1,74 
0,5467 5,60 
-1,7261 -14,58 
-0,8678 -6,02 
0,0017 7,72 
Est. t-value 
-10,5801 -17,90 
2,2282 18,69 
0,0043 0,25 
0,0002 1,05 
0,2646 5,09 
0,1560 3,47 
0,0622 1,19 
0,2644 3,24 
-1,3258 -16,20 
-0,7336 -8,74 
0,0005 3,49 
 
-28,5041 -26,34 
5,2782 26,61 
-0,0090 -0,30 
0,0002 0,58 
0,4277 6,74 
0,1757 3,21 
0,0249 0,39 
0,4793 4,74 
-1,8145 -14,87 
-1,2266 -8,32 
0,0008 4,12 
Est. t-value 
-9,5156 -18,26 
1,9021 18,66 
0,0192 1,22 
0,0000 0,26 
0,2614 5,55 
0,1203 2,75 
0,2410 4,53 
0,3837 5,23 
-1,3241 -17,63 
-0,7758 -10,21 
0,0006 4,76 
 
-25,3696 -27,64 
4,2330 26,11 
0,0739 2,78 
-0,0006 -2,15 
0,4410 7,76 
0,1614 3,08 
0,2841 4,52 
0,5544 6,10 
-1,9381 -17,25 
-1,0658 -8,24 
0,0011 6,59 
Est. t-value 
-9,3042 -16,68 
1,9585 17,81 
-0,0195 -1,12 
0,0005 2,47 
0,2363 4,87 
0,1721 3,72 
0,2331 4,34 
0,5249 6,61 
-1,2407 -14,92 
-0,7029 -8,60 
0,0004 3,27 
 
-22,9351 -25,19 
4,0972 24,88 
0,0021 0,08 
0,0001 0,47 
0,3709 6,45 
0,1704 3,12 
0,2962 4,71 
0,7199 7,49 
-1,8896 -15,83 
-1,2038 -8,72 
0,0007 4,40 
Est. t-value 
-9,1202 -16,26 
2,1624 18,95 
-0,0368 -2,07 
0,0007 3,54 
0,2447 5,10 
0,0876 1,87 
0,3803 6,43 
0,2776 3,50 
-1,2712 -14,98 
-0,9214 -11,35 
0,0002 1,37 
 
-24,1350 -25,00 
4,5572 26,34 
-0,0200 -0,69 
0,0004 1,25 
0,4488 7,70 
0,1245 2,23 
0,3539 5,16 
0,4633 4,80 
-1,8263 -14,75 
-1,5156 -10,52 
0,0004 2,72 
Est. t-value 
-9,5093 -15,90 
1,9512 16,69 
0,0167 0,90 
0,0001 0,68 
0,1268 2,68 
0,1380 2,76 
0,2290 3,99 
0,5442 6,31 
-1,1568 -12,62 
-0,8437 -9,81 
0,0000 0,30 
 
-24,3291 -24,20 
4,3540 24,52 
-0,0007 -0,02 
0,0003 0,84 
0,3243 5,47 
0,1635 2,72 
0,2638 3,87 
0,8182 7,67 
-1,7865 -13,47 
-1,4529 -9,28 
0,0004 3,23 
Est. t-value 
-7,8113 -9,18 
1,9555 11,40 
-0,0575 -1,97 
0,0009 2,78 
0,1816 2,45 
0,1252 2,04 
0,3019 3,14 
0,3907 3,23 
-1,0807 -7,69 
-0,8100 -6,36 
0,0001 0,65 
 
-21,5514 -14,85 
4,1333 16,04 
-0,0207 -0,44 
0,0003 0,58 
0,2220 2,44 
0,0992 1,38 
0,3475 3,22 
0,5576 3,80 
-1,8220 -9,29 
-1,1642 -5,60 
0,0003 1,49 
Est. t-value 
-1,6420 -10,84 
0,0124 45,79 
0,0054 0,86 
0,0002 2,75 
0,2200 12,20 
0,1433 8,56 
0,1805 8,79 
0,4709 15,79 
-1,1916 -39,96 
-0,7972 -26,75 
0,0003 6,11 
 
-6,1339 -25,41 
0,0209 64,75 
0,0404 3,81 
-0,0003 -2,84 
0,3899 17,63 
0,1874 9,28 
0,1934 7,90 
0,6992 19,10 
-1,7655 -39,78 
-1,3107 -24,89 
0,0006 10,46 
Observations 
L(0) 
L(c) (degrees of freedom) 
L(β) (degrees of freedom) 
McFaddens ρ2 (0) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (c) 
56.464 
-62.032,0443 
-51.148,2943 (18) 
-36.916,0413 (180) 
0,4049 
0,2783 
      56.464 
-62.032,0443 
-51.202,5516 (2) 
-37.247,5566 (22) 
0,3995 
0,2725 
Table A.6: Test statistics for the model with all households. Model estimates with free variables for all years and model estimates with 
identical parameters for all years. Variable for real estate value included. 
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Estimates for the A.7 model (Urban real estate owners and a variable for real estate values) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Identical coef 
Choice 1 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Value 
Choice 2 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Value 
Est. t-value 
-12,7202 -8,07 
1,8781 5,78 
0,0397 0,76 
-0,0001 -0,24 
0,2460 1,47 
0,2891 2,09 
0,1611 1,16 
0,6070 2,81 
0,0010 2,35 
 
-31,7394 -10,38 
4,7132 8,47 
0,0571 0,68 
-0,0004 -0,40 
0,2122 1,01 
0,4121 2,34 
-0,0351 -0,20 
0,6661 2,50 
0,0023 4,58 
Est. t-value 
-12,5693 -10,77 
2,1086 8,63 
-0,0065 -0,17 
0,0003 0,79 
0,0432 0,32 
0,0969 1,02 
0,1365 1,23 
0,2806 1,87 
0,0018 5,84 
 
-33,3613 -13,18 
4,9049 11,05 
0,0706 1,02 
-0,0005 -0,62 
0,2974 1,74 
0,2095 1,69 
0,2662 1,94 
0,3906 2,00 
0,0027 7,40 
Est. t-value 
-13,6642 -10,91 
2,2103 8,17 
0,0425 1,10 
-0,0002 -0,50 
0,4349 3,06 
0,1746 1,57 
-0,0946 -0,90 
0,1348 0,80 
0,0008 3,13 
 
-35,8590 -14,89 
5,4350 12,58 
0,1141 1,67 
-0,0010 -1,33 
0,8499 4,74 
0,0577 0,41 
-0,0501 -0,37 
0,2881 1,32 
0,0011 3,56 
Est. t-value 
-10,8348 -10,50 
1,6197 7,66 
0,0054 0,15 
0,0003 0,72 
0,4442 3,16 
0,0161 0,16 
0,3318 2,90 
0,5412 3,54 
0,0008 3,63 
 
-26,4259 -14,08 
3,6939 11,33 
0,0888 1,48 
-0,0008 -1,19 
0,7808 4,67 
-0,1489 -1,14 
0,2985 2,19 
0,5600 2,87 
0,0014 5,72 
Est. t-value 
-10,8919 -9,69 
1,7949 7,62 
-0,0458 -1,10 
0,0009 1,91 
0,2835 2,03 
0,1680 1,51 
0,3733 3,19 
0,4289 2,60 
0,0010 4,52 
 
-25,4350 -12,91 
3,7540 10,72 
-0,0459 -0,69 
0,0008 1,12 
0,6092 3,63 
0,1033 0,74 
0,3884 2,74 
0,7781 3,76 
0,0018 6,58 
Est. t-value 
-11,3777 -10,41 
1,8342 7,66 
0,0006 0,01 
0,0004 0,86 
0,2985 2,18 
-0,0568 -0,52 
0,3945 3,30 
0,3061 1,88 
0,0006 2,98 
 
-25,0223 -13,11 
4,0567 11,72 
-0,0680 -1,04 
0,0010 1,46 
0,5699 3,43 
-0,0743 -0,53 
0,4601 3,25 
0,4984 2,42 
0,0010 4,14 
Est. t-value 
-13,7924 -10,78 
2,2742 8,77 
0,0005 0,01 
0,0005 1,11 
0,4888 3,21 
0,1229 1,07 
0,3191 2,62 
0,2778 1,62 
0,0002 1,18 
 
-28,3596 -13,89 
4,2597 11,83 
0,0041 0,06 
0,0005 0,67 
0,5613 2,96 
0,0167 0,11 
0,4031 2,77 
0,7385 3,48 
0,0008 3,55 
Est. t-value 
-7,4517 -4,03 
1,6152 4,13 
-0,1591 -2,03 
0,0024 2,75 
0,0251 0,10 
0,1785 1,20 
0,7310 3,62 
0,4481 1,58 
0,0004 1,43 
 
-21,4223 -7,05 
3,7243 6,71 
-0,1333 -1,20 
0,0021 1,73 
-0,0080 -0,03 
0,0544 0,30 
0,7278 3,16 
0,4689 1,37 
0,0006 1,93 
Est. t-value 
-4,3066 -14,17 
0,0107 20,96 
0,0166 1,14 
0,0002 1,23 
0,3235 6,25 
0,1083 2,77 
0,2530 5,88 
0,4297 7,02 
0,0005 6,74 
 
-10,0625 -19,94 
0,0173 29,37 
0,0699 2,94 
-0,0004 -1,73 
0,5701 8,98 
0,0864 1,73 
0,2955 5,69 
0,6690 8,79 
0,0009 10,51 
Observations 
L(0) 
L(c) (degrees of freedom) 
L(β) (degrees of freedom) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (0) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (c) 
10.990 
-12.073,7491 
-10.125,5609 (18) 
-7.841,0372 (180) 
0,3506 
0,2256 
      10.990 
-12.073,7491 
-10.132,4230 (2) 
-8.001,3378 (22) 
0,3373 
0,2103 
Table A.7: Test statistics for the model with all households. Model estimates with free variables for all years and model estimates with 
identical parameters for all years. Variable for real estate value included. 
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Estimates for the A.8 model (Rural real estate owners and a variable for real estate values) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Identical coef 
Choice 1 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Value 
Choice 2 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Value 
Est. t-value 
-10,9842 -7,06 
2,0336 6,25 
0,0488 1,09 
-0,0003 -0,66 
0,3238 2,91 
0,0235 0,24 
0,1146 0,99 
0,3727 1,79 
-0,0002 -0,28 
 
-30,4213 -13,94 
4,8057 11,36 
0,1470 2,36 
-0,0016 -2,25 
0,6017 4,86 
0,0686 0,63 
0,1068 0,83 
0,3142 1,36 
0,0006 0,93 
Est. t-value 
-11,7386 -9,44 
2,2000 8,73 
0,0164 0,48 
0,0002 0,47 
0,2770 3,46 
0,0603 0,77 
0,3185 3,08 
0,6626 4,00 
-0,0005 -1,37 
 
-29,8701 -17,61 
5,1189 15,56 
0,0060 0,13 
0,0002 0,43 
0,4607 5,04 
0,1298 1,51 
0,2951 2,62 
0,8391 4,65 
-0,0002 -0,50 
Est. t-value 
-13,2030 -10,27 
2,5037 9,99 
0,0237 0,64 
0,0000 0,07 
0,1497 1,88 
0,0861 1,00 
0,2017 1,84 
0,4003 2,47 
0,0007 1,80 
 
-30,5557 -18,16 
5,4559 17,09 
0,0076 0,16 
0,0000 -0,03 
0,2554 2,86 
0,1070 1,16 
0,1327 1,12 
0,6364 3,63 
0,0006 1,31 
Est. t-value 
-9,8478 -8,98 
1,7687 8,16 
0,0134 0,40 
0,0001 0,37 
0,2163 2,72 
0,0991 1,17 
0,4739 3,83 
0,8541 5,48 
0,0001 0,29 
 
-26,7402 -18,57 
4,2738 15,78 
0,0780 1,82 
-0,0007 -1,44 
0,3616 4,15 
0,1797 2,00 
0,4969 3,84 
0,9915 5,90 
0,0001 0,39 
Est. t-value 
-8,9202 -7,55 
1,4820 6,12 
0,0418 1,16 
-0,0003 -0,72 
0,1014 1,42 
0,2310 2,64 
0,1864 1,67 
1,1242 6,32 
-0,0001 -0,29 
 
-22,9384 -15,86 
3,6475 12,84 
0,0785 1,78 
-0,0008 -1,61 
0,1889 2,40 
0,2245 2,42 
0,2657 2,27 
1,2632 6,71 
-0,0003 -0,85 
Est. t-value 
-11,0389 -8,35 
2,2960 8,69 
-0,0261 -0,64 
0,0006 1,40 
0,1822 2,36 
0,0356 0,40 
0,5014 3,50 
0,6826 3,67 
-0,0002 -0,78 
 
-26,8801 -16,53 
4,8116 15,41 
-0,0190 -0,39 
0,0004 0,74 
0,3498 4,09 
0,0904 0,96 
0,4544 3,07 
0,9155 4,64 
-0,0002 -0,81 
Est. t-value 
-11,0392 -8,42 
1,9819 7,88 
0,0604 1,51 
-0,0003 -0,69 
0,0192 0,27 
0,1885 1,88 
0,1973 1,67 
0,8417 4,63 
-0,0007 -2,98 
 
-27,0133 -16,45 
4,4498 14,68 
0,0606 1,22 
-0,0003 -0,61 
0,2236 2,73 
0,2389 2,25 
0,2442 1,96 
1,0424 5,31 
-0,0005 -1,66 
Est. t-value 
-10,4784 -5,64 
2,0136 5,33 
0,0100 0,16 
0,0002 0,26 
0,1526 1,30 
0,1816 1,55 
0,1792 0,93 
0,7277 2,74 
-0,0002 -0,56 
 
-25,8419 -10,88 
4,3957 9,71 
0,0563 0,72 
-0,0005 -0,65 
0,1914 1,45 
0,1901 1,53 
0,2359 1,18 
0,9014 3,18 
-0,0001 -0,27 
Est. t-value 
-3,1744 -10,21 
0,0124 20,22 
0,0355 2,66 
-0,0001 -0,92 
0,1554 5,48 
0,1186 3,75 
0,2207 5,18 
0,8191 12,96 
0,0000 -0,48 
 
-8,2534 -21,90 
0,0217 33,16 
0,0759 4,48 
-0,0007 -3,98 
0,3039 9,59 
0,1706 5,03 
0,2326 5,16 
1,0146 14,92 
0,0001 0,99 
Observations 
L(0) 
L(c) (degrees of freedom) 
L(β) (degrees of freedom) 
McFaddens ρ2 (0) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (c) 
29.174 
-32.050,9149 
-21.168,3518 (18) 
-18.041,8511 (180) 
0,4371 
0,1477 
      29.174 
-32.050,9149 
-21.214,8269 (2) 
-18.172,5051 (22) 
0,4330 
0,1434 
Table A.8: Test statistics for the model with all households. Model estimates with free variables for all years and model estimates with 
identical parameters for all years. Variable for real estate value included. 
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Estimates for the A.9 model (Urban tenants and a variable for real estate values) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Identical 
coef 
Choice 1 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Value 
Choice 2 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Value 
Est. t-value 
-10,9842 -7,06 
2,0336 6,25 
0,0488 1,09 
-0,0003 -0,66 
0,3238 2,91 
0,0235 0,24 
0,1146 0,99 
0,3727 1,79 
-0,0002 -0,28 
 
-30,4213 -13,94 
4,8057 11,36 
0,1470 2,36 
-0,0016 -2,25 
0,6017 4,86 
0,0686 0,63 
0,1068 0,83 
0,3142 1,36 
0,0006 0,93 
Est. t-value 
-11,7386 -9,44 
2,2000 8,73 
0,0164 0,48 
0,0002 0,47 
0,2770 3,46 
0,0603 0,77 
0,3185 3,08 
0,6626 4,00 
-0,0005 -1,37 
 
-29,8701 -17,61 
5,1189 15,56 
0,0060 0,13 
0,0002 0,43 
0,4607 5,04 
0,1298 1,51 
0,2951 2,62 
0,8391 4,65 
-0,0002 -0,50 
Est. t-value 
-13,2030 -10,27 
2,5037 9,99 
0,0237 0,64 
0,0000 0,07 
0,1497 1,88 
0,0861 1,00 
0,2017 1,84 
0,4003 2,47 
0,0007 1,80 
 
-30,5557 -18,16 
5,4559 17,09 
0,0076 0,16 
0,0000 -0,03 
0,2554 2,86 
0,1070 1,16 
0,1327 1,12 
0,6364 3,63 
0,0006 1,31 
Est. t-value 
-9,8478 -8,98 
1,7687 8,16 
0,0134 0,40 
0,0001 0,37 
0,2163 2,72 
0,0991 1,17 
0,4739 3,83 
0,8541 5,48 
0,0001 0,29 
 
-26,7402 -18,57 
4,2738 15,78 
0,0780 1,82 
-0,0007 -1,44 
0,3616 4,15 
0,1797 2,00 
0,4969 3,84 
0,9915 5,90 
0,0001 0,39 
Est. t-value 
-8,9202 -7,55 
1,4820 6,12 
0,0418 1,16 
-0,0003 -0,72 
0,1014 1,42 
0,2310 2,64 
0,1864 1,67 
1,1242 6,32 
-0,0001 -0,29 
 
-22,9384 -15,86 
3,6475 12,84 
0,0785 1,78 
-0,0008 -1,61 
0,1889 2,40 
0,2245 2,42 
0,2657 2,27 
1,2632 6,71 
-0,0003 -0,85 
Est. t-value 
-11,0389 -8,35 
2,2960 8,69 
-0,0261 -0,64 
0,0006 1,40 
0,1822 2,36 
0,0356 0,40 
0,5014 3,50 
0,6826 3,67 
-0,0002 -0,78 
 
-26,8801 -16,53 
4,8116 15,41 
-0,0190 -0,39 
0,0004 0,74 
0,3498 4,09 
0,0904 0,96 
0,4544 3,07 
0,9155 4,64 
-0,0002 -0,81 
Est. t-value 
-11,0392 -8,42 
1,9819 7,88 
0,0604 1,51 
-0,0003 -0,69 
0,0192 0,27 
0,1885 1,88 
0,1973 1,67 
0,8417 4,63 
-0,0007 -2,98 
 
-27,0133 -16,45 
4,4498 14,68 
0,0606 1,22 
-0,0003 -0,61 
0,2236 2,73 
0,2389 2,25 
0,2442 1,96 
1,0424 5,31 
-0,0005 -1,66 
Est. t-value 
-10,4784 -5,64 
2,0136 5,33 
0,0100 0,16 
0,0002 0,26 
0,1526 1,30 
0,1816 1,55 
0,1792 0,93 
0,7277 2,74 
-0,0002 -0,56 
 
-25,8419 -10,88 
4,3957 9,71 
0,0563 0,72 
-0,0005 -0,65 
0,1914 1,45 
0,1901 1,53 
0,2359 1,18 
0,9014 3,18 
-0,0001 -0,27 
Est. t-value 
-3,4162 -13,69 
0,0132 27,66 
-0,0145 -1,26 
0,0004 3,05 
0,2464 5,77 
0,1016 2,85 
0,2041 5,12 
0,2078 3,80 
0,0000 0,38 
 
-8,8793 -11,84 
0,0224 25,34 
-0,0404 -1,08 
0,0005 1,26 
0,5054 4,45 
0,2289 2,70 
-0,1778 -1,74 
0,4472 3,55 
0,0008 4,09 
Observations 
L(0) 
L(c) (degrees of freedom) 
L(β) (degrees of freedom) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (0) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (c) 
9.435 
-10.365,4069 
-7.498,6473 (18) 
-5.819,2340 (180) 
0,4386 
0,2240 
      9.435 
-10.365,4069 
-7.507,2105 (2) 
-5.961,9033 (22) 
0,4248 
0,2058 
Table A.9: Test statistics for the model with all households. Model estimates with free variables for all years and model estimates with 
identical parameters for all years. Variable for real estate value included. 
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Estimates for the A.10 model (Rural tenants and a variable for real estate values) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Identical 
coef 
Choice 1 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Value 
Choice 2 
Constant 
Loginc 
Age 
Age2 
Distpub 
Distwork 
Child 
Adults 
Value 
Est. t-value 
-10,2408 -8,03 
2,1066 7,45 
-0,0606 -1,48 
0,0008 1,82 
0,2685 2,24 
0,3061 3,11 
0,0918 0,58 
0,0939 0,46 
0,0007 1,51 
 
-27,2850 -6,78 
4,9552 6,26 
-0,0723 -0,61 
0,0008 0,54 
0,3798 1,59 
0,4148 2,39 
-0,4906 -1,41 
0,2553 0,61 
-0,0001 -0,11 
Est. t-value 
-10,3889 -9,28 
1,8258 7,10 
0,0120 0,35 
-0,0001 -0,24 
0,3840 3,77 
0,1464 1,79 
-0,0013 -0,01 
0,3578 1,91 
0,0007 1,92 
 
-29,3952 -8,43 
5,1725 7,46 
-0,1172 -1,11 
0,0010 0,81 
0,5752 3,13 
0,4199 2,83 
0,1011 0,50 
0,8317 2,24 
0,0010 1,30 
Est. t-value 
-11,8521 -9,69 
2,2284 8,54 
0,0010 0,03 
0,0002 0,55 
0,3208 3,15 
0,1815 2,17 
0,0631 0,54 
0,0419 0,23 
0,0004 0,97 
 
-31,9786 -9,24 
5,3275 8,39 
0,0574 0,59 
-0,0006 -0,55 
0,6890 4,31 
0,1785 1,26 
-0,0137 -0,07 
0,1806 0,55 
0,0002 0,29 
Est. t-value 
-10,3785 -10,57 
2,0232 9,42 
-0,0010 -0,03 
0,0001 0,26 
0,2255 2,75 
0,1286 1,59 
0,1225 1,14 
0,1396 0,88 
0,0003 0,94 
 
-24,5007 -10,02 
4,0545 8,53 
-0,0385 -0,55 
0,0005 0,59 
0,3753 2,76 
0,1375 1,01 
0,3979 2,54 
0,7853 2,96 
0,0010 1,76 
Est. t-value 
-9,6147 -8,54 
1,8866 7,82 
-0,0432 -1,23 
0,0006 1,56 
0,3283 3,38 
0,1273 1,53 
-0,0653 -0,59 
0,4507 2,50 
0,0003 0,82 
 
-29,5657 -9,10 
5,1346 8,22 
-0,0614 -0,64 
0,0007 0,64 
0,5517 3,45 
0,2626 1,79 
-0,0039 -0,02 
0,5172 1,41 
0,0003 0,52 
Est. t-value 
-9,4050 -8,78 
1,9434 8,30 
-0,0403 -1,23 
0,0006 1,59 
0,1750 2,05 
0,1897 2,20 
0,2409 2,02 
0,2298 1,39 
-0,0002 -0,65 
 
-26,0277 -8,56 
3,8679 7,51 
0,1429 1,42 
-0,0018 -1,46 
0,5834 3,86 
0,0191 0,12 
0,1716 0,88 
0,3868 1,48 
0,0000 -0,08 
Est. t-value 
-10,6433 -9,28 
1,9550 7,83 
-0,0036 -0,10 
0,0002 0,63 
0,1532 1,72 
0,2231 2,55 
0,2570 2,20 
0,2062 1,14 
0,0005 1,77 
 
-29,5114 -8,43 
4,9587 7,57 
-0,0123 -0,11 
0,0001 0,04 
0,3655 1,94 
0,0500 0,26 
-0,0714 -0,29 
0,6269 1,78 
0,0007 1,06 
Est. t-value 
-7,5970 -4,94 
2,0198 5,84 
-0,1084 -1,91 
0,0012 1,93 
0,0735 0,57 
0,2319 1,87 
-0,0411 -0,22 
0,0947 0,41 
-0,0001 -0,39 
 
-19,8121 -5,16 
3,1782 4,63 
0,0908 0,67 
-0,0012 -0,79 
0,2422 1,12 
-0,1170 -0,53 
0,0809 0,29 
0,0953 0,24 
0,0005 0,80 
Est. t-value 
-2,8064 -10,71 
0,0147 21,81 
-0,0072 -0,59 
0,0002 1,51 
0,2273 6,77 
0,1886 6,12 
0,0745 1,76 
0,2142 3,31 
0,0002 1,80 
 
-8,4312 -13,29 
0,0248 24,26 
0,0086 0,25 
-0,0002 -0,47 
0,4606 7,87 
0,2003 3,66 
0,1006 1,40 
0,5752 5,12 
0,0004 1,67 
Observations 
L(0) 
L(c) (degrees of freedom) 
L(β) (degrees of freedom) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (0) 
McFaddens ρ 2 (c) 
6.865 
-7.541,9734 
-5.919,4227 (18) 
-4.744,1334 (180) 
0,3710 
0,1985 
      6.865 
-7.541,9734 
-5.926,5814 (2) 
-4.815,1884 (22) 
0,3615 
0,1875 
Table A.10: Test statistics for the model with all households. Model estimates with free variables for all years and model estimates 
with identical parameters for all years. Variable for real estate value included. 
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Abstract 
This paper examines how real estate ownership, increasing real estate values and the 
falling interest rates affect car demand. It uses data from the Danish Transport Diary 
Survey together with data from Statistics Denmark to estimate a simple partial adjustment 
model for car ownership in Danish households. We find that car ownership differs among 
households owning real estate and households not owning real estate and we find that real 
estate owners have increased their demand for cars as a result of the increasing real estate 
values and that other households are unaffected by the increasing real estate values. 
Furthermore we show that both household groups have increased their demand for cars 
due to the falling interest rate. We also find that long-run income elasticities for car 
ownership differ between rural and urban households. 
  
78
1. Introduction 
The modeling and forecasting of car ownership is often based on cross section data in a 
discrete model setting (e.g. logit or probit) where it is assumed that the parameters 
estimated remain constant over time. There are two underlying assumptions behind this. 
The first is that that the economy is in equilibrium. The other is that observed differences 
in consumption between, e.g., a high income person and a low income person is a valid 
description of what would happen if a low income person suddenly received the same 
income as the high income person, all other things being equal. Both these assumptions 
are probably invalid. What is needed is a dynamic model which explicitly takes account 
of the dynamic nature of car demand. 
 
Ideally, panel data should be used but since these are rarely available in the transport 
sector and since many cross section data exist, the simpler approach of cross-section 
modeling is often adopted and it is argued that the elasticities found are long-run 
elasticities21. Deaton (1985) shows that it is possible to create panel data from repeated 
cross-section data named pseudo-panel data. He shows that by using a characteristic that 
is invariant over time for a given household type (e.g. year of birth of the oldest person in 
the household) it is possible to create a pseudo panel describing average behavior for the 
household type in question. The use of pseudo-panel data is an attempt to circumvent 
some of the shortcomings of the cross-sectional data and use the strength of the time 
series analysis. The pseudo panel approach also allows for the inclusion of macro 
                                                 
21 In Goodwin et. al. (2004) a survey of many recent elasticity studies are presented and a discussion of the 
claim that the elasticities found in simple cross-section studies can be interpreted as long-run elasticities 
can also be found here. 
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variables which might affect both the transport behavior (e.g. number of kilometers 
traveled) and the demand for transport vehicles (e.g. cars). This paper utilizes the Danish 
Transport Diary Survey together with data from Statistics Denmark to create a pseudo-
panel data set for the Danish population based on the year of birth for the interviewee in 
the Danish Transport Diary Survey, real estate ownership status for the interviewees 
household, and whether the household lives in an urban or rural area. It examines how 
changing real estate values and a falling interest rate affect the number of cars available 
in Danish households and to what extent the different types of households differ with 
regard to income elasticities. To our knowledge this is the first time the effect of the 
development in real estate prices and the interest rate is linked to the demand for cars. 
 
The approach suggested by Deaton has been utilized in a number of papers. An 
estimation of dynamic car ownership models is undertaken for the first time in Dargay 
and Vythoulkas (1999) where the UK Family Expenditure Survey is used. They 
demonstrate that the  pseudo-panel method can be applied and gives credible estimates 
when it comes to describing the dynamics of transport behavior. They also show that 
there are large differences between short and long run elasticities with the latter being 
three times bigger than the former. Birkeland et al. (2000) use data from the Danish 
Tranport Diary Survey in a pseudo panel analysis of personal transport in Denmark. They 
use a non-dynamic model to identify cohort effects and life-cycle effects. They also 
compare income elasticities estimated by simple cross-section analysis with those found 
by the use of pseudo panel data, showing that the two approaches yield very different 
results. They conclude that pseudo panel methods are preferable when predicting future 
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demand for transport. In another paper (Nielsen (2006b)) we use repeated cross-section 
analysis to investigate the demand for cars in Denmark and we show that housing prices 
probably influence the demand for cars. The present paper is thus a continuation of the 
work in Nielsen (2006b). In Dargay (2001) a pseudo-panel for UK is constructed and the 
approach is used to show that hysteresis effects are present for car ownership. She shows 
that the elasticities with regard to rising income is higher than the elasticities for falling 
income. This hysteresis shows that a car after it is purchased becomes a necessity, which 
is not disposed of as easily as it is acquired. Using the same data as in Dargay (2001) the 
approach is later used in Dargay (2002) to show that important differences in the 
elasticities between rural and urban households exists and that rural households have 
lower income elasticities than urban households. 
 
In Denmark the real estate values have increased steadily and at very high rates since 
1993 and at the same time the long run interest rate has dropped from around 10% to 
around 5%. This is shown in figure 1 and figure 2.  
 
In a situation like the one experienced in Denmark with ricing real estate prices and 
falling interest rate, households already owning real estate can (after a few years) 
withdraw equity from their real estate without increasing monthly mortgage payments 
due to the fall in the long run interest rate. Such an increase in wealth could increase the 
number of cars in households. For households entering the real estate market the effect is 
less clear. The fact that the real estate value increases will make it more expensive to 
purchase a house or an apartment and the mortgage payments will be higher than for 
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those households who already own real estate. The decreasing interest rate will counter 
this by reducing the mortgage payments. If the first effect dominates the households will 
have less income available for consumption which will reduce the number of cars. If the 
latter effect dominates the mortgage payments will go down and the household will have 
more income available for consumption which could increase the number of cars in the 
households.  
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Figure 1: Real estate prices (1.000 DKr.).  
Source: Statistics Denmark 
 
Since the interest rate is the same for all households in the country we examine real estate 
owners and tenants separately. This enables us to see if the changing real estate prices 
and the changing interest rate has affected the two groups differently. Our expectation is 
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that the falling interest rate could affect both groups but the increasing real estate values 
only affect the real estate owners. One problem is that the interest rate and the housing 
prices are correlated and that non-real estate owners may face different credit market 
constraints than real estate owners. If these capital restrictions for non-real estate owners 
are strong we expect that the interest rate has affected the real estate owners more and 
may even have had no effect on non real estate owners. 
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Figure 2: Interest on 30-years bonds.  
Source: Statistics Denmark 
 
This paper extends the findings in previous studies by looking at the differences between 
real estate owners and tenants, thus providing more insight into the behavior of different 
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household groups. It also identify effects of rising real estate prices and falling interest 
rates on car demand which is new to the transport literature. Furthermore, we also 
identify differences between urban and rural households, showing that these groups have 
different long run income elasticities but fairly identical short run income elasticities with 
regard to car ownership. The findings show that rural households have lower long run 
elasticities and thus that they adjust their vehicle stock more slowly than urban 
households, supporting findings for the UK in Dargay (2002). 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and the construction of the 
pseudo-panel. Section 3 sets up the model and section 4 presents the estimations. Section 
5 calculates different elasticities and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The pseudo-panel data 
The data utilized in the present paper come from two sources, the Danish Transport Diary 
Survey and Statistics Denmark. The people participating in the Danish Transport Diary 
Survey are selected by random draw from the Danish Civil Register.  Data concerning the 
individual as well as the household are collected and the travel pattern for a single day for 
the interviewee is recorded. In the years 1992 to 1997 a monthly sample of 1800 was 
drawn for people between the age of 16 and 74. In 1998 this was extended to 2100 and 
the age group was extended to 10 to 84. The response rate in the survey is about 65-70%. 
The variables included in the present analysis are after-tax income, number of adult 
household members, degree of urbanization (living in a major Danish city or not), car 
availability (how many cars the household has access to), information about whether the 
household owns real estate, and if they live in a house or in an apartment. Due to data 
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limitations on certain variables, the sample used here is restricted to the years 1996 to 
2002. 
 
The pseudo panel is constructed by dividing the data into cohorts. Following Deaton 
(1985) the cohorts have to be based on some characteristic that remain invariant in the 
period analyzed. In the present study we have used the year of birth of the interviewee as 
the determining factor together with real-estate ownership status and degree of 
urbanization. The two latter may not be invariant over time but in this study we exclude 
moving patterns thus assuming that households do not change residence. We thus assume 
that real-estate ownership status and the degree of urbanization remains invariant over 
time for all households. Each of the cohorts’ averages for all the variables included are 
then calculated resulting in a ‘representative’ observation for the given cohort which in 
our panel is an interviewee born in a given year, who is either a real estate owners or a 
tenant, and either lives in an urban or rural area. This means that for a representative 
person born in e.g. 1945 or in 1960, who is a tenant in an urban area we have a series of 
observations from 1996 to 2002 describing the behavior of the representative person each 
year. This data can then be linked to the macro data for the development in housing prices 
and interest rate obtained from Statistics Denmark giving us the pseudo panel used in the 
paper.  
 
Car ownership includes both ownership of cars and other cars which the household can 
use for personal transport22. Car ownership is calculated as the total number of cars 
                                                 
22 The appropriate expression would be ‘car availability’ since the respondents are asked if they have access 
to a car. 
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available to the households divided by the number of households for every cohort year. 
These are shown in figure 3 and figure 4 where the car ownership for different cohorts 
over time according to age is shown. Figure 3 shows the cohorts for real estate owners 
and figure 4 shows the cohorts for tenants. It is clear from these figures that there is a 
huge difference not only between households living in cities and on the countryside but 
also between real estate owners and tenants.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Car ownership by cohort for real estate owners. 
Source: Danish Transport Diary Survey. 
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The figures show that the life-cycle effect is larger for real estate owners. It is also clear 
that households living in less urbanized areas have higher car ownership than households 
living in large cities or in Copenhagen. One explanation of this is that the public transport 
network is better and distances are smaller in cities, thus reducing the need for a car23. 
 
 
Figure 4: Car ownership by cohort for tenants. 
Source: Danish Transport Diary Survey. 
 
Figure 5 gives another picture of a life cycle effect for households. It depicts the number 
of adults living in a household. As the age of the interviewee increases, the number of 
                                                 
23 See Nielsen (2006a) for further discussion. 
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adults also increases. This is due to people getting married and having children. When the 
children reach a certain age they also count as adults24. This goes on until the interviewee 
reaches the age of 50 where the children start to move away from their parents thus 
reducing the size of the households. We are not able to see if households change 
residence when these changes happen but it is likely that more adults and more children 
will increase the demand for cars and induce the household to look for a new (and bigger) 
home. The size of the households also decreases as a result of divorce and death. 
 
 
Figure 5: Number of adults in the household by cohort. 
Source: Danish Transport Diary Survey. 
                                                 
24 A problem with the classification of ’adults’ in the Danish Transport Diary Survey is that people over the 
age of 16 are counted as adults but a driving license can not be acquired before the age of 18.  
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Figure 6: Average real estate values for cohorts (real estate owners). 
Source: Statistics Denmark. 
 
Unfortunately the Danish Transport diary Survey does not include information 
concerning the value of real estate owned by the households. Data for the average 
housing prices in the separate municipalities can be obtained from Statistics Denmark and 
these data can be linked to the information in the Danish Transport diary Survey for each 
household living in a given municipality. We thus assume that these average values are 
the same for each household in a given municipality25. It is well known that the 
development in housing prices has differed significantly between different regions in 
                                                 
25 We are also able to distinguish between households living in apartments and households living in houses. 
This is important since the development in market values for these two types of housing differs. 
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Denmark, with the largest increases happening in the greater Copenhagen area and the 
large cities. This can be seen in figure 6 where the average real estate values for different 
cohorts are shown. Furthermore it seems that for urban households the older cohorts have 
experienced higher increases than younger cohorts and in rural areas the picture is the 
opposite with the oldest cohorts having experienced the lowest increases in real estate 
values. 
  
The interest rate shown in figure 2 is also obtained from Statistics Denmark on an annual 
basis. Since this is a general macro variable, all households in the economy face the same 
interest rate. Some households might have limited access to the financial market, but we 
ignore this and assume that all households have the same opportunities for borrowing 
money and that they all face the same long run interest rate26. 
 
As mentioned earlier it would be preferable to use real panel data but using a pseudo-
panel also hold some advantages. One advantage is that we do not need to include the 
same households in each observation. The problem of finding a panel and following the 
same panel over a long period is thus avoided. A tradeoff has to be made between the 
number of individuals in a given cohort and the number of cohorts constructed. In our 
case we have 11 cohorts, 2 degrees of urbanization, and 2 states for real estate ownership. 
In all we therefore have 44 observations which we track over a period of 7 years. It is also 
clear that when using a pseudo-panel we loose information about the variation between 
the individuals within a given cohort. If the variation is large one could argue that the loss 
                                                 
26 We have used the interest rate for the 30-year bond. It could be argued that another interest rate should be 
used. 
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of information is large but at the same time if the variation within a given cohort is small, 
the loss of information is also low. Having these shortcomings in mind the next section 
presents the dynamic car ownership model used in the analysis. 
3. The car ownership model 
With the examination of the impact of real estate ownership, changing real estate prices, 
and the changing interest rate as the objective we specify a simple partial adjustment 
model of car demand inspired by Dargay & Vythoulkas (1999). The data we use were 
described in section 2. In Dargay (2001) different specifications27 are tested and 
compared. She concludes that the semi-log specification dominates and also argues that 
this specification makes most sense economically. Based on her result we use a semi-log 
specification. We let itC  represent the number of cars at time t for household i, 
i
tI  the 
number of adults in the household, iG  the cohort number, tR  the long term interest rate 
at time t, itY  the annual after tax income for household i at time t, 
i
tE  is a dummy 
indicating if the household is a real estate owner, itU  is a dummy for households living in 
urban areas, and itW  is the increase in real estate values experienced during the last 
year28.  For each household we assume that the number of cars can be described as 
1log( )
i i i i i i i i i
t Y t W t E t U t R t I t G C t tC Y W E U R I G Cα β β β β β β β β γ−= + + + + + + + + +  (1)
where 1
i
tC −  is the number of cars in household i in period t-1, α  is a constant, and itγ  is 
an error process which we will describe in more detail below.  
 
                                                 
27 Linear, Double-log and Semi-log. 
28 One could speculate that the level of housing prices should be used instead. A discussion of this 
possibility can be found in appendix A. 
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Due to the aggregation each variable has the form of an average for the cohort it comes 
from. The average at the cohort level is thus given by ct
i
i
t
c
t
A
n A=∑  where ctn  is the number 
of households in cohort c and ctA  is the variable. Using this aggregation we let 
i
tC  
represent the number of cars at time t for cohort i, 
i
tI  the number of adults in the 
household, 
i
G  the cohort number, tR  the long term interest rate (which is identical for all 
cohorts), 
i
tY  the annual after tax income, 
i
tE  indicates if the household is a real estate 
owner, 
i
tU  is a dummy for households living in urban areas, and 
i
tW  is the increase in 
real estate values experienced during the last year. This gives the general functional form 
1log( )
i i i i ii i i i
t t tt t tt Y W E U R I t G C tC Y W E U R I G Cα β β β β β β β β γ−= + + + + + + + + +  (2)
where 1
i
tC −  is the number of cars in the previous period, α  is a constant, and and itγ  
again is an error process. As shown in figure 7 we note that the increase in real estate 
value experienced by one cohort does not have to be identical to the increase experienced 
by other cohorts since we have been able to distinguish between the housing prices in 
different municipalities. In contrast all cohorts experience the same development in the 
interest rate. To capture possible saturation effects in income we take the logarithm of 
i
tY . As argued by Dargay & Vythoulkas this type of model can be estimated using 
standard techniques. 
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4. Estimation 
A list of the variables included in the model can be seen in table 1 together with their 
sources. The hypothesis put forward in the introduction is modeled by the variables 
‘value increase’ and ‘interest rate’.  
 
Variable Source Description 
Cars 
Owner 
Urbanization 
Value increase 
Interest rate 
Income (log) 
Generation  
Adults 
DTDS 
DTDS 
DTDS 
SD 
SD 
DTDS 
DTDS 
DTDS 
Number of cars available to the household 
Real estate ownership status 
Living in urban area (Copenhagen or large city) 
Increase in housing prices during last year 
Average 30 years interest rate 
Household yearly after-tax income 
Generation effect (cohort number) 
Number of adults in the household 
Table 1: Variables used in the model (Statistics Denmark (SD) and Danish Transport 
Diary Survey (DTDS)). 
 
The number of observations used to construct each of the cohorts can be seen in table 2 
divided into groups coming from urban areas (Copenhagen and suburbs together with the 
3 largest cities) or rural areas (medium and small cities or the countryside) and owning or 
not owning real estate29. It should be noted that especially for tenants the number of 
                                                 
29 Due to data limitations we have excluded households living on the island of Bornholm (a small Danish 
island in the Baltic Sea).  
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observations for some cohorts is quite low. The number could be increased by reducing 
the number of cohorts and increasing the number of observations within each of these.  
4.1 Models for household owners and tenants 
Initially we specify three different models. The first model (M-all) includes all variables 
described in table 1. The second model (M-owner) and the third model (M-tenant) does 
not include the variable for real estate ownership because we split the data into real estate 
owners and tenants.  
Cohort 
number 
Cohort date 
of birth 
Urban 
owner 
Rural 
owner 
Urban 
tenants 
Rural 
tenants 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
1920-24
1925-29
1930-34
1935-39
1940-44
1945-49
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69
1970-74
467
689
866
1043
1420
1709
1475
1534
1532
1482
1094
1335
2103
2605
3250
4297
5247
4873
4625
4519
3892
2135
483 
617 
519 
478 
513 
611 
591 
615 
755 
1031 
1310 
687
767
720
712
711
793
695
829
1087
1607
2151
Cohort average 1210 3535 684 978
Table 2: Number of observations 
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Since we have a lagged dependent variable in the specification, we use the Durbin-h 
statistics to test for the presence of autocorrelation. Table 3 present the results for the 
Durbin-h statistics in the three models. The tests indicate that autocorrelation is present in 
two of the models (M-all and M-tenants). Since we wish to keep the specifications 
identical we proceed under the assumption that autocorrelation is present. 
 
The next step is to identify the order of autocorrelation. To do this we use stepwise 
autoregression initially specifying an autoregressive model with four lags and then 
removing autoregressive parameters until we have significant t-tests. This procedure 
shows that we only need to specify a model with one autoregressive lag.  
 
 M-all M-owners M-tenants 
Durbin-h statistics 
p-value 
-4.0950 
<0.0001 
-1.5218 
0.0640 
-4.9070 
<0.0001 
Table 3: Test for the presence of autocorrelation 
 
Since the number of households in each cohort is not the same, we potentially face the 
problem of heteroscedasticity. To avoid this problem we weight all observations by the 
square root of the number of households in the given cohort. To see this note that the 
variance of the error-term will be given by 
21 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c c c c
t t t t
i i i i i
t t t t tn n n n
i i
Var Var Var Var Varγ γ γ γ γ= = = =∑ ∑  (3) 
thus depending on the number of observations, ctn . Multiplying with the square root of 
the number of observations used in the given cohort gives 
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21 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c c c
t t t
ic c i c i c i i
tt t t t t t t tn n n
i i
Var n Var n Var n Var n Varγ γ γ γ γ= = = =∑ ∑  (4) 
thus making the variance of the error-term independent of the number of observations in 
the different cohorts. Using this procedure we see, that the problem of heteroscedasticity 
disappears and we therefore assume that all the error terms follow a normal distribution. 
Based on the Durbin-h statistics, we proceed under the assumption of homoscedasticity in 
the error process and the full model is now given by 
1
1
2
log( )
~ (0, )
i i ii i i i
t t ttt Y W E R I t G C t t
t t t
t
C Y W E R I G C
N
γ
α β β β β β β β γ
γ ε β γ
ε σ
−
−
= + + + + + + + +
= +  (5)
The estimation results are shown in table 5 together with test statistics for tree different 
models. The models for tenants include the variable for the increasing real estate values. 
This we do to see if it is significant. If so we should be skeptical about our hypothesis 
since we do not expect non-real estate owners to benefit from increasing real estate 
values. A problem with the variable for the increasing real estate values could be that 
households who have lived in their house for a longer period of time have accumulated 
more wealth than indicated by this variable. The dynamic model specification is capable 
of handling this since past increases in real estate values are included. If a given cohort 
has experienced increases in the housing prices in the past, this is included in the model. 
Another problem with the present specification is that we do not account for moving 
patterns. We thus assume that households do not change residence in the selected period. 
It could be interesting to examine moving patterns and its influence on car demand but 
we do not have the data to do this and it is also not the main focus of this paper.   
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Variable M-all M-owners M-tenants 
Intercept 
Real estate owner 
Urbanization 
Value increase 
Interest rate 
Income (log) 
Generation (cohort) 
Adults 
Cars (t-1) 
AR1 (βγ) 
 
 R2 
Log Likelihood 
SSE 
MSE 
-0.1815 (-1.30)
0.0650 (6.10)
-0.0625 (-5.36)
0.0003 (2.46)
-0.0458 (-4.84)
0.0756 (3.99)
0.0040 (3.36)
0.0659 (4.50)
0.7221 (21.39)
0.2872 (4.90)
0.9966
-305.8879
131.3977
0.4409
-0.2403 (-0.76)
-0.0968 (-4.17)
0.0007 (3.05)
-0.0565 (-4.18)
0.1105 (4.20)
0.0036 (2.27)
0.0627 (3.50)
0.6737 (13.53)
0.2270 (2.55)
0.9958
-160.8236
72.7733
0.5019
-0.0239 (-0.08)
-0.0524 (-3.08)
-0.0002 (-0.95)
-0.0564 (-3.56)
0.1040 (2.82)
0.0030 (1.14)
0.0490 (1.31)
0.6797 (12.09)
0.3941 (4.91)
0.9486
-135.0271
52.0174
0.3587
Table 5: Estimates, t-values and summary statistics30 
 
All parameters have the expected sign and from the 2R  values we see that especially the 
complete model and the model for real estate owners fit the data well. A high degree of 
urbanization reduces the number of cars which we also saw in figure 3 and 4. This is not 
surprising since urban households generally have access to better public transport 
                                                 
30 A model using real estate values instead of the yearly increase in real estate values are estimated in 
appendix A. 
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facilities, they have access to fewer parking spaces and in general have to travel shorter 
distances to reach their destination. Higher income affects car availability positively. 
Again this is expected since cars are assumed to be normal goods. Generation effects are 
found to be present for real estate owners. Younger generations have a higher tendency to 
purchase cars. For non-real estate owners the generation effect is also positive but 
statistically insignificant. This is in line with findings of generation effects in Dargay 
(2001) and Dargay (2002) where less significant generational effects were found which 
could be seen as a confirmation of the findings here that the generation effects are not 
present in all household groups. We also see that the number of adults affect the demand 
for cars positively but the effects are only statistically significant for real estate owners. 
Turning to the interest rate, we see that both real estate owners and tenants experience an 
increase in their demand for cars when the interest rate decreases. Looking at the effect of 
the increasing real estate values, we get the expected result that only real estate owners 
are affected and as expected the households have increased their demand for cars as a 
consequence of the increasing wealth. For tenants, the effect of increasing real estate 
values is negative but statistically insignificant. Letting (1 )Cφ β= −  we have 0.33φ =  for 
real estate owners and 0.32φ =  for tenants. We thus see that 33% and 32% of the 
adjustment in car availability for the two household groups happen within the first year. 
The high degree of significance for the adjustment parameter tells us that the dynamic 
specification is needed since households in general do not adjust to changes 
instantaneously. 
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4.2 Models for urban and rural households 
Another possibility we have with the data available is to examine the differences between 
rural and urban households. As pointed out in Dargay (2002), large differences between 
these two kinds of households can be expected. To examine this we estimate two models, 
one for rural households (M-rural) and one for urban households (M-urban). We use a 
model based on equation (2) in which the difference between households owning real 
estate and other households are captured by the variable for household ownership status. 
 
 M-rural M-urban 
Durbin-h statistics 
p-value 
-0.8940 
0.1857 
-4.1873 
>0.0001 
Table 6: Test for the presence of autocorrelation 
 
As before, we use the Durbin-h statistics to test for the presence of autocorrelation. The 
test statistics in table 6 show that autocorrelation is present in the model for urban 
households but absent in the model for rural households. Using stepwise autoregression 
to identify the number of lags we find, as before, that one lag is needed. Based on this the 
model we estimate will be given by 
1
1
2
log( )
~ (0, )
i ii i i i
t t tt Y E R I t G C t t
t t t
t
C Y E R I G C
N
γ
α β β β β β β γ
γ ε β γ
ε σ
−
−
= + + + + + + +
= +  (6)
and the estimation results together with summary statistics can be found in table 7. 
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Variable M-rural M-urban 
Intercept 
Real estate owner 
Interest rate 
Value increase 
Income (log) 
Generation (cohort) 
Adults 
Cars (t-1) 
AR1 (βγ) 
 
 R2 
Log Likelihood 
SSE 
MSE 
-0.8894 (-3.32)
0.1145 (6.41)
-0.0799 (-5.42)
0.0009 (3.33)
0.1589 (5.62)
0.0075 (4.91)
0.0932 (5.37)
0.4280 (6.86)
0.1426 (1.58)
0.9971
-132.9520
50.6830
0.3495
-0.6061 (-1.99)
0.0668 (4.30)
-0.0685 (-4.44)
0.0000 (0.18)
0.1188 (3.64)
-0.0028 (-1.02)
0.0656 (2.15)
0.6936 (11.93)
0.3782 (4.65)
0.9800
-148.6676
62.1046
0.4283
Table 7: Estimates, t-values and summary statistics 
 
Both models fit the data well with high 2R  values and we see that all statistically 
significant variables have expected signs. As in the M-all model we find that owning real 
estate increases the car ownership, and we find that a higher interest rate affects car 
ownership negatively. One striking difference between rural and urban households is that 
it seems like only rural households have increased their demand for cars due to the falling 
interest rate. An explanation could be that better public transport and parking restrictions 
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reduce the attractiveness of car ownership in urban areas since this is not the case for 
rural households they exploit falling interest rates and thus falling cost of borrowing more 
than urban households to purchase cars since cars are necessary due to the poor service of 
public transport compared to the public transport service in urban areas. 
 
Cohort effects are only found to be present in the model for rural households but it is not 
significant in the model for urban households.  Both the number of adults, increasing 
income and the car-ownership in the previous period has a positive effect on car 
ownership. In the model for rural households we see that the γβ  parameter is 
insignificant which is not surprising since the Durbin-h statistics rejected the presence of 
autocorrelation. A large difference between rural and urban households are found in the 
adjustment parameter φ  where we for rural households have 0.57φ =  and for urban 
households have 0.31φ =  which tells us that for rural households the adjustment happens 
faster than for urban households. An explanation for this could be that cars are more 
necessary in rural areas than in urban areas which cause adjustment to happen faster. 
Both of these parameters are again highly significant underlining the need for the 
dynamic specification 
5 Elasticities 
Short run income elasticities can be calculated directly from the estimated parameters, 
since we know that the short run income elasticity for car ownership, srYε , given the 
logarithmic specification, will be given by 1sr C YY YY C Cε β∂∂= = . The long run elasticity, lrYε , 
is given by 
sr
Ylr
Y
ε
φε = . With the semi-logarithmic specification we also know that the 
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elasticities fall as car ownership increases which, as mentioned earlier, seems realistic 
since some saturation effects are expected even if it is lower in Denmark than in other 
countries (see Fosgerau et al. (2004) and Dargay et at. (2006)) 
5.1 Income elasticities for real estate owners and tenants 
For the models estimated in section 4.1 (table 5) the income elasticities for car ownership 
are shown in table 8. What can be seen from table 8 is that real estate owning households 
in general have slightly higher income elasticity than tenants both in the short run and in 
the long run if they have the same level of car ownership. But if we account for the 
differences in car ownership level, we find that the tenants have higher short- and long-
run elasticities than real estate owners. We also see that long run income elasticities are 
three times higher than short run elasticities which are the same order of magnitude as 
found in Dargay and Vythoulkas (1999). The values for the elasticities are lower than 
those found for Denmark in Dargay and Gately (1999) where the long run GDP elasticity 
for cars in Denmark for 1992 was found to be 1.13. Our findings are more in line with 
findings in Bjørner (1999) where the short run income elasticity for the size of the car 
fleet was found to be 0.21 and the corresponding long run income elasticity was found to 
be 0.57. The values found by Bjørner is based on 1991 values and we would thus expect 
our estimates to be below his since we use more recent data and the effect of motorization 
(that is, the increasing car ownership in the households) is expected to decrease the 
income elasticities.  
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5.2 Income elasticities for urban and rural households 
The difference in elasticities for urban and rural households can be found if we calculate 
the elasticities from the estimates found in section 4.2 (table 7). The results are shown in 
table 9. 
 
 M-owners M-tenants 
 
Car availability = 0.5 
Car availability = 0.75 
Car availability = 1.00 
Car availability = 1.25 
 
Mean car availability in the group31 
Short run 
0.2210 
0.1473 
0.1105 
0.0884 
 
0.1008 
Long run 
0.6773 
0.4514 
0.3386 
0.2709 
 
0.3090 
Short run 
0.2080 
0.1387 
0.1040 
0.0832 
 
0.1952 
Long run 
0.6494 
0.4330 
0.3203 
0.2598 
 
0.6094 
Table 8: Income elasticities for car ownership32. 
 
For households living in urban areas we find that long run income elasticities are around 
three times larger than short run elasticities. This however, does not hold for rural 
households where the long run elasticities are around twice the size of the short run 
elasticities. The short run income elasticities found here are lower than the ones reported 
in Dargay (2002) for the UK where short run income elasticities for rural and urban 
households were reported to be 0.36 and 0.25. The long run income elasticities found 
                                                 
31 The average for real estate owners is 1.0960 cars and for tenants it is 0.5326. 
32 For comparison, a model without a variable for the increasing real estate values and the resulting income 
elastitities can be found in appendix B. 
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here for urban households are in line with Dargays finding of a long run income elasticity 
for urban households around 0,50. Our finding for rural households remain quite low 
compared with her reported elasticity around 0.34 for rural households. 
 
 M-rural M-urban 
 
Car availability = 0.5 
Car availability = 0.75 
Car availability = 1.00 
Car availability = 1.25 
 
Mean car availability in the group33 
Short run 
0.3178 
0.2104 
0.1589 
0.1272 
 
0.1506 
Long run 
0.5556 
0,3678 
0.2780 
0.2224 
 
0.2631 
Short run 
0.2376 
0.1584 
0.1188 
0,0950 
 
0,1653 
Long run 
0,7755 
0.5170 
0.3877 
0,3101 
 
0.5395 
Table 9: Income elasticities for car ownership. 
5.3 Elastitities for the real estate value and the interest rate 
To calculate the elasticity of car demand with regards to changing real estate values we 
use the model M-owners where the parameter for changing real estate prices was found to 
be 0.0007. Short run and long run elasticities can now be calculated as 
sr
WW
C W W
C CWε β∂∂= = . The long run elasticity, lrWε , is given by WlrW
srε
φε = .  Similar the short 
run and long run interest rate elasticities are given by srR R
C R R
C CRε β∂∂= = . The long run 
elasticity, lrRε , is given by RlrR
srε
φε = .  To calculate these we use the models M-owners and 
M-tanents. The results can be seen in table 10. 
                                                 
33 The total average for rural households is 1.0549 cars and for urban households it is 0.7188. 
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What can be seen from table 10 is that tenants respond more to changes in the interest 
rate than real estate owners. 
 
 Interest rate Real estate values 
 
Real estate owners 
Tenants 
Value increase (wealth elasticity) 
Short run 
-0.2578 
-0.5396 
Long run 
-0.7902 
-1.6843 
Short run 
 
 
0.1277 
Long run 
 
 
0.3916 
Table 10: Interest rate elasticities  and real estate wealth elasticities34. 
 
The housing prices’ wealth elasticity for car ownership indicate that the number of cars in 
real estate owning households have increased because of the increasing housing prices. 
These elasticities is believed to be higher than what could be expected since we have seen 
increases especially in urban areas which is very high but the development in car 
ownership does not support the high elasticities found here. Our findings could indicate 
that the increase in wealth caused by the increasing real estate values and capitalized 
through the mortgage credit associations induces households to make an instant purchase 
of a car. If this is the case the household wealth elasticity we find is biased by this. 
According to the results presented here some of this increase in the number of cars can be 
explained by the increasing real estate values and the falling interest rate.  
                                                 
34 The average for real estate owners is 1.0960 cars and for tenants it is 0.5326. The average increase in 
housing prices in the period has been around 200.000 DKK. per year. The interest rate is assumed to be 5%. 
  
105
6. Conclusions and caveats 
We have shown that differences between different household types exist when it comes to 
car ownership and we have shown that there are differences in the long run income 
elasticities for urban and rural households as well as between real estate owners and 
tenants. We also show that households in urban areas in general are slower to adapt to 
changing situations, confirming findings from earlier studies and explaining why the long 
run income elasticity for car ownership differs between rural and urban households. 
 
Furthermore, we have shown that real estate owners have benefited from the recent 
increases in real estate values giving these households large capital gains which have 
resulted in an increased demand for cars. We have also shown that all households were 
affected by the falling interest rate and that the decreasing cost of borrowing has 
increased the demand for cars. 
 
The present study could be improved. The use of the pseudo-panel is not fully 
satisfactory and real panel data should be obtained in order to test the hypotheses 
examined here. The exclusion of moving patterns is also not satisfactory and the 
correlation between interest rate and housing prices should be included in the analysis. 
However, the findings point in the expected direction and indicate that the hypothesis put 
forward is correct, namely the possibility to finance the purchase of cars by borrowing 
against capital gains on real estate. To confirm the hypothesis more strongly, access to 
register data is needed. These shortcomings will hopefully be addressed in future work. 
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Appendix A 
In this appendix we estimate the model with the actual prices for real estate instead of the 
annual increase in real estate values. The test for autocorrelation can be found in table 
A.1.  
 M-all M-owners M-tenants 
Durbin-h statistics 
p-value 
-4.3946 
>0.0001 
-1.3423 
0.0898 
-4.9927 
>0.0001 
Table A.1: Test for the presence of autocorrelation 
 
Using stepwise autoregression initially specifying an autoregressive model with four lags 
and then removing autoregressive parameters until we have significant t-tests we find that 
one lag is required. As before, we weight all observations with the square root of the 
number of households in the cohort to avoid the problem of heteroscedasticity. The 
estimation results are seen in table A.2.  
 
As seen in table A.2 the signs of all variables except for the absolute value of real estate 
are as expected. The variable for the value of real estate are non-significant in all cases 
and close to zero and negative. The change in the value of real estate was found to be 
significant in table 5. This seems to support our hypothesis that it is the gain in wealth 
which has influenced car ownership and not the absolute value of real estate.  
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Variable M-all M-owners M-tenants 
Intercept 
Real estate owner 
Urbanization 
Real estate value 
Interest rate 
Income (log) 
Generation (cohort) 
Adults 
Cars (t-1) 
AR1 (βγ) 
 
 R2 
Log Likelihood 
SSE 
MSE 
-0.0349 (-0.23) 
0.0734 (6.38) 
-0.0330 (-3.56) 
-0.00002 (-1.32) 
-0.0432 (-4.44) 
0.0720 (3.68) 
0.0039 (3.18) 
0.0590 (3.90) 
0.7551 (23.47) 
0.3069 (5.33)
0.9944
-308.1442
133.3314
0.4474
-0.4433 (-1.29)
 
-0.0278 (-1.88) 
-0.000020 (-0.73) 
-0.0391 (-3.00) 
0.0946 (3.37) 
0.002944 (1.60) 
0.0564 (2.79) 
0.7120 (13.44) 
0.1970 (2.18)
0.9936
-165.2860
77.1221
0.5319
0.1215 (0.37)
 
-0.0519 (-3.19) 
-0.00005 (-1.53) 
-0.0620 (-3.79) 
0.1177 (3.06) 
0.0032 (1.21) 
0.0395 (1.04) 
0.6691 (11.83) 
0.3923 (4.95)
0.9146
-134.2893
51.5219
0.3553
Table A.2: Estimates, t-values and summary statistics 
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Appendix B 
This appendix presents estimates and income elasticities for a model without a variable 
for real estate values. The test for autocorrelation can be found in table B.1.  
 
 M-all M-owners M-tenants 
Durbin-h statistics 
p-value 
-4.2815 
>0.0001 
-1.2593 
0.1040 
-4.8138 
>0.0001 
Table B.1: Test for the presence of autocorrelation 
 
Using stepwise autoregression initially specifying an autoregressive model with four lags 
and then removing autoregressive parameters until we have significant t-tests we find that 
one lag is required. We weight all observations with the square root of the number of 
households in the cohort to avoid the problem of heteroscedasticity. The estimation 
results are seen in table B.2.  
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Variable M-all-A M-owners-A M-tenants-A 
Intercept 
Real estate owner 
Urbanization 
Interest rate 
Income (log) 
Generation (cohort) 
Adults 
Cars (t-1) 
AR1 (βγ) 
 
 R2 
Log Likelihood 
SSE 
MSE 
-0.1215 (-0.88) 
0.0677 (6.36)
-0.0408 (-5.43) 
-0.0386 (-4.29) 
0.0633 (3.46) 
0.004349 (3.63) 
0.0648 (4.41) 
0.7461 (23.21) 
0.2922 (5.05)
0.9944
-309.0223
134.0981
0.4485
-0.5626 (-1.75)
 
-0.0351  (-3.03) 
-0.0355 (–3.10) 
0.0884 (3.46) 
0.003479 (2.11) 
0.0623 (3.25) 
0.6954 (13.39) 
0.1750 (1.93)
0.9936
-165.5526
77.3939
0.5301
-0.0580 (-0.19)
 
-0.0588 (-3.71) 
-0.0549 (-3.47) 
0.0983 (2.69) 
0.003051 (1.15) 
0.0578 (1.57) 
0.6796 (11.99) 
0.3822 (4.80)
0.9132
-135.5135
52.3507
0.3586
Table B.2: Estimates, t-values and summary statistics 
 
As seen in table B.2 the signs of all variables are as expected. Calculating income 
elasticities we get the results presented in table B.3. Comparing the results from table B.3 
with the elasticities given in table 8 we see that excluding the variable for the increasing 
real estate values reduce both short run and long run income elasticities.  
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 M-owners-A M-tenants-A 
 
Car availability = 0.5 
Car availability = 0.75 
Car availability = 1.00 
Car availability = 1.25 
 
Mean car availability in the group35 
Short run 
0.1768 
0.1179 
0.0884 
0.0675 
 
0.0807 
Long run 
0.6963 
0.3871 
0.2902 
0.2216 
 
0.2649 
Short run 
0.1966 
0.1311 
0.0983 
0.0786 
 
0.1846 
Long run 
0.6136 
0.4092 
0.3068 
0.2453 
 
0.5762 
Table B.3: Income elasticities for car ownership. 
 
 
                                                 
35 The average for real estate owners is 1.0960 cars and for tenants it is 0.5326. 
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Abstract 
We examine how the demand for car travel in Denmark is affected by income, fuel cost, 
and car purchasing cost. We use two different sources of data; The Danish Transport 
Diary Survey and time series from Statistics Denmark. A partial adjustment model for 
daily car transport is estimated. As in recent UK and Danish studies we find that on a 
national level, car travel is more sensitive to car purchase cost than it is to fuel cost. We 
offer some insight into this result by showing that car travel by urban households depends 
mostly on fuel prices and car travel for rural households depend mostly on car purchase 
cost. This finding is important since it helps us to understand how different transport 
policies might affect households in different regions thus contributing to the 
understanding of the distributional impact of the policies. 
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1. Introduction 
To plan infrastructure investments and tax policies in the transport sector we need to 
understand how the demand for transport evolves, what affect the demand and who is 
affected by changing prices. To do so one often looks at past experiences, extrapolates 
trends, and examines what cause the trend to increase or decrease. When investigating 
demand for car transport there are two margins which are of interest. The first is the mode 
choice, i.e. the choice on the extensive margin. The second is the choice of how much to 
travel given the mode choice, i.e. the choice on the intensive margin. Investigating 
behavior on both margins is important since it helps to understand the level of road 
congestion which is a major concern in almost all major cities. The estimation of car 
ownership in Denmark we addressed in Nielsen (2006a) and Nielsen (2006b). The 
present paper is concerned with the choice of how much to travel once households have 
acquired at least one car and use it. We therefore look at car trips thus focusing on the 
choice on the intensive margin.  
 
We set up a partial adjustment model for car transport and estimate it using the approach 
suggested by Dargay & Vythoulkas (1999) where a partial adjustment model for car 
ownership for the first time is estimated using a pseudo-panel. The approach has since 
been extended in several ways to analyze car ownership decisions. Dargay (2001) allows 
for asymmetric income effects in car ownership showing that hysteresis is present. She 
later examines differences in car ownership between rural and urban households (Dargay 
(2002)) and in Nielsen (2006a) the influence of changing real estate prices and changing 
interest rates on car demand is analyzed. The method is also used in Dargay (2004) to 
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examine the price and income effects on car travel in the UK. She shows that households’ 
car transport is more sensitive to changes in car purchase cost than changes in user cost. 
She finds short-run elasticites with regards to car purchase cost to be -0.35 and the short-
run elasticity with regards to motor fuel prices to be -0.10 with corresponding long-run 
elasticities of -0.46 and -0.14. This paper extend on her findings and offer some insight 
into this result by showing that for rural households car travel is sensitive to car purchase 
cost and not so much to fuel cost. For urban households we find the opposite; that car 
travel is sensitive to fuel cost and not so much to car purchase cost. One possible 
explanation for this is that rural households have a higher need for car transport and low 
possibility of changing to other means of transport. This causes their travel demand to be 
affected more by the number of cars available to them (one car or more than one car) 
compared to the changed use of a single car. For urban households the public transport 
system is better and when fuel prices increase they can more easily change their mode of 
transport and they also have shorter distances to travel than rural households. 
 
In a Danish setting the demand for car transport has been investigated in Bjørner (1999). 
He uses aggregated time series to estimate a model where he assumes that the level of 
transport can be described by a Cobb-Douglas function. He finds long-run elasticities 
with regard to income, fuel cost and car price to be 0.42, -0.84 and -1.12 respectively. 
Surprisingly he find that income in some estimations are not significant but point out that 
this might be due to multicollinearity between income, car ownership and a trend 
parameter used in his specification, but as he also points out it might be that income plays 
a minor role in the demand for car transport once a car is purchased. Birkeland et al. 
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(1999) use both cross-section modeling and a pseudo-panel approach to estimate income 
elasticities for car transport in Denmark. The cross-section methods they use gives 
income elasticities between 0.28 and 0.48 whereas the pseudo-panel method (used on a 
non-dynamic model) results in an income elasticity of 0.19. A recent Danish study also 
dealing with the demand for car transport is Fosgerau et al. (2004) where an aggregate 
model for the Danish road transport is presented. Their model consists of several minor 
models, one of which deals with the demand for car transport. They use gross national 
product per capita for Denmark together with a relative price index for the running cost of 
driving to estimate a partial adjustment model finding short- and long-run income 
elasticities of 0.13 and 0.16 together with short- and long-run cost elasticities of -0.30 and 
-0.37. They also address the problem of saturation in car ownership in Denmark 
concluding that saturation effects are not likely to affect the development in car 
ownership in Denmark, since the car ownership per capita is still well below that of other 
countries. This is confirmed by figures from EuroStat where Denmark is one of the 
countries with the lowest amount of cars per 1.000 inhabitants (350 cars per 1.000 
inhabitants. See Dargay et al. (2006) for details) 
 
A recent paper dealing with the development in car transport is Kwon and Preston (2005). 
They use data from the National Travel Survey in the UK to decompose the effect of 
increased travel distance into what they call ‘car ownership effects’ (changes caused by 
changing car ownership) and ‘car use effects’ (changes in car use dependent on car 
ownership level)36. They find that ‘car ownership effects’ explain about half of the 
                                                 
36 In our work we label these effects ‘intensive effects’ and ‘extensive effects’ in order to use the same 
methodology as is used in other economic papers, especially literature dealing with the labor-market where 
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growth in car trip distance but also that this trend seems to be going down possibly 
because of saturation effects. They also identify two trends affecting the ‘car use effects’ 
namely increasing number of trips and increasing trip lengths. The first of these were 
dominating in the 1970s and 80s whereas the latter seems to dominate in the 90s. 
Furthermore they identify several factors affecting these effects and they present a survey 
of some recent fuel price elasticities for car transport reporting a consensus of -0.15 in the 
short run and -0.30 in the long run. These findings are higher than those reported by 
Dargay (2004) and also higher than what we find for long run fuel cost elasticities in the 
present paper. 
 
Our paper adds to the literature in two ways. It offers new insights into the influence of 
car purchase prices and fuel prices on car travel found in both Denmark and in the UK. 
Secondly, since the data used by Dargay in the UK studies did not include information on 
the distance traveled but calculated a proxy for this variable from household expenditure 
data, average fuel price data, and data on the average fuel efficiency of cars, one could 
question the reliability of the UK results. By using a different type of data, namely a 
transport survey where the needed variables are available, we obtain results comparable 
to those found for the UK thus verifying the approach used in these studies. This is 
important since large transport surveys are rarely available and household expenditure 
surveys are.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘intensive responses’ capture effects on the number of working hours and ‘extensive responses’ describe 
the labor market participation decisions (see for example Kleven and Kreiner (2006)). 
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This paper has the following structure. The next section presents the data and describes 
the construction of the pseudo-panel. Section 3 describes the model, section 4 presents 
the estimation and section 5 derives price and income elasticities. The final section 
concludes. 
2. The data and the pseudo-panel 
We use data from the Danish Transport Diary Survey together with time series from 
Statistics Denmark for the period from 1995 to 2002. The survey is conducted on a 
monthly basis with 1800 people between 16 and 74 being sampled from the Danish 
Central Personal Register every month until 1997. From 1998 the sample is extended to 
include people from age 10 to 84 and the sample size is increased to 2100 persons per 
month. The response rate is between 65% and 70%. Information on a given day of travel, 
including transport mode, distance traveled, trip chaining, and time use. Background 
information about the interviewee and her household is also collected (income, number of 
adults and children, car ownership, employment, etc.) together with a series of 
geographical variables37. We do not use all the observations in the survey. Since our 
focus is on the distance traveled by car we exclude all households not owning at least one 
car. Observations with missing variables are also excluded from the sample. From 
Statistics Denmark we obtain time series for car purchase costs and fuel costs for the 
years 1995 to 2002.  
 
                                                 
37 A full description of the data can be found at the homepage of the Danish Transport Research Institute, 
www.dtf.dk.  
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Using the procedure described by Deaton (1985) we construct a pseudo-panel for cohorts 
for the years 1995 to 2002. We use three characteristics to create our panel; year of birth 
of the interviewee, real estate ownership status, and urbanization. The year of birth is 
often used when pseudo-panels are created and we choose the remaining characteristics 
since we want to examine differences between urban and rural households and since it 
was shown in Nielsen (2006a) that real estate ownership could influence the demand for 
cars. Creating the pseudo-panel according to these variables thus reduce the variation 
within the cohort-group and thus reduce the loss of information caused by the aggregation 
to cohort levels (See Deaton (1985) for a discussion of this). We thus end up with cohort-
observations for four types of households; urban real estate owners, rural real estate 
owners, urban tenants, and rural tenants. With 11 cohorts we therefore have a total of 44 
observations for each of the years between 1995 and 2002. 
 
In figure 1 we see that the distances traveled by car depend on both the degree of 
urbanization and the cohort. The fact that the urbanization level influences the travel 
distance by car is not surprising since distances in general are longer in rural areas than in 
urban areas and since public transport services are better in urban areas. Urban 
households thus have better substitutes for car travel than rural households. Differences in 
the traveled distance only seem to be present for the younger cohorts though. For persons 
over the age of 55 the traveled distance still depends on the cohort but the effect of the 
level of urbanization seems to disappear.  
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Figure 1: Distance traveled by car in urban and rural areas by different cohorts, 
contingent on the households having at least one car. 
Source: Danish Transport Diary Survey. 
  
Incomes are also different for urban and rural households with urban households having 
higher income than rural households as shown in figure 2. We also see that the income 
differs between cohorts with income rising until a person turns 50 and a large drop in 
income when the person passes 60 and retires. These differences are to a large extent due 
to life-cycle effects but some cohort-effects are also present with young generations 
having higher salaries than the older generations had when they were young.  
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Figure 2: Household income (after tax) for different cohorts in urban and rural areas for 
car owning households. 
Source: Danish Transport Diary Survey. 
 
The number of adults in the households is shown in figure 3 where a clear life-cycle 
effect can be seen. One difference between urban and rural households which is shown in 
figure 3 is that the number of adults peaks a few years earlier for rural households than 
for urban areas. One explanation for this difference could be that the children in rural 
households have to move from their parents to get an education whereas children coming 
from urban households can stay with their parents while studying. 
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Figure 3: Number of adults in urban and rural areas for different cohorts38 contingent on 
car ownership. 
Source: Danish Transport Diary Survey. 
  
Figure 4 shows the average number of cars in the different cohorts for households have at 
least one car. It thus shows the development in multi-car households. As can be seen 
there is no large difference between rural and urban households except for a slight 
tendency for young rural households to own more cars than young urban households. A 
reason for this difference could be that more students live in the large cities and that they 
have substantially lower car ownership than other young people.  
 
                                                 
38 One problem with the data is that people count as adults when they become 16 years old. 
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Figure 4: Car ownership for urban and rural households, contingent on households having 
at least one car. 
Source: Danish Transport Diary Survey. 
 
Figure 5 shows the development in both fuel price and purchase price for cars between 
1993 and 2002. We see that car prices have increased slightly in the period whereas fuel 
prices have fluctuated more with a huge increase from 1998 to 2000.  
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Figure 5: Price index for fuel price and car purchase cost (2000=100).  
Source: Statistics Denmark. 
3. The model 
We use a model based on Dargay and Vythoulkas (1999) with a semi-log specification 
for income. Our choice of semi-log specification is based on the findings of Dargay 
(2001) where different specifications were tested (Linear, Double-log and Semi-log) 
concluding that the semi-log specification was the preferred one. Letting itC  represent the 
number of kilometers driven at time t for household i, itY  the annual after tax income for 
household i at time t, tT  is the average purchase price for cars at time t, 
i
tU  is a dummy 
for households living in urban areas, tF  is the average fuel price at time t, 
i
tI  the number 
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of adults in the household, and with iG  being the cohort number, the demand for car 
travel is determined by 
1log( )
i i i i i i i
t Y t T t U t F t I t G C t tC Y T U F I G Cα β β β β β β β ε−= + + + + + + + +  (1)
where α  is a constant and itε  is an term following a normal distribution, 
2(0, ( ) )i it tNε σ∼ . 
 
Since we use a pseudo-panel approach as described in Deaton (1995) all our variables 
take the form 
i
t
c
t
A c
tn
i
A=∑  where ctn  is the number of households in cohort c and ctA  is the 
variable. We let 
i
tC  represent daily car transport in kilometers in year t for cohort i, 
i
tI  
the number of adults in the household, 
i
G  the cohort number, tF  the fuel price, 
i
tY  the 
annual after tax income, 
i
tU  is a dummy for households living in urban areas, and tT  is 
the average purchase price for cars.  
 
In order to determine if autocorrelation is present we use the Durbin-h statistics and the 
Durbin-t statistics. The results for the three models are shown in table 1. 
 
 M-all M-urban M-rural 
Durbin-h 
Durbin-t 
-0.2776 (0.3907) -2.8589 (0.0021)  
1.1436 (0.1274) 
Table 1: Test statistics for the presence of autocorrelation. 
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As we can see in the M-all model and the M-rural model we get a strong indication that 
we can proceed under the assumption of autocorrelation. For the M-urban model the 
result is less clear but we have estimated the model with several lags and all parameters 
are insignificant. We thus conclude that we can proceed under the assumption of 
autocorrelation. 
 
The statistical model can thus be written as 
1
2
log( )
(0, ( ) )
i ii i i i
t t tt tt Y T U F I t G C t
i
t t
C Y T U F I G C
N
α β β β β β β β ε
ε σ
−= + + + + + + + +
∼
 
 
(2) 
where 1
i
tC −  is the number of cars in the previous period and tε  is an error term39.   
 
Estimating the model shown in (2) directly on the pseudo-panel described in section 2 
would result in the problem of hetehoscedasticity since the variance of the error-run will 
be given by 
21 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c c c c
t t t t
i i i i i
t t t t tn n n n
i i
Var Var Var Var Varε ε ε ε ε= = = =∑ ∑  (3) 
and thus be dependent on the number of observations in each of the cohorts. In order to 
avoid this we simply multiply all cohort-observations with the square root of the number 
of observations used in the given cohort thus getting 
21 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c c c
t t t
ic c i c i c i i
tt t t t t t t tn n n
i i
Var n Var n Var n Var n Varε ε ε ε ε= = = =∑ ∑  (4) 
                                                 
39 A test for the presence of autocorrelation showed that in most cases we could proceed with the simple 
error structure shown in (2).  
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and thus having a model where heteroscedasticity is eliminated. We therefore assume that 
all the error terms follow a normal distribution with the same variance σ2 as in (1). As 
argued by Dargay and Vythoulkas this model can be estimated using standard techniques. 
4. Estimation 
The variables used can be seen in table 2 together with their sources.  
 
Variable Source Description 
Urbanization 
Income (log) 
Cohort 
Adults 
Car purchase price 
Fuel price 
Transport demand 
DTDS 
DTDS 
DTDS 
DTDS 
SD 
SD 
DTDS 
Dummy for living in a large city 
Logarithm of household income 
Cohort number 
Number of adults in the household 
Price index for car purchase cost 
Price index for fuel cost 
Daily transport demand in kilometers 
Table 2: Variables used in the model (Source: Statistics Denmark (SD), Danish Transport 
Diary Survey (DTDS)) 
 
In table 3 the number of observations used to construct the pseudo-panel is shown. We 
have defined urban households as households living in one of the five largest cities in 
Denmark and rural areas are thus the remaining households. Since the number of 
observations in each cohort should be as large as possible we are faced with a tradeoff 
since increasing the number of observations reduces the number of cohorts we can 
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construct. Here we have chosen 5-year bands for each cohort but still the average number 
of observations for tenants are low.   
 
Cohort 
number 
Cohort date 
of birth 
Urban 
owner 
Rural 
owner 
Urban 
tentants 
Rural 
tenants 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
1920-24 
1925-29 
1930-34 
1935-39 
1940-44 
1945-49 
1950-54 
1955-59 
1960-64 
1965-69 
1970-74 
291
502
695
880
1237
1500
1277
1314
1259
1081
614
936
1707
2293
3026
4080
5010
4676
4430
4337
3709
1989
198 
303 
319 
372 
375 
431 
335 
427 
578 
803 
762 
170
288
298
278
314
390
375
421
509
744
812
Cohort average 968 3290 446 418
Table 3: Number of observations 
 
Using the pseudo-panel to estimate the model, remembering that we multiply each 
cohort-observation with the number of observations used to construct it, we get the 
results shown in table 4. 
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Variable M-all M-rural M-urban 
Constant 
Urbanization 
Income (log) 
Adults 
Car purchase price 
Fuel price 
Cohort 
Transport demand  
 
R2 
Log Likelihood 
SSE 
MSE 
-0.0056 (-0.00)
-6.3271 (-6.39)
9.4187 (3.67)
2.9518 (1.69)
-0.3357 (-3.07)
-0.0425 (-2.40)
1.5164 (7.82)
0.2025 (3.52)
0.9535
-1661.3546
1213776.56
4185
12.4345 (0.75)
10.5508 (2.75)
3.2965 (1.44)
-0.4316 (-2.62)
-0.0256 (-1.08)
1.4793 (5.27)
0.2332 (2.71)
0.9580
-850.2932
789693.948
5561
-70.3248 (-3.10)
4.2964 (1.19)
1.2177 (0.41)
0.0533 (0.32)
-0.0703 (-2.50)
1.6192 (6.33)
0.0270 (0.35)
0.8896
-792.6594
364321.752
2566 
Table 4: Estimates, t-values and summary statistics 
 
Most of the variables are significant but we see that income and the number of adults in 
the urban households is insignificant. For income this correspond to the findings in 
Bjørner (1999) where income was found to be insignificant in some instances. Signs of 
the variables are also as expected with the exception of car purchase prices in the model 
for urban households but this variable is not statistically significant. For rural households 
the variable for fuel price is not significant. One possible explanation is that rural 
households, having poor access to public transport and longer distances to travel are more 
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dependent on their car for all trips and especially trips which are necessary (like 
commuting trips, essential shopping trips, and leisure trips where the distances makes 
other modes of transport than car impractical). Such trips could potentially be a large part 
of the trips undertaken for rural households. This is not the case for urban households 
where the distances are shorter and the public transport network is a good substitute for 
car transport. Even though we do not see great differences between rural and urban 
households when it comes to the number of cars available in car-owning households (see 
figure 3) the effect of changing prices on the purchase of cars only seems to affect the car 
transport of rural households and not that of urban households. The estimation also shows 
that cohort effects are present and younger generations travel longer than older 
generations. Except for the urban households the adjustment parameter is also significant 
but with values of 0.20 and 0.23 we see that around 80% of the adjustment in transport 
demand happens within the first year. For rural households the adjustment parameter is 
0.03 and adjustment is almost instantaneous which also explains why the parameter is not 
statistically significant.  
5. Elasticities 
To calculate the elasticities for Denmark we use the M-all model. The formula for short 
run elasticities of car transport with regards to variable xi is given by i i
ii
x xsr C
i xx C Cε β∂∂= =  
and the corresponding long run elasticity can be calculated as 
SR
i
i
LR
i
ε θε =  where θi=(1-βi) 
is the adjustment parameter. Estimated short- and long-run elasticities are shown in table 
5. 
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Income Car purchase price Fuel price 
Short run 
0.25 
Long run 
0.32 
Short run 
-0.90 
Long run 
-1.13 
Short run 
-0.11 
Long run 
-0.14 
Table 5: Elasticities for the complete model40 
 
With the adjustment parameter being relatively high (θi=7975) the difference between 
short- and long-run elasticities are not large. The income elasticities found here is in line 
with some findings in Birkeland et al. (1999) but lower than those found in Bjørner 
(1999) and Fosgerau et al (2004). Our income elasticities are much lower than those 
reported for UK in Dargay (2004) where values around 1 are found. For the elasticity 
with regard to car purchase cost our results are comparable with those found in Bjørner 
(1999) but our fuel price elasticity is substantially below his finding but in line with the 
findings in Birkeland et al. (1999) and Dargay (2004). 
 
 Rural households Urban households 
 
Income elasticity 
Car purchase price elasticity41 
Fuel price elasticity42 
Short run 
0.27 
-1.09 
Long run 
0.35 
-1.42 
Short run 
0.14 
 
-0.23 
Long run43 
0.14 
 
-0.23 
Table 6: Elasticities for rural and urban households44 
                                                 
40 We assume that the number of kilometers traveled is 36 which is the average in 2000. The price index for 
the purchase price for cars was 100 in 2002 and the price index for fuel was 100. 
41 The car purchase price is only significant for rural households. 
42 The fuel price is only significant for urban households 
43 For urban households the income parameter and the adjustment parameter are insignificant. With an 
adjustment parameter close to 1 we thus have almost identical short- and long-run elasticities. 
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Using the models for urban and rural households we get the results shown in table 6. As 
in Christens and Fosgerau (2004) that urban households have higher income elasticity 
than rural households but we also keep in mind that their elasticities were for car 
ownership and our elasticities are for travel by car. For the two groups the elasticities 
with regard to car purchase price and fuel price increase numerically compared to the 
elasticities shown in table 5.  
6. Conclusion 
Other studies have estimated the demand for car transport for Denmark but in this paper 
we for the first time utilize the Danish Transport Diary Survey to create a pseudo-panel 
and use this to estimate a dynamic partial adjustment model for car transport. Other 
dynamic specifications have used aggregate time series or based their estimates on cross-
section methods. Elasticities for car transport are found with regard to income, car 
purchase cost and fuel price.  
 
We show that urban households respond more to changing fuel prices than to changes in 
the purchase price of cars. The opposite holds for rural households where the demand for 
car transport is more sensitive to changes in the purchase price of cars than to changing 
fuel prices. Our result supports the findings of Dargay (2004) where the UK Family 
Expenditure Survey is used to estimate a dynamic model for car transport. She 
constructed a proxy for car transport and it is thus interesting to see, if a different type of 
data gives comparable results. Finding that the different data yield similar results is 
                                                                                                                                                 
44 We assume that the number of kilometers traveled is 39.7 for rural households and 30.9 for urban 
households which is the average in 2000. The price index for the purchase price for cars was 100 and the 
price index for fuel was 100 in 2000. 
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important since many countries have large expenditure surveys but do not have large 
transport surveys. Using expenditure surveys in future work thus seems to be justified.  
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Abstract 
We explore the interaction between taxes on the purchase of cars and on the use of cars 
when households face a discrete choice of purchasing a car or not. We use a simple labor-
leisure model with a logit formulation for the discrete choice of car-ownership to examine 
how a tax reform which shifts taxes from car ownership to use of cars affects welfare. To 
our knowledge this is the first time the discrete nature of car purchase is modeled 
explicitly in a tax-reform model and it is thus the first consistent analysis of a tax reform 
involving both fixed and variable cost. Car transport is associated with negative 
externalities and feedback effects. We show that the welfare effect of this type of reform 
depends on both the choices of car usage and car ownership decisions and that feedback 
effects exist on both the intensive margin and on the extensive margin. Furthermore the 
effect of such a tax reform depends on the initial level of the variable tax on car transport 
relative to the pigouvian level. The findings are illustrated by simulations.  
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1. Introduction 
The importance of intervention in the transport sector has become obvious in recent years 
with externalities, and especially congestion externalities, increasing rapidly in almost 
every major city. The dilemma facing the transport authorities is that transport, while 
causing negative externalities, is an essential part of social life and that increasing 
transport seems to be closely related to economic growth. One aspect of this dilemma is 
pointed out in Parry & Bento (2001). They show that the implementation of marginal cost 
pricing to reduce externalities can cause negative welfare effects if the extra costs of 
transport discourage labor supply. A similar insight is obtained in Nielsen (2006a) where 
the optimal tax rules in a Becker (1965) framework for household time allocation are 
derived for a situation with atmospheric externalities. Here it is shown that the additivity 
property derived by Sandmo (1975) still apply, though in a modified form thus extending 
the findings of Kleven (2004) where an inverse factor share rule was derived in a Becker 
framework. An important insight from the Parry and Bento paper is that we have to be 
careful when we evaluate the welfare effects of tax reforms in the transport sector, since a 
tax which seems to be optimal when analyzed in isolation (in their case marginal cost 
pricing) could have negative welfare effects if analyzed in a general equilibrium setting.  
 
In this paper we examine a tax reform in the transport sector involving a fixed cost of 
purchasing (or owning) cars. A fixed purchase (or ownership) tax on cars is replaced by a 
variable tax on the use of cars in a budget neutral way. In order to analyze this reform one 
needs to account for car ownership decisions (e.g. decisions on the extensive margin). 
Reforms of this kind are frequently suggested in the Danish debate since the marginal tax 
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on the purchase of cars in Denmark is 180% (DORS (2006)). This type of tax reforms 
have to our knowledge not yet been analyzed consistently, since the discrete nature of the 
car ownership decision has been left out of previous analysis.  
 
We build upon several results from the economic literature. The explicit inclusion of time 
in economic models was first undertaken by Becker (1965), DeSerpa (1971), and 
others45. They include time as a source of utility for households, either directly in the 
utility functions (DeSerpa), or indirectly through a household production function 
(Becker). For the modeling of car ownership, we draw upon the results from Small and 
Rosen (1981). Based on the work of McFadden (1974) they present a framework for 
modeling welfare effects when discrete consumer choices have to be taken into account. 
De Borger (2000) demonstrates that the Small & Rosen approach can be implemented in 
a tax model, and he uses their framework to derive the optimal two-part tariff in a model 
of discrete choice which he extends to a situation with externalities in De Borger (2001).  
Unfortunately the time allocation problem and thus the labor-leisure tradeoff is not 
included in these papers.  
 
The modelling framework used here is based on Parry and Bento (2001). They construct 
a general equilibrium model for commuting transport, labor supply, and congestion 
externalities in order to analyze tax reforms involving variable taxes on the use of cars, 
subsidies to public transport (in their model a metro system), and reduction in labor taxes. 
They show that interactions with pre-existing taxes are important and that feedback 
effects influence the welfare effects of the tax reforms. They use the same framework in 
                                                 
45 A recent survey on the literature on time allocation can be found in Jara-Díaz (2003) 
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Parry and Bento (2002) to analyze situations with different types of externalities and 
interactions with different types of taxes. Again they conclude that welfare effects of tax 
reforms depend on interactions with pre-existing distortions in the economy. De Borger 
and Van Dender (2003) use the same framework to analyze the effect of a tax reform on 
the value of time. They show that commuting taxes might reduce the value of time while 
taxes on non-commuting traffic plausibly raise the value of time. They thus demonstrate 
that the tax system and time values are closely related; a finding which was also pointed 
out earlier in Forsyth (1980).  
 
In this paper we show that the welfare effect of a tax reform depends on a combination of 
several factors, some of which are identified in the papers mentioned above. The new 
finding is that changes on the extensive margin (e.g., changes in car-ownership) could be 
large and should be modeled explicitly if correct estimates of welfare effects are to be 
obtained. With the use of simulation, we demonstrate that it is possible to include discrete 
effects and we believe that future evaluation of tax reforms in the transport sector should 
include these or at least reflect on the consequences of not including extensive responses. 
Furthermore our simulation shows that the optimal tax on the use of cars is equal to the 
marginal external damage cost, i.e. the pigouvian tax rate. 
 
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 presents the modeling framework in 
which household decisions on the intensive margin (how much to consume contingent on 
car-ownership) is analyzed and the choice on the extensive margin (the car-ownership 
decision) is also described in detail. The production sector and the government 
  
141
optimization problem are also presented. Section 3 derives an expression for the welfare 
effect of a tax reform involving a shift from fixed to variable taxation of cars. Section 4 
simulate a tax reform to illustrate the theoretical findings. The final section concludes.  
2. The model 
Inspired by Parry and Bento (2001) we construct a model where households decide on the 
consumption of goods and leisure and they also choose how much to work and if they 
want to commute by private transport ('car') or public transport ('metro'). Our model 
deviates from previous models of this type since we do not assume households to be 
identical. Instead we assume that all the observable socioeconomic characteristics of the 
households are identical and it thus seems as if they have identical utility functions. 
Observing the outcome of the households' actions their choice of car-ownership is not 
consistent with the households being identical since some households purchase a car and 
others do not. Their choice thus appears to be random. The households can therefore be 
divided into two types: those who do not purchase a car and those who purchase a car. 
We assume that households purchasing a car can commute by either car or metro. 
Households not purchasing a car can only commute by metro. Furthermore we assume 
that congestion externalities are present in 'car transport'.  
 
The production sector in this economy is fully competitive and operates under constant 
returns to scale. All producer prices are therefore constant and equal to the marginal cost 
of production. The government taxes goods, transport and labor income in order to 
generate revenue for some unspecified tasks (e.g. national defense or the health care 
system).  
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2.1 The households 
Households consume 'pure leisure', L, an aggregate consumption commodity, Z, public 
transport (a metro service), and private transport (car transport). Households also supply 
labor to the production sector and can go to work by either metro or car. We assume that 
consumption of the aggregate good and consumption of leisure as well as 'transport' in 
itself generates household utility and we write the individual households utility function 
as 
( , ) ( , )b cU L Z u Z Z+  (1) 
where bZ is trips by metro and cZ is trips by car. These are defined in detail below. The 
separability assumption between U and u in (1) separates the choice of transport mode 
from the decision on how much to work. It also allows for imperfect substitutability 
between transport by metro and transport by car. This seems like a realistic assumption 
since some people dislike crowded metros and enjoy the privacy of their own car.  
 
We assume that H households exist and that H is large. All households have the same 
earning capacity and thus the same wage rate w. Furthermore all households have the 
same endowment of time, L , and non-labor income, y. Each commuting trip takes up a 
certain amount of household time which we will denote bL  for a trip by metro and cL  for 
a trip by car. A trip is defined as traveling both to and from work. This means that 
households either go back and forth by car or by metro. Following Parry & Bento (2001) 
we assume that the number of working hours in one day is fixed and equal to one. This 
means that the supply of labor hours given by wL  is equal to the total number of 
commuting trips 
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w b cL Z Z= +  (2) 
We let Z  be total number of trips by car and assume that, because of congestion, a higher 
value of Z  increases the time requirement for car transport. We thus have that 
( )' 0
cL Z
ZL
∂
∂= >  (3) 
Assuming that households ignore their own influence on Z , we have an externality 
problem in car transport. We assume that the metro service is not affected by congestion.  
 
Letting P , bP , and cP  represent consumer prices on goods, metro trips and car trips, wt  
the tax on labor, and P  be the fixed cost of purchasing a car. Normalizing the wage rate 
w to one then allows us to write the constraints which the households face as 
{ 0} (1 )c
b b c c w
wZPZ P Z P Z P t L y>+ + + Ι = − +  (4) 
b b c c wL L Z L Z L L+ + + =  (5) 
where { 0}cZ >Ι  is an indicator function equal to 1 if 0cZ >  and zero otherwise. It therefore 
indicate whether the households purchase a car or not. Following DeSerpa (1971) we will 
label (4) the budget constraint and label (5) the time resource constraint. The constraints 
are interdependent through wL , bZ , and cZ . Apart from the fixed cost, P , and the fact 
that households can make a choice on the extensive margin with regards to car 
ownership, this part of the model is similar to the one used in Parry & Bento (2001).  
2.1.1 The choice at the intensive margin 
We now examine how a household behaves conditional on its choice of car ownership 
status. Since households owning a car and households not owning a car can choose 
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between different consumption bundles ('non-owners' can not choose to travel by car) and 
face different budget constraints ('owners' have to pay a fixed fee P ), we analyze the two 
types of households separately.  
2.1.1.1 The choice for car owners 
Letting subscript 1 indicate car ownership, using the constraint given in (4) and (5), and 
remembering that the households ignore their own influence on the level of Z  we can 
specify the utility maximization problem for car owners as  
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
, , ,
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
max ( , ) ( , )
. .
(1 ) ( )
( ) ( )
b c
b c
L Z Z Z
b b c c w M
w
b b c c w T
U L Z u Z Z
s t
PZ P Z P Z P t L y
L L Z L Z Z L L
λ
λ
+
+ + + = − +
+ + + =
 
 
(6) 
where 1Mλ  is the marginal utility of income, 1Tλ  is the marginal utility of time as a 
resource, and labor supply will be given by  
1 1 1w b cL Z Z= +  (7) 
With (6) being a standard maximization problem the first order conditions are given by 
1
1
TU
L
λ∂∂ =  (8) 
1
1
MU
Z
Pλ∂∂ =  (9) 
1 1
1 ( (1 )) ( 1)
M b T b
wb
u
Z
P t Lλ λ∂∂ = − − + +  (10) 
1 1
1 ( (1 )) ( ( ) 1)
M c T c
wc
u
Z
P t L Zλ λ∂∂ = − − + +  (11) 
together with the budget constraint (4) and the time resource constraint (5).  
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Following De Serpa (1971) we define the value of time for car owners, 1VoT ,  as 1
1
U
L
U
Z
∂
∂ ∂
∂
 
and by using (8), (9), and (11) we can write this as  
1 1 1
1
((1 ) )
( ) 1
1 c
wT M
cM
t P
L Z
u
cZ
VoT λλ
λ + − −
+
∂
∂
= =  
 
(12) 
or by using (10) instead of (11) we can write it as 
1 1 1
1
((1 ) )
1
1 b
wT M
M b
t P
L
u
bZ
VoT λλ
λ + − −
+
∂
∂
= =  
 
(13) 
The numerator of (12) and (13) measure the value of one days work. To see this note that 
1c
u
Z
∂
∂  and 1b
u
Z
∂
∂  measure the marginal utility of a trip by car or metro respectively. By 
dividing with 1Mλ  this is converted into monetary terms. One days work also generates 
income and there is a price on commuting. This is captured by ((1 ) )cwt P− −  and 
((1 ) )bwt P− −  which is the income from one days work consisting of the after tax income, 
(1 )wt− , and the price of the commuting trip, bP  or cP . The denominator measure the 
time used on a days work which consist of the time spend working (which we normalized 
to one) and commuting time. We thus see that (12) and (13) describes the value of time 
for car owners. From (12) and (13) we get that a tax on commuting working through 
either bP  or cP  reduce the value of time, which is also pointed out in De Borger and Van 
Dender (2003). It is also obvious that a reduction of the labor tax, wt , will increase the 
value of time and increased congestion reduce the value of time. The expressions in (12) 
and (13) for the value of time resemble those found in De Borger and Van Dender (2003), 
and as they note the value of time is independent of the activity in which it is used. 
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Using the first order conditions (8) through (11) together with the budget constraint (4) 
and the time resource constraint (5) we get the ordinary demand functions for car owners 
1( , , , , , ( ), , , )b c b cwL P P P t L L Z y P L  (14) 
1( , , , , , ( ), , , )b c b cwZ P P P t L L Z y P L  (15) 
1( , , , , , ( ), , , )b b c b cwZ P P P t L L Z y P L  (16) 
1( , , , , , ( ), , , )c b c b cwL P P P t L L Z y P L  (17) 
together with shadow prices 1Mλ  and 1Tλ . Using these together with 
1 1 1w b cL Z Z= +  (18) 
we can write the indirect utility function for households owning a car as 
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1
, , ,
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
( , , , , , ( ), , , )
max { ( , ) ( , )
( (1 ) )
( ( ) )}
b c
b c b c
w
b c
L Z Z Z
M b b c c w
w
T b b c c w
V P P P t L L Z y P L
U L Z u Z Z
PZ P Z P Z P t L y
L L Z L Z Z L L
λ
λ
= +
− + + + − − −
− + + + −
 
 
(19) 
which is now given as a function of variables exogenous to the household.  
2.1.1.2 The choice for non-car owners 
Letting subscript 0 indicate non-ownership of cars, households not owning a car have to 
solve 
0 0 0
0 0 0
, ,
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
max ( , ) ( ,0)
. .
(1 ) ( )
( )
b
b
L Z Z
b b w M
w
b b w T
U L Z u Z
s t
PZ P Z t L y
L L Z L L
λ
λ
+
+ = − +
+ + =
 
 
 
(20) 
where 0Mλ  is the marginal utility of income, 0Tλ  is the marginal utility of time as a 
resource, and labor supply will be given by  
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0 0w bT Z=  (21) 
With (20) being a standard maximization problem the first order conditions are given by 
0
0
TU
L
λ∂∂ =  (22) 
0
0
MU
Z
Pλ∂∂ =  (23) 
0 0
0 ( (1 )) ( 1)
M b T b
wb
u
Z
P t Lλ λ∂∂ = − − + +  (24) 
together with the budget constraint (4) and the time resource constraint (5). 
 
As before we follow DeSerpa (1971) define the value of time for non-car owners, 0VoT , 
as 0
0
U
L
U
Z
∂
∂ ∂
∂
. By using (22), (23), and (24) we can write this as 
0
0
0 0
0
((1 ) )
1
b
wT M
M b
t P
L
u
bZ
VoT λλ
λ + − −
+
∂
∂
= =  
 
(25) 
As in (12) and (13) the numerator is the value of one days work and the denominator is 
the time used on one days work. Again we see that a tax on commuting (in this case 
public transport) raise the cost of travel through bP  and this reduce the value of time. It is 
also obvious that a reduction of the labor tax, wt , will increase the value of time. From 
(13) and (25) we also see that if the government implement a policy where the time 
requirement for public transport, bL , is reduced the value of time for both car owners and 
non-car owners will go up46.  
 
                                                 
46 In Copenhagen such a policy could be the opening of the new metro line in 2007 and the extension of the 
metro system with a city ring expected to be build during the next 10 years.  
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The problem in (20) is structurally identical to (6). As before we get the ordinary demand 
functions for non-car owners 
0 ( , , , , , )b bwL P P t L y L  (26) 
0 ( , , , , , )b bwZ P P t L y L  (27) 
0 ( , , , , , )b b bwZ P P t L y L  (28) 
together with shadow prices 0Mλ  and 0Tλ . Again we can write the indirect utility 
function for households not owning a car as 
0 0 0
0
0 0 0
, ,
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
( , , , , , )
max { ( , ) ( ,0)
( (1 ) )
( )}
b
b b
w
b
L Z Z
M b b w
w
T b b w
V P P t L y L
U L Z u Z
PZ P Z t L y
L L Z L L
λ
λ
= +
− + − − −
− + + −
 
 
(29) 
which is now given as a function of variables exogenous to the household.  
2.1.2 The choice at the extensive margin 
Facing the price structure ( , , , )b cP P P P , wage tax wt , having non-labor income y, facing 
time requirements bL  and cL  together with externality level Z , the household chooses 
between the utility level 0V  and 1V  given in (19) and (29). Since households are utility 
maximizing, they each choose {0,1}i∈  such that 
0 1max{ , }iV V V=  (30) 
Using the random utility approach pioneered by Daniel McFadden (McFadden (1974)) 
we assume that the households behave as if the indirect utility function is composed of an 
observable deterministic part, iV , together with stochastic error term, iε . We write this 
as i iV ε+ . The error term captures the unobservable characteristics which make the 
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household choice seem random to the government. For simplicity and to ensure a closed 
form solution, we assume that these error terms are independently and identically 
distributed following a double exponential distribution with scale parameter η  which we 
will normalize to 1. This gives us a logit model for discrete choice47,48 . We know (Ben-
Akiva & Lerman (1985) and Train (2003)) that the probability of choosing not to buy a 
car, 0π , and the probability of choosing to buy a car, 1π , are given by49 
0 0
0 1( , , , , , ( ), , , )
b c b c
w
V
V V
e
e e
P P P t L L Z y P Lπ +=  
(31) 
1 1
0 1( , , , , , ( ), , , )
b c b c
w
V
V V
e
e e
P P P t L L Z y P Lπ +=  
(32) 
It is worth noting that the probabilities shown in (31) and (32) depend on all the 
parameters in the model. This means that even though households not owning a car do 
not directly affect the total level of congestion, by changing behavior on the intensive 
margin they still indirectly affect the level of congestion, via their impact on the extensive 
margin. The expected maximum utility W for a representative household is given by50 
0 1
ln( )V VW e e= +  (33) 
                                                 
47 Further details about the logit model, the double exponential distribution and a discussion of 
the scale parameter η  can be found in Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Train (2003). 
48 A discussion of the restrictiveness relating to the choice of the double exponential distribution 
of the error terms can be found in appendix C of De Borger (2000). 
49 From Train (2003) we have that 
0 0 1 0( ) 00 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1Pr( ) Pr( ) ( )
V V V
V V
e e e
e e
V V V V e e e d
ε εεπ ε ε ε ε ε− + − −− − − += + > + = < + − = =∫  
and thus that 
1 0 1
0 11
V
V V
e
e e
π π += − = . 
50 From Train (2003) we get that the maximum expected utility for a representative household is given by 
0 10 0 1 1[max{ , }] ln( )V VE V V e eε ε+ + = +  
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which is also known as the log-sum. The demand for goods and commodities for a 
representative (or average) household as well as the supply of labor can now be written as 
l 0 0 1 1Z Z Zπ π= +  (34) 
l 0 0 1 1b b bZ Z Zπ π= +  (35) 
l 1 1c cZ Zπ=  (36) 
 0 0 1 1w w wL L Zπ π= +  (37) 
which is a weighted average of the demand for the two types of households in the 
economy. By defining ( )bL Z  as a function of  l cZ  instead of Z  we have that (36) plays 
the role of the total number of trips by car in the economy, i.e. l cZ Z= . As expected we 
see that the level of Z  depend on both the choice on the intensive margin, 1π , and the 
choice on the extensive margin, 1cZ  which is an extension compared to previous models 
where the level only depend on the choice on the extensive margin. To simplify notation 
we will make the assumption that l cZ Z=  in the coming derivations. 
2.2 The production sectors and the government 
We assume that all production sectors are fully competitive and operate under constant 
returns to scale. No profits thus exist and the producer prices p , bp , and cp  for 
commodities, public transport (a 'ticket') and private transport ('fuel') become constant 
and equal to the marginal cost of production. The government can tax both private and 
public transport. Letting bt  and ct  represent the tax on public and private transport we 
can write 
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b b bP p t= +  (38) 
c c cP p t= +  (39) 
We assume that the fixed fee P  for the purchase of a 'car' is paid directly to the 
government which is just a normalization not affecting the results. The government has to 
raise revenue G for some unspecified purposes using the taxes defined in (38) and (39), 
together with the labor tax, wt , and the fixed fee, P . Following De Borger (2000) we use 
(33) to write the social welfare function as 
0 1
( , , , (1 ), , ( ), , , ) ln( )b c b cw
V VW P P P t L L Z y P L e e− = +  (40) 
which the government seeks to maximize. We define the government's revenue function 
as 
 l l1( , , , ) wb c b cb cw wR P t t t P t L t Z t Zπ= + + +  (41) 
where the first term is the fixed fee collected from car owners, the second term is the total 
labor tax, and the last two terms represent taxes on metro and car transport respectively. 
The government's budget constraint is now given by 
( , , , )b cwR P t t t G=  (42) 
Taking a closer look at the formula for expected maximum utility for a representative 
household (33), we see that the effect of changes in parameters is a weighted sum of 
changes in the indirect utility functions for households owning a car and households not 
owning a car. Letting Θ  represent some policy parameter that is changed, the change in 
maximum expected utility will be given by 
0 10 1W V Vπ π∂ ∂ ∂∂Θ ∂Θ ∂Θ= +  (43) 
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where we can interpret the probabilities as fractions of households not owning and 
owning a car. Since for households being at the border between having and not having a 
car we have 0 1V V= , the change in the probability of car ownership at the margin does 
not change the overall welfare. Hence the change in probabilities does not enter the 
expression above. 
3. Tax reform analysis 
In this section we examine how social welfare changes when the government implements 
a tax reform reducing the purchase tax on cars while increasing the variable tax on the 
use of cars in a revenue neutral manner.  
3.1 Helpful derivations 
Using (19), (29), and (43) we know that 
1 1 1M c
c
W
t Zπ λ∂∂ = −  (44) 
1 1 1T c
c
W
L Zπ λ∂∂ = −  (45) 
1 1MW
P π λ∂∂ = −  (46) 
The marginal welfare effects (44) and (45) resemble the results from Parry & Bento 
(2001) except for the probability weighting included here. Note that the effect of the fixed 
fee derived in (46) is identical to the effect of a lump-sum transfer in the Parry and Bento 
paper (again except for the probability weighting here). This is a consequence of P  only 
having an income effect on the intensive margin for car owners.  
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3.2 Feedback effects 
It will be useful to know how the demand for car transport changes as a function of the 
fixed fee. Since we have externalities in the model, we expect feedback effects to be 
present both on the intensive margin and on the extensive margin in the demand for 
private transport.  
 
Evaluating the change in demand when the fixed fee changes and the revenue is recycled 
through ct  we find by using (36) that 
m m m1 11 1 1 1 1 1( ' ) ( ' )c
c cc c c c c
c c c c
c
dt d Z Z Z dt Z d Z
t L t LP d P d P P d P d P
d Z
d P L Z L
π π π π∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂= + + + + +  (47) 
which by manipulation gives 
m 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(1 '( )) (1 '( ))
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
c c c
c c
Z Z Z
L Z L Z
c c c c c c cZ Z dt dt Z Z dtc c c c cP P d P P d P P d Pt t t t
c cZ Z
c c c cL L L L
d Z
d P
π π π
π π
π π π π
π π
+ + + + + +
− + − +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= =  (48) 
The numerator captures the effect of the change in the fixed fee had there been no 
externalities present in the model, since there is a direct response to the increase in P  and 
a response from the revenue recycling given by m
c c
c
Z dt
t d P
∂
∂ . With externalities present a 
feedback effect is also present which is captured by the denominator. By assumption 
' 0L > , and since we expect private transport to be a normal good, the increase in cL  will 
cause the generalized price to increase. We therefore have that 1 0ccZL
∂
∂ <  and 
1 0cL
π∂
∂ <  thus 
making the denominator exceeds 1. Since we normally also expect ''' LZL
∂
∂=  to be larger 
than zero, the feedback effect becomes larger when the congestion externality increases. 
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Furthermore, we see that the size of the feedback effect is determined by both the change 
on the intensive margin, 1ccZL
∂
∂  , and the change on the extensive margin, 
1
cL
π∂
∂ .  
3.3 Shifting from fixed to variable tax on cars 
We now examine the effect of changing the fixed tax, P , on the purchase of cars and 
financing this by raising the variable tax, ct , on the use of cars. The welfare effect is 
given by 
'c cc cdW W W dt W dZt Ld P P d P d PL
∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂∂= + +  (49) 
The first term on the right hand side is the direct effect on welfare from the change in P . 
The second term captures the revenue recycling effect that works through ct . The last 
term captures the welfare effect of the change in the level of congestion. 
 
To find cdtd P , we now differentiate the government budget constraint (42) with regard to 
P . Using 0dRd P =  since we consider a budget neutral reform, we get 
l m m110 c c w
c wcd dt d Z d L
d P d P d P d PP Z t t
π π= + + + +  (50) 
which by manipulation gives 
m m
l
11
c w
c
P t t
Z
c wd d Z d Lc d P d P d Pdt
d P
ππ + + += −  (51) 
Substituting this together with (44), (45), and (46) into (49) gives 
m m
l
m11 1 1 1 1
1
'c wc
P t tM M c T c
Z
c wd d Z d L c
d P d P d PdW d Z
d P d PZ Z L
ππλ λ λ+ + += − + −  (52) 
Using the definition given in (36) together with (48) we can rewrite (52) as 
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m m 1 1
1 1
( ) ( )1 1
(1 '( ))
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1( ) '
c
c
ZM c
L Z
c cdt dtc Z Z cc w T t tP d P P d Pc w c c
M cZ
c cL L
t tdW d d Z d LP
d P d P d P d P Z L
π
π
π π
π
π λ
π π π λλ
+ + +
− +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
= + + −  (53) 
which simplifies to  
m
m m
m
l1
1 '
1 1
1( [ { }{ ' }])
c cZM
w c
L
c c dtZ Z cw TtP d Pc
c MZ
cL
dW d d L
d P d P d PP t Z L t
π λ
λλ
+
−
∂ ∂∂∂
∂
∂
= + + − −  (54) 
Taking a closer look at this expression, we see that several effects affect the outcome of 
the proposed tax reform. The first term, 1dd P P
π , captures revenue effects coming from 
changes in the number of car owners. This effect is new compared to previous models 
since they do not capture the changes on the extensive margin. The expression in square 
brackets is structurally identical to formula 10 in Parry & Bento (2001). It is comprised of 
two terms. The first term, mw
wd L
d Pt , captures revenue effects coming from changes in labor 
market participation, since changes in labor supply will change the tax revenue collected 
from labor taxes. The second term in the square bracket is a bit more complex. The first 
part captures changes in the demand for car transport including both tax interaction 
effects (the second term in the numerator) and feedback effects (the denominator). We 
see that the feedback effect can be decomposed into a feedback effect from the intensive 
margin, 11' cc LL Z
π∂
∂ , and a feedback effect from the extensive margin, 
11' c
cZ
LL π∂∂ . This last 
term is new compared to previous models since they only model intensive responces. The 
second part of this term describes the difference between the marginal external cost of 
transport, l11 '
cT
M Z Lλλ , and the variable tax on transport, ct . The marginal external cost of 
transport includes an expression for the value of time savings for car owners, 11
T
M
λ
λ , which 
we discussed in (12) and (13). Multiplying the value of time savings with the marginal 
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time lost due to congestion, l 'cZ L , gives the marginal cost of the externalities. The sign of 
this last parenthesis depends on the level at which ct  is set. If it is above the marginal 
social cost, the term is negative, and if it is set below marginal cost it is positive. In the 
special Pigouvian case where the tax on transport is equal to the marginal external costs 
we see that this term cancels out. Assuming that Pigouvian marginal cost pricing is 
implemented by letting l11 '
c
c
T
Mt Z Lλλ=  we end up with a welfare effect given by 
m1 1( )M w
wdW d d L
d P d P d PP t
πλ= +  (55) 
which only includes revenue effects. That only revenue effects are relevant in this case is 
intuitive since the externalities from the congestion are internalized through ct . 
4. Numerical example 
In this section we use simulation to illustrate how the welfare effects could change when 
a tax reform shifting taxes from fixed fees to variable taxes is implemented. To illustrate 
this, we make some assumptions concerning the functional form of the utility function.  
 
To keep things simple we specify the two parts of the utility function given in (1) as the 
CES functions 
1 1
1( , ) ( )L ZU L Z L Z
σσ σσ σ σβ β− − −= +  (56) 
1 1
1( , ) ( ( ) ( ) )b c
T T T
T T Tb c b c
Z Z
u Z Z Z Z
σ σ σ
σ σ σβ β− − −= +  (57) 
where σ  is the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption and where Tσ  
is the elasticity of substitution between the two transport modes. Lβ , Zβ , bZβ  and cZβ  
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are share parameters. We also need to specify how the total level of car travel affects the 
time required for car transport. Letting cfreeL  denote the free-flow time requirement for a 
trip by car and C the denote the road capacity, we choose one of the most commonly used 
speed-flow travel time functions 
4( ) (1 0.15( ) )c cfree ZCL Z L= +  (58) 
which was derived in Bureau of Public Roads (1964) and also used in Parry and Bento 
(2002)51. Furthermore, the two types of households face the budget constraints given by 
(4) and (5), and finally the government faces the constraint given by (42).  
4.1 The benchmark case and calibration 
The model split in the year 2000 between transport by car and other types of transport is 
shown in table 1. One problem with our model is that we do not allow non-car owners to 
commute by car but as we can see in table 1 around 9.7 % of the commuting trips done 
by non-car owners are by car. One explanation for this could be that people not owning a 
car have borrowed one or they share a ride with someone owning a car. In the calibration 
we assume that all commuting trips by non-car owners are done by public transport. For 
households having a car available around 63% of the commuting trips is done by car. 
From the Danish Transport Diary Survey we also know that the fraction of households 
now having access to a car in 2000 is approximately 21 % with 79 % having access to at 
least one car.  
 
 
                                                 
51 A discussion of speed-flow functions can be found in Small (1992) chapter 3. 
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 Car owners Non-car owners Total 
Use other transport 37.3 % 90.3 % 45.5 % 
Use private transport 62.7 % 9.7 % 54.5 % 
Table 1: Modal split on commuting trips (Source: Danish Transport Diary Survey). 
 
Referring to (IRIS (1993)) and (Pollet (2000)) it is argued in De Borger and Van Dender 
(2003) that in Belgium around 67% of commuting trips are done by car. We see that for 
Denmark around 55 % of commuting trips is done by car (according to the Danish 
Transport Diary Survey). One possible explanation for this could be the 180% marginal 
tax on car purchase prices in Denmark and the fact that the car ownership ratio in 
Denmark is one of the lowest in EU (Dargay et al. (2006)).  
 
 
In our benchmark scenario the modal split can be seen in table 2. The fraction of 
households owning a car (measured by the choice probabilities) is given by 68.5% and 
the fraction of households without car is 31.5%. In our model fewer households thus 
owns a car than the Danish Transport Diary shows. We assume this since we want the 
total modal split between car and other types of transport (our metro service) to be 
comparable. Initially we have a model split as shown in table 2. Here 24% of car owners 
use some other modes of transport than car on commuting trips and households not 
owning a car only goes by other modes (e.g. metro). The total modal split is comparable 
to the modal split in table 1 with 56.6% of commuting trips done by car and 43.4% of 
commuting trips done by some other mode. 
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 Car owners Non-car owners Total 
Use other transport 24.0% 100.0% 43.4% 
Use private transport 76.0% 0.0% 56.6% 
Table 2: Modal split on commuting trips in base scenario. 
 
The model is calibrated so that in the benchmark case the car ownership elasticity with 
regards to fixed cost of purchasing a car is -0.20 which is numerically higher than the 
estimates from Dargay (2001) where a long term elasticity of -0.11 is found52. Fosgerau 
et al. (2004) estimate a short term elasticity of -0.19 and a long term elasticity of -0.48 for 
Denmark. With the high tax on cars in Denmark we would expect the elasticity to be 
numerically higher in Denmark than in the UK which is also confirmed by the findings in 
Fosgerau et al. (2004). The car ownership elasticity with regards to variable transport cost 
(i.e. fuel price) is our benchmark case -0.19 which is numerically higher than those found 
in Dargay (2002) where the long run fuel cost elasticities is found to be between     -0.14 
and -0.06. Fosgerau et al. (2004) again reports values for Denmark which are numerically 
higher than those reported by Dargay. They find a short term elasticity of      -0.22 and a 
long term elasticity of -0.55 with regards to user cost. The car transport elasticity with 
regards to the fuel price in our baseline scenario is -0.17 which is in line with the fuel 
price elasticity of -0.14 found in Nielsen (2006c) and Dargay (2004) find a long run fuel 
cost elasticity for car travel to be between -0.18 and -0.10. Fosgerau et al. (2004) find the 
short term elasticity with regards to running costs of car use to be -0.30 and a long term 
elasticity to be -0.37. The car transport elasticity with regards to car purchase cost is in 
                                                 
52 In Dargays paper the elasticity depend on the number of cars per household. The elasticity of -0.09 
applies when the number of cars per household is 1.2. If the number of cars is 1.0 the elascitity is found to 
be -0.11 and if the number of cars per household is 1.5 the elasticity is -0.07.  
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our model -0.08. This is numerically much lower than the findings in Nielsen (2006c) 
where a long run elasticity of -1.13 is found for the entire country. Dargay (2004) find 
long run elasticities between -0.62 and -0.43 which is closer to our value than the finding 
in Nielsen (2006c). Since the values from Dargay (2004) and the value of -1.13 in 
Nielsen (2006c) is found on a national level it is interesting that Nielsen (2006c) also 
examines rural and urban households separately. He finds an insignificant effect of the 
car purchase price on the travel demand in urban areas. This finding would call for a very 
low elasticity to apply for these and we can thus se our model as being calibrated to fit a 
situation in for example Copenhagen where a metro is also present. The labor supply 
elasticity is chosen to be 0.5 which is in line with the reported values in Fuchs et al. 
(1998). 
 
In the situation where no congestion exists we have specified the speed-flow function 
(58) such that the use of public transport takes 50% longer than transport by car. In the 
basic scenario congestion exist and the use of public transport only takes 20% longer than 
car transport. Furthermore we have specified the tax system so that a very high tax exists 
on the purchase of cars (in our model 180%) and a fairly high tax exists on the use of cars 
(in our model 100%). Furthermore car owners supply approximately 7.8 hours of work 
per day and those who do not own a car supply approximately 5.9 hours of work per day 
with an average working day of 7.2 hours in the economy. With an official working week 
of 37 hours the average working time for Denmark is 7.4 hours and since we do expect 
car owners to work more than those households who do not own a car, we find our model 
to be well specified with regards to the time allocation. Using (12) and (25) to derive the 
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value of time for car owners and non-car owners we find that 0VoT  is approximately 
equal to 48% of the gross wage and 1VoT  is approximately equal to 64% of the gross 
wage. Expecting the value of time to be close to the after-tax wage rate we find these 
values to be reasonable since the tax on labor in the model is 50% and since we expect 
car owners to have a higher value of time than people not owning a car.  
4.3 Shifting from fixed to variable taxes on cars 
Labeling our base scenario as SC0 we now analyze two tax reforms (SC1 and SC2) 
involving a reduction of the fixed tax on the purchase of cars in a budget-neutral way.  
The first reform (SC1) reduces the tax on the purchase of cars from 180% to 170% 
financing it by increasing the tax on the use of cars. The second reform (SC2) reduces the 
taxation of cars to 100% again financing it by increasing the tax on the use of cars. The 
modal split before and after the reforms can be found in table 3. 
 SC0 SC1 SC2 
Car owners (% of population) 
Use private transport (car) 
Use public transport (metro) 
Non-car owners (% of population) 
Use other transport 
Use private transport 
Total modal split 
Use private transport (car) 
Use public transport (metro) 
68.5 %
76.0 %
24.0 %
31.5 %
100.0 %
0.0 %
56.6 %
43.4 %
68.6 % 
75.8 % 
24.2 % 
31.4 % 
100.0 % 
0.0 % 
 
56.5 % 
43.5 % 
68.8%
74.2%
25.8 %
31.2%
100.0 %
0.0 %
55.3%
44.7%
Table 3: Modal split before and after the tax reforms 
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We see that more households purchase a car which is expected since the purchase price 
goes down. We also see that the modal split shifts away from the use of cars to other 
modes. If the elasticity was higher in the model we could end up in a situation where both 
the number of car owners and the use of cars increase thus reversing the effect on the 
modal split.  The tax reforms also affect other parts of the economy. The changes in the 
tax system, the change in labor supply, and the change in welfare is shown in table 4.  
 
 SC1 SC2 
Taxes 
Change in car purchase tax (relative to SC0) 
Change in tax on car use (relative to SC0) 
Effect on travel time by car (relative to SC0) 
Effect on the labor supply 
For non-car owners (relative to SC0) 
For car owners (relative to SC0) 
Total effect on labor supply (relative to SC0) 
The welfare effect (relative to SC0) 
 
-5.56% 
7.20% 
-0.40% 
 
0.00% 
-0.10% 
-0.07% 
0.005% 
-44.44%
59.20%
-2.40%
0.00%
-0.85%
-0.58%
0.034%
Table 4: Changes in the tax system, travel time by car, and labor supply. 
 
What we see from table 4 is that the reforms reduce the travel time by car. Furthermore 
the effect on labor supply is interesting since our model shows that implementing a tax 
reform like the one proposed here will reduce labor supply. This finding is in line with 
results found elsewhere since increased taxation of commuting reduce the value of 
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working and thus discourage the supply of labor. Had the model not incorporated the 
discrete nature of car ownership decision the conclusion could have been that the 
reduction in labor supply would be closer to 0.85% but since we have households who 
change car-ownership status and thus starts supplying more labor since car owners work 
more., the reduction in labor supply could have been higher. 
 
We also see that the tax reform actually improves welfare. It is however not clear if 
welfare will continue to increase if the fixed tax is reduced even further. In order to 
examine this we simulate a series of reforms which gradually reduce the fixed tax from 
180% to 20%. The change in welfare when the taxes changes are shown in figure 1, 
figure 2. In the figures the full line comes from the model and we also show best fit of a 
high degree polynomial approximation to these results.  
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Figure 1: Change in welfare at different levels of the fixed tax relative to the welfare 
when the tax is 180%.  
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Figure 2: Change in welfare when the tax on car transport is increased relative to the tax 
in SC0. 
 
Figure 1 shows that as the tax on purchase of cars decrease the welfare increase to a point 
around 70% at which point we can see in figure 2 that the variable tax have increased 
with around 85% (to approximately 190% in our model). One could speculate if this 
external damage cost in this point is below, above or exactly equal to the tax rate 
imposed. To examine this we specify the model in such a way that the variable tax is 
given by l11 '
c
c
T
Mt Z Lλλ= , keeping the budget balanced, and adjusting the fixed tax 
accordingly. By doing so we find that a variable tax of 199% is internalizing the 
externalities and the resulting fixed tax will be set equal to 50%. Using the model to 
examine how welfare changes around this ‘pigouvian point’ we conclude that the 
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implementation of pigouvian taxation is the optimal choice if a tax reform which shifts 
taxes from purchase of cars to use of cars are to be implemented.  
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Figure 3: Change in some key parameters relative to SC0 when the fixed tax is reduced. 
 
The effect of such reform on other key variables can be seen in table 3. As in figure 1 we 
depict the effect of the reduced purchase tax. We see that if we reduce this to 50% (the 
pigouvian case) the labor supply will fall by approximately 1% and the travel time on car 
trips will be reduced with around 4.5%. The number of car trips falls with approximately 
5%.  
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper shows that the decision on the extensive margin (e.g., of car ownership), is an 
important element in welfare evaluation of tax reforms in the transport sector. Omission 
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of decisions on the extensive margin could therefore be critical. Using a simple model for 
household decisions, taxation, and discrete choice, we show how the feedback effect as 
well as the welfare effect depends on the ownership decision and on the interaction with 
the labor supply decision. We illustrated the effects in a small numerical model showing 
that if we choose to implement a balanced budget tax reform which shifts taxes from car 
ownership (or purchase) to car use it is optimal to implement pigouvian taxation. 
 
Several extensions to this model can be envisioned. Including only commuting is not 
satisfactory and leisure trips ought to be included. This extension could possibly be 
implemented following the ideas of De Borger and Van Dender (2003). One could also 
wish for more than two types of transport with different levels of fixed taxes to be 
allowed for. This extension is straight forward to implement in the discrete setup 
presented here and it would probably not influence the theoretical results. The simulation 
used here should also be improved by calibrating it toward a specific city with 
specifically obtained parameters and tailor made speed-flow functions for different types 
of transport. Interaction between different transport modes could also be wished for since 
congestion on the streets affects the travel time by bus but probably still leaves a metro 
system unaffected. All these shortcomings will be left for future research and we still 
believe that the findings of this paper will benefit future modeling of transport tax 
reforms. 
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